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MODERN CIVILIZATION
ON TRIAL

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DEMOCRACY: ITS DEFECTS AND ADVANTAGES

GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY

INDUSTRY AND CIVILIZATION

PRINCIPLES OF REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE PHILOSOPHY OF LABOUR

A SHORT HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL
INTERCOURSE

MODERN CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL

by

C. DELISLE BURNS

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P R E F A C E

MODERN civilization has been so roundly condemned by some and so unintelligently praised by others that it may be more useful to analyse its characteristics than to estimate its value. In this book modern civilization is taken to mean the whole complex of social customs, beliefs, and emotional attitudes, which make the people of New York, London, Paris, and Berlin to-day different from those of Tientsin or Timbuctoo, and different also from what Western peoples were even twenty years ago. Modernity, then, is taken to mean not merely industrialism but its latest phases. Thus the motor-car, the cinema, and the radio are more significant for the argument here than the railway or cotton clothing, not only because the West has adopted them more recently, but also because the whole world is being directly affected by them at the same time. Modernity is world-wide; but is it a form of civilization?

The issue is not fundamentally political nor economic. It is cultural in the sense which recognizes that new mechanisms are having effects upon personality and upon the relations between persons. A cultural problem is involved, for example, in the use of the radio by the Chinese or in the French peasant's visits to the cinema. And the same kind of problem is involved in modern medicine and modern drama; for a new world of ideas and expressions of feeling is in existence. The theory of relativity is as significant of that new world as is the cinema. But these are signs of civilization; and these, too, are world-wide.

Modern civilization is part of a continuous process. It is unfinished. Therefore the time has not come for an estimate of its value; but the analysis of the situation, attempted in this book, is intended as a basis for action, both in public

policy and in personal life. The summary treatment of certain aspects of contemporary custom is intended to emphasize the better elements in modernity, not only because so many adverse criticisms have been due to ignorance of the facts, but also because these better elements are the only possible grounds for policy. Only on the achieved good, however inadequate, can the good of the future be built. The argument, therefore, runs in this way. A recent change in habits, largely due to recent inventions, has changed the social situation in most countries, and also changed the relations between all countries. Modern civilization, for example, requires a greater supply of tropical products; and therefore the modern world is remodelling its policy with regard to primitive peoples. Secondly, the most recent effects of industrialism have led in Asia to a revolt against European domination, combined with an effort to secure independent modernization of Asia itself. A third contact between different stages of civilization is to be seen in the influence of North America upon Europe. But these changes in the relations between peoples reveal the need for an analysis of the changes within the Western tradition, which has been the source of world-wide modernization.

Dictatorship is a method of modernizing mediæval Europe: but modern government in industrialized Europe adopts new functions, for example in health and education, allows spontaneous vitality to new political groupings, and, in spite of some co-operation across frontiers, has not yet abolished the absurdity of preparations for wars of "defence." Meantime industrial production has changed its character; and standardization of taste has equalized the distribution of advantages derived from new discoveries. Education uses new methods; and recent advances in the sciences and the arts promise a new type of social life, more adventurous and more willingly shared by all those who claim to be civilized.

The assistance for which thanks are due is acknowledged in the course of the several chapters; but a special note of thanks is due to my friends J. A. Hobson, A. J. Toynbee, W. F. Crittall, and Victor Lefebure, whose comments have greatly helped to give the material its form.

C. DELISLE BURNS

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MODERN CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL

CHAPTER I

MODERNITY

MEN act and think and feel together. The pattern of each man's life is set within a social system, as the pattern of the leaf has its place in the form of the tree; and the pattern and the system vary from age to age. A distinctive pattern of life is now to be seen in North America and in Western Europe. This is Modern Civilization. Its most obvious characteristic is a new transport-system of motor-cars and aeroplanes. But not less important is the rapid mechanization of production and the standardization of taste; and even these characteristics are less fundamental than the new methods in education and government, which express a change of attitude towards life and the world. Modern Civilization in its latest phase has existed for only about twenty years. The time has not yet come to cast the account—to set against standardization of taste, for example, the much more widespread power to indulge any taste that happens to exist. But by some such balancing of good and evil, we may make an estimate of modernity. The terms of our calculation must be sufficiently inclusive to allow for a comparison not only of the instruments, but also of the uses to which they are put. The motor-car may be compared with the horse-cart; but sometimes the instruments have changed without affecting any change in the men who use them. The old farmer has transferred himself from the horse-cart to the motor-car; but he is still the same old bag of prejudices and local habits. The terms of the com-

parison between what is modern and what is not, must therefore include mental attitudes and customs; and they must also have reference to the distinction between the latest music and Beethoven's, for modern civilization is not, as its Eastern critics and domestic opponents seem to imagine, entirely confined to new mechanisms and their uses. Modern science and modern works of fine art make up one whole social experience with aeroplanes and radio and cinemas.

The analysis of the characteristics of modern civilization will be based upon the assumption that it is somehow better to see more and to hear more, to be more effectually protected against cold and disease and to live longer. This assumption underlies the effort by which barbarians first discovered civilization. Stone implements gave place to bronze and bronze to iron; the sword and the hand-plough gave place to the rifle and the tractor; and now the radio and the aeroplane are being tried. But the new instruments are less important than the desires which went to produce them and the incidental effects of success in learning to use them; for every step forward in the use of tools has brought a wider area of experience under the control of each man and has established a closer integration of all men. This is not, however, the place for history. It is enough to note that modern civilization is one stage in a development—a stage no less, perhaps more, transitory than the neolithic. Every civilization, which is usually conceived as a product, is itself a process; and the characteristics of the process may be analysed, as one may state the “law” of a series without knowing its next number.

Existing types of civilized life differ in two ways. They may have different racial or climatic origins; or they may be at different stages of development. Thus the European type of civilization is divided from the Chinese: and within the European type there are subdivisions, the British, the French,

and the rest. No amount of development among the Chinese is likely to turn them into Europeans; and within European civilization, the French do not become less French when they begin to use motor-cars instead of horse-carts. Racial, climatic, or national differences are therefore important; but there is another still more important distinction, for each race or nation has a history, and the existing races of the world are at different stages in the development of their own histories.

As it now stands, modern civilization is undeniably "Western," because it has arisen in certain geographical or racial centres in Europe. Western is our name for it probably because our forefathers were conscious of an Eastern world, but of nothing at the opposite point of the compass. In any case, the meaning of the word "Western" is no longer geographical; for the Eastern shore of the Pacific looks westward to what we call "the East," and the Islamic west in Morocco is "the East" for Italians. The West, therefore, means the European tradition; and that tradition is racially composite. In its present form the civilization called "Western" is generally conceived to include the manners and customs of Northern Italy as well as those of Scandinavia and Scotland; and both Americas are European in their mixture of blood and their collection of languages, habits, and traditions.

Some seem to believe that there are important differences within the racial complex generally called "Western," by which the Nordic can distinguish himself from the merely Mediterranean man. But these differences are irrelevant for the present purpose. Marconi may be either Nordic or Mediterranean: Einstein is Semitic; but they both use motor-cars and a mathematical calculus, and probably neither of them understands Chinese acting or Javanese dancing. The West is a unit of social experience.

How it came to be the sort of unit it now is, may be ex-

plained by reference to Greece and Rome and the Middle Ages in Europe; or the unity may be believed to have its roots deeper down still in linguistic affinities. But omit the discussion of origins. Consider men as they are. Monkeys may be useful guides for the understanding of men; but probably the present difference between a textile operative and a lady of fashion is more important for a knowledge of human behaviour, although neither of these is quite so easy to make theories about as the chimpanzee, which cannot correct the professor's account of him. If we hope to understand civilization, therefore, it is best to consider civilized men and women. But a review of ladies of fashion and textile operatives, of motor mechanics and mathematicians, indicates that the geographical and racial aspects of modern life—those aspects in which it is "Western," are not the most important. A candid account of the daily habits of our contemporaries in all the different parts of the world will show some differences in the manners and customs of civilization which are not biological but psychological. That is to say, types of civilized life are distinguishable, not merely in reference to geographical or racial differences, but in reference to the *stage* of development which each type has reached. An individual American, for example, differs from a Chinaman, not merely because of the colour of his skin or the shape of his eyes, but also because the American uses power machines and the Chinaman hand-tools. In that difference is a distinction of two types of social experience. And the American of to-day differs in the same way, not merely from the contemporary Chinaman, but also from his own grandfather. The "mental age" of the society to which he belongs is more advanced; for as the "mental age" of a man is not to be calculated by reference to the length of time his body has been growing, so a civilization may have a "mental age" not calculated by the date or the place of its

birth. From that point of view, modern civilization is "older" than the Chinese or the Indian, because it is the latest stage of an experience which has already passed through a greater number of radical changes. India used cotton-goods long before Europe did; but Europe has now invented artificial silk. China used horses long before Greece did; but the modernized West has now discarded the horse for the motor-car. What we call modern civilization, therefore, is the latest phase of a movement which had quite distinct and different phases in mediæval Europe, in the Renaissance, and in the nineteenth century. The psychological stages in a man's life are arbitrarily distinguished. But there is no doubt that adolescence is distinct from childhood. It does not matter at what date one began and the other ended. So also with the ages of history: where one began and the other ended may be difficult to decide; but it is quite clear that one is distinct from the other.

"Mental age" is a psychological fact which distinguishes contemporaries. The steps by which any mind has become more fully developed are irrelevant: the point is that two men born at the same date may differ mentally in the range of their perceptions or the speed of their reactions. And this same sort of difference can be made the basis of a distinction between the types of social life which now exist. It is enough to use three labels. There is the *primitive*, now to be seen most clearly in tropical Africa, the *mediæval*, in China and India, and the *modern*, in most of Europe and in North America. This last type of civilization here called modern is Western in origin; but its most important characteristic is that it has followed upon a social experience which has already passed through the other two stages.

All three types of civilization are in close contact to-day. Some peoples live at one stage and some at another; but they

all trade together. Primitive civilization in the tropics provides modern civilization in Europe and America with rubber for its motor-cars; and mediæval civilization in China and India uses the cotton-goods and the cinemas produced by modern industry. But each type of civilization remains distinguishable, not only with respect to the mechanisms it uses, but also with respect to its dominant beliefs and customs. Beliefs and customs lie deeper down than clothes or film-drama; and they tend to survive longer than external habits. Thus "pockets" of the primitive or the mediæval may be found in the midst of the modern world; and indeed sometimes two stages of civilization, in mental outlook, are separated only by the length of the street. It may be that in the same apartment-house the first floor is mediæval and the sixth modern, except for the incidental effects of the elevator; for the habits of men, in the "set" to which they belong, constitute the stage of civilization in which they live. Caliban is to be seen in Piccadilly. His primitive eyes look out under the rim of a silk hat. It may not, therefore, be necessary to go to Africa to study the primitive, nor to China to study mediævalism. As a complete whole, however, in its mechanisms as well as in its mental outlook and habits, each type of civilization may be distinguished geographically.

THE PRIMITIVE

In tropical areas where the primitive is dominant, rituals control all important episodes in life, whether personal or social. Both adolescence and the harvest are regarded as crises, through which certain rites provide safe passage. What we call individual thinking or action hardly exists; but there is a very keen social sense or group-perceptiveness. The consciousness of dependence upon nature is more continuous than with us moderns, who are sometimes reminded by death

and birth that we are not such very fine fellows after all, but are usually unconscious of the vaster non-human forces. In a primitive society death and disease reduce energy; and they are always present facts. Fear and the social uses of fear are well known. Primitive peoples are by no means children: they are men and women, with our desires and our hopes, but without our knowledge and the ability which is available for our use. The shelters they have made for themselves by respect for tradition, by close contact with earth and the dead, and by carefully preserved institutions, may be destroyed by the impact of other types of civilization; but we have no right to despise them.

THE MEDIÆVAL

A second type of contemporary social life is mediæval. It is to be found dominant in China and India, in Northern Africa and in Southern Europe: but clearly it is also to be found in "pockets" left by the receding tide, in the midst of the modern world of Northern Europe and the Americas. To call the ways of life in certain countries to-day "mediæval" may be misleading. Those ways of life are in general survivals; and a survival is never identical with a living society. The word "mediæval" so used, then, does not imply any condemnation of Europe in the fourteenth century. European mediævalism in the fourteenth century must have differed essentially from the survival of that type of life in certain parts of the world to-day: for that Europe produced the modern world and the peculiarity of surviving mediævalism is that it has not developed. But with all due concessions to history, contemporary mediævalism, as the mental age of a social system, may be understood to be of this kind. First, the external forms of mediævalism include the simplest form of house, either in small agricultural settlements or in small cities, set in fields,

dominated chiefly by craftsmen and merchants. It is a society in which the "diseases of poverty" and of ignorance are common and very destructive: for example, lack of adequate food in certain countries to-day causes skin-diseases as distressing as leprosy was in mediæval Europe. Incompetence or bad housing makes cripples. Plague and hookworm and bilharzia are in China and India and Egypt to-day. There is a great waste of energy in manufacture and transport. Social stability is secured by the inertia which is due to the lack of interchange of ideas between distant parts; but society is rendered stable most of all by the significant characteristic of all mediæval societies—authoritarianism. A clergy or a learned caste or a sacred book is regarded as the repository of truth: and the chief exercise of intelligence is commentary. A "dead" language is usually the medium of education; painting, music, and drama are rituals; and the best men look backwards.

Naturally in such a society the older forms of what we still call "religion" are operative everywhere. In Southern Italy, for example, in 1927 the village folk took out the relics of a saint in order to stop a flow of lava from a volcano. In China they pound scorpions to make "medicine"; and the cure of disease is sought from wise-looking old men who learnt a secret art from their grandfathers. The sense of a world too vast and too powerful for human power to control it, oppresses such efforts as men might otherwise make to discover what, within that world, they *can* control. The authoritarianism of a caste society is reinforced by the fatalism of small-scale agricultural production; for men who depend upon the seasons or the rains, which they cannot control, tend to acquiesce in the social institutions which they could control, if they thought they could. The farmer knows that he cannot stop the rain: he therefore tends to suppose that he cannot change the government. He regards taxation as a plague sent

by heaven or the devil, and poverty and war as "human nature, which cannot change."

That mediæval world has produced very great art; and it preserves a social consciousness of interdependence within small groups such as cities or river valleys. Its defects, as in the case of primitive society, are due to lack of knowledge and organizing ability; and although its main effort is directed to preserving the hopes of men and the little knowledge already acquired against the return of the tide of barbarism, it is always at work curing its own defects with the limited means at its disposal. There is nothing despicable in mediæval civilization, even if there is much that is regrettable.

THE MODERN

Modern civilization, which is the third great type of social life to-day, dominates Western Europe and North America, and is extending the area of its influence daily. The first phase of modernity was reached in industrialized Europe and America about 1860; and this first phase still survives in Glasgow and London, in St. Etienne and Lyons, and in the decaying textile districts of New England. At that stage machines are gods; "output" is the sacred ritual; and profits the share of the sacrifice, accruing to the priests. The gospel is in the textbooks of the economists: or perhaps it is not a gospel, but a Talmud. In Kinglake's *Eothen* the Pasha showed that he understood the nineteenth century; for he said it was "Whirr, whirr—all by wheels. Whizz, whizz—all by steam." The universe itself was believed, by those who travelled on clumsy railways or tall bicycles, to be a machine.

There was a spirit in the body of this mechanized life. It was blind and complacent; but after all, it was still in the womb. It was the modern world, not yet quite born. The mechanical stage in civilization continued the division of men

into upper and lower classes, with appropriate distinctions of dress and food and in the hours for feeding. It replaced old authorities by new authorities, without perceiving that thereby all authority was undermined. It extended the franchise to more male property-owners, who called themselves "the people" and called their peculiar ability in looking after their own interests "democracy." It extended education by torturing young children with the three R's. And in that age of progress men really believed in themselves! They also enforced upon the primitive and the mediæval, in Africa and Asia, a despotism—benevolent, but not without pecuniary advantages for the democratic despots. There was painting—on rich men's walls and in mausoleums called picture galleries: there was music—at expensive concerts. There was poetry which soothed those who could not succeed in business or in politics. And there was religion, formal among those in power and pathetically limited among the powerless.

But as in earlier development, the first stage in modernity is by no means despicable. Preventive medicine and large-scale public organization began to extend the expectation of life and to increase men's vitality between birth and death. More food and clothing became available; and the farthest peoples began to be aware that they belonged to the same world. In the mechanical age, however, men did not know how far they had gone because what was only a beginning was thought by them to be the end of a process. The theory of evolution and the belief in progress gave them much satisfaction, because they thought themselves the results of the labour of the universe—not seeing that they, too, would soon be discarded in a further development. They hardly thought out the assumptions and implications of their own success in the application of science to common services, and they were strangely unconscious of their impercipience in the arts.

Most men believed that progress consisted chiefly in doing more quickly or more often what had been done before, a belief surviving now hardly even in America. And so the Western world, in its first step out of mediævalism, continued to support substitutes for it, even when the power-machines and the science and the history were being established, which inevitably displace that ancient structure of custom.

THE LATEST PHASE

The process of change from mediævalism has now reached a new stage, which is recognizably modern; for the simpler mechanical age of the nineteenth century has been taken up into a new movement. Contemporary Modernity has these external signs—the motor-car, the aeroplane, the cinema, and the radio. But there are also some changes of custom which indicate the existence of a new kind of life among common folk—the use of tinned food, for example, and of electricity for household services. The social effects of all these are not yet realized. The motor-car has brought common folk into closer, more continuous, and more varied contact, since Mrs. Smith who lives in the village can make her purchases in Town, and—more important still, can escape the eye of her neighbour, Mrs. Jones. The younger generation assumes that one goes to the local “pictures,” even if one lives in what is still called the country. Again, the talkies and the already old-fashioned “movies” bring men and women together in new ways and make them aware of classes in society or strange nations, hitherto unknown to them. The radio also assimilates the minds of men and extends their interest and intelligence. The agricultural labourer, the textile operative, the banker, and the leisured lady all “cut off” the same lecture and all listen to what is not intended to improve them. The units of thinking and feeling made up of many men and

called mind-groups, are much larger in the modern world than they were even in the mechanical age of fifty years ago. In Europe men listen to music provided by foreigners against whom they are preparing to defend themselves in war. In America the radio promotes the will to believe in advertisement.

But modernity has also some external signs which were to be found in the first step towards the modern—the mechanical age. Social customs are dominated by the habits and outlook of large city-areas. There is nothing comparable in the mediæval world to the areas we call London, New York, Paris, and Berlin. Not merely are those populations numerous, but the country-side is alien to their minds. The street is the setting of life—and not the street to live in but the street to pass through. Neighbours are hardly known. Occupations are diversified. Again, in the modern world the factory dominates the outlook of the majority, by contrast with the domestic workroom of an earlier age. Psychologically it makes a great difference to spend most of waking life in large rooms with machinery, more powerful and more lofty than the human body. Size affects the imagination. The old hand-tool was subordinate: the power-machine is dominant. Again, the worker in a factory or mill or mine lives with great numbers, sometimes in close proximity at work, who are like him or her in their dress, speech, occupation, and prospects. Hence comes a practical sense of co-operation on a large scale, unknown in domestic industry.

Add together as psychological influences—the city-area, the power-machine and the group co-operating; and there is a complete contrast with the circumstances of mediæval, agricultural, small-scale life. Clearly the city-area and the factory are man-made: not so the land and the rain. The modern man, therefore, has a sense of human power over the

circumstances in which he lives. He is no longer acquiescent. He sees that institutions, too, may be man-made. He speaks of "the machinery of government"—implying a conception which would be unintelligible to Plato and Aristotle. And again, the modern man is aware that individually he is weak, as compared, for example, with a locomotive or a textile-loom; but socially he feels strong. He has the sense that by co-operation of equals the control of non-human forces or material nature is possible. To minds so formed not merely the acquiescence of the agriculturist but the naïve individualism of the domestic worker in a mediæval world is altogether alien. What was new a century ago has now become the assumed background for the majority of men in the modern world. The background of 1830 was still mediæval. The mechanical world has now been taken up into a new form of social life in which its discoveries have become commonplaces.

Again, the goods and services available, the raw material with which factory-workers operate, the markets they supply, and the entertainments available for common folk in modern circumstances—all these come from distant lands. The majority of men are not conscious of the economic and political structure upon which the supply of cotton or of cinemas may depend; but they are at least aware of a varied and far distant world. Men know that great numbers follow different religions than their own, that vast populations live in climates diverse from their own. Indeed, it is almost impossible for anyone in the modern world to understand the simplicity and smallness of the world in which the mediæval mind still operates. The imaginative background for modern life is the whole human race, inhabiting a subordinate planet in a subordinate system of a universe without limits either physical or intellectual.

The external signs of modernity, motor-cars and radio-

sets, imply an elaborate science always improving the conditions of life not by the accidental discoveries of practical men, as in the first industrial revolution, but by the planned co-operation of skilled thinkers. We are engaged upon prospecting the Future; but we have also gone deeper into the Past, for Egypt and Ur are as well known now as Greece was a century ago. And we have not only lengthened the expectation of life in modernized countries by about fourteen years within the past fifty years: but we have discovered the causes and are organizing the defeat of the diseases which until now have delayed development outside the industrial world. It is hardly possible now to believe that the inhabitants of warmer climates are inert, because it is warm. Insects and not the sun destroyed ancient Greece, and still spread disease in Africa and Asia. As for intellectual and emotional activities, modernity is not concerned with such ancient controversies as the nineteenth century found necessary. Scientific thinking is now taking its own hypotheses to pieces, to see how they work; and what seems at first to be fantastic speculation is soon practically applied. The criticism of traditional moral standards bubbles up out of new habits. The new materials made available by applied science, steel and concrete and rubber composites, compel new forms of art; and the modern mind—larger, stronger, more active than that of the mechanical age, is by no means so complacent.

CRITICISM OF MODERNITY

Certain defects in the type of civilization called modern are generally acknowledged, whether those defects are inherited by it from earlier civilizations or are inherent in the new system. War and poverty survive in the midst of the social habits and beliefs which now dominate the Western world; but both war and poverty are old. There may be, however,

some other defects which seem to be directly due to the new situation. Even if it be granted that modern knowledge has decreased the diseases of poverty and established a world-wide interdependence which may be a basis for peace, these gains have been accompanied by some loss. As against the increase of vitality may be set the charge that modern society does not know how to use its vitality for the creation of finer personalities and subtler social contacts. The lower levels of life in an older civilization have been raised; but have not the higher levels been lowered? The mediæval world has its cathedrals and mosques: has the modern world, however excellent its newest architecture, anything to show which expresses as great a social idealism in the use of architecture?

Again, it may be good to feel one's power and to dare to make experiments; but is it good to waste such power, for example, in rushing from one insignificant town to another along a featureless road? It may be possible to make clothes more quickly; but the design of the clothes used in the modern world is either traditional or it is bad.

As for the closer contact between peoples, one at least of the results is that the more highly organized nations seize the new opportunities for exploiting distant and weaker peoples; and the preparations for a future war against neighbouring peoples have been so modernized as to threaten a greater disaster than any hitherto possible. Indeed, if in the surviving mediævalism of the Asiatic world some men are still practising the ancient custom of warfare as a means of livelihood, it is the modern world that is supplying them with weapons. This modern world, then, having solved some old problems, has left some still untouched and has created others. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to argue that we have a new alphabet and cannot spell.

There are indeed some untenable judgments upon modern-

ity, pontifically announced. It seems to be believed among some representatives of an older civilization that modern civilization has reached its greatest possible development; and a quasi-biological law has been invented to show that the modern world is in a decline. An analogy is supposed to prove that Western peoples are now where the Egyptians or the Romans were when their civilizations dissolved. The biological metaphors and analogies which have been used are most misleading. But the refutation of the whole conception of decline is perhaps most clearly seen in the *pace* at which change is now occurring. Rapid change in social customs has always been a sign of growth, not of decay: when change is slow or stops in institutions or in customs, then the dissolution of a civilization begins, because the new generation is cramped by an established fixity. It was fixity, not change, that destroyed Egypt and Rome. And again, the general unrest in the modern world and the discomfort at what are said to be signs of decay are themselves signs of life. A dying man does not so clearly feel himself to be dying. But finally, the complaint against modernity as unrestful, superficial, or dissolute comes from the cultured few who have been trained in the traditional standards and who live by maintaining those standards. What is in a decline is not the modern world, but traditional criticism. The sense of decline is in those who stay away from cinemas and jazz-dances, not in those who enjoy them. Jeremiads are commentaries by professors, upon a text they cannot read. But it is not important to decide whether or not the modern world is in a decline. Gibbon made the Roman world decline and fall for eight centuries. Even by analogy we have another five hundred years to die in. We have time yet. The most interesting problem is what we are to do next week.

The modern world is an unfinished structure. In the every-

day life of common folk, the use of motor-cars and radio sets, not to mention newspapers and tinned food, makes up one whole with the distrust of traditional authorities, the domination of relativity in science and strange forms of art. Modern habits and the modern outlook cannot be taken apart. Some of the new habits may belong to a permanent structure of social custom, not yet completely created; some may be only scaffolding, or less important still—only the apparatus for removing the old buildings. But the whole, made up of all these new elements, must provide for daily needs. Business has to be carried on, pending alterations. The rain comes while the old roof is being removed, before the new structure is ready; and some complain against the change, forgetting the leaks in the old roof. But carrying on the business, as well as planning the new structure, demands imagination; and the strongest imagination is needed to see the facts.

CHAPTER II

A NEW INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

THE cinema-theatres are full, not only in Glasgow and Chicago, but also in Singapore and Tokio. African natives are riding bicycles on forest paths, where lions can still chase them. The agricultural labourer, hundreds of miles from a railway in Eastern Europe or in Western Asia, listens to jazz-music on the radio. In countries already mechanized twenty years ago, new mechanisms extend the power already acquired. It is possible now to take breakfast in London, lunch in Paris, and dinner in Rome on the same day.

All this has come within the last twenty years; and it has come everywhere in the world. A bare record of changes in certain countries will indicate the new influences upon social custom and the dominant mental attitude. In Great Britain, for example, in 1908 it was regarded as wonderful that an aeroplane had flown a mile in the air. Hardly twenty years after, during the year 1927, British aircraft alone flew 2,489 times between Great Britain and the Continent, carrying about 28,750 passengers without mishap. As for motor-cars, in 1910 there were about 114,000 registered in Great Britain and in 1929 there were 2,163,076. Up to 1914 about 800 public motor-coaches were in use; and the number hardly increased during the war. In 1929 there were 95,798. In 1910 the cinema had only just become a "business proposition"; but in 1930 there were about 4,000 cinema-theatres in Great Britain and the amount invested in the trade in Great Britain was more than £80,000,000. As for radio, the general public hardly knew of it until about 1920. In 1925 there were about

1,500,000 radio-set licences issued in Great Britain; and five years after, in 1930, there were over 3,000,000.

Changes of social habits can be noted in the same period, by comparing the consumption of tea and beer. In 1900 the consumption of beer in the United Kingdom was about 31 gallons per head of population; in 1927 it was about 15 gallons. As for tea, the consumption per head of population was about 6 lb. in 1900; and it was about 9 lb. in 1927. Tea is a tropical product; and most of the beer consumed is brewed in Great Britain. Therefore the change of consumption in Great Britain has not only increased the dependence of Great Britain upon other countries, but has directly affected workers in the tropics. The total amount of tea imported in 1913 was valued at about £13,000,000; and the amount imported in 1927 was valued at about £41,580,000, not including, in 1927, imports into the Irish Free State, but rendered in a lower value of the pound sterling. Somebody abroad has more money from services rendered to Great Britain. Again, the consumption of fruit has greatly increased, especially among the wage-earners. In 1913 the oranges imported were valued at £2,348,000: and in 1927 at £8,543,000. The changed character of consumption among wage-earners is partly a result of education and higher wage-rates in certain sections: and it is itself a cause of new health and a new outlook on life.

In the United States, within twenty years, the importance of the automobile has immensely increased; for in 1910 there was one to every 265 persons and in 1928 one to every six. Passenger cars in 1920 numbered about 9,000,000 and in 1928 21,000,000. But that is an old story. Since 1910 the aeroplane has come, and in 1930 there were 20,000 miles of aeroplane routes regularly travelled. This is the beginning of a new and closer unity between distant parts of the nation.

The radio apparatus produced in 1914 was valued at \$800,000, and in 1925 it was valued at \$177,000,000. Receiving-sets in use in 1922 numbered 60,000; and in 1928 about 7,500,000. The results upon the minds of adults and children include a change in the power of newspapers, a transformation of country life, and a much more widespread acquaintance with foreign countries. The motion-picture, as the official statistics call the new form of dramatic art, now entertains about 120,000,000 spectators a week, that is a number almost as large as the whole population of the United States. The available seats in the picture-theatres number about 18,500,000; and 350,000 persons are employed in the trade. Again, the motion-picture became a "business proposition" just before the Great European War; and therefore Europe was unable to develop the new industry, thus leaving it, in its earliest form to the United States. A large income is still derived by the United States from its sale of films abroad.

Household consumption has changed its character since 1913, as in 1913 only about 3,000,000 residences had electric light and in 1928 about 17,000,000. Residence telephones on the Bell system in 1913 numbered about 2,800,000; and in 1928 about 8,333,000. But these are merely carrying forward changes begun long ago. In foodstuffs the change has been recent and like that in Great Britain: less is consumed and a greater variety. Cereals and meat are decreasing in popularity; and sugar and fruits are increasing. Much less and much lighter clothing is worn. Indeed "there is probably some reduction in characteristic body weights," which has reduced both clothing and food requirements.¹ But all this involves change in mental outlook, social custom, and current operative beliefs.

On the European Continent the most rapid changes have

¹ *Recent Economic Changes, 1929, "Consumption,"* by I. eo Wolman.

taken place recently in Germany. In spite of a disastrous war and a still more disastrous peace, following upon defeat, the transformation of custom and belief within the past ten years has been remarkable. In the newest mechanisms Germany has progressed more rapidly than any other non-English speaking country. The cinema-theatres, which number about 7,000 in German-speaking districts as compared with about 5,000 in French-speaking countries, and the excellent German films have led to increased export as well as increased attendance, whereas, by contrast, there was a 30 per cent. decrease of attendance at cinemas in 1928 in France, because of bad films.¹ In aeroplane flights, Germany increased from about 6,000,000 kilometres in 1926 to about 11,000,000 in 1928: the time of the journey from Moscow to Berlin has been reduced from 45 hours by rail to 15 hours by aeroplane. Quite apart therefore, from the result of a political revolution in 1918, the social habits of Germany are changed by new mechanisms, and the relation of Germany to neighbouring peoples is transformed.

France is still largely pre-industrial and agricultural, for more than half of her diminishing population is still employed upon small-scale, non-mechanized farming. But France, too, is changing rapidly. In 1913 the number of motor-cars was one for every 400 inhabitants, and in 1930 it was one for every 40. The motor-bus has come into French villages; and it now takes the French agriculturist to town-shops and town-cinemas. The immediate result is more expenditure: the thrift of the French peasantry, which was the basis of foreign investment by French banks, was the result not of a peculiar virtue, but of a lack of opportunities for spending. The motor-bus and the cinema are changing the proportion of saving and spending in France; and they will transform

¹ *International Review of Educational Cinema*, February 1930.

French foreign investment and therefore French diplomacy. Security may have a new meaning when securities are less important.

Across half the world to India the same force spreads. In 1913 the number of motor-cars imported was 2,000 and in 1925 it was 12,000. Motor-omnibuses, vans, and lorries imported increased by 124 per cent. between 1925 and 1926. This means that Indians in villages are coming into contact with the towns; and the growth of the cinema audiences has begun to alarm those who do not enjoy such things. In the 1921 official Report on India, films are not mentioned, but in the 1927 Report it is said that "India's peoples are regularly witnessing films, practically every one of which depicts manners, scenes, customs, and characters utterly alien from their own."¹ The motor-bus and the cinema are doing more to destroy acquiescence in the old regime among Indians than any speeches by politicians. Mediævalism is undermined by movies.

In Japan the cinemas in 1928 had an attendance of 136,000,000, the total population of Japan being about 60,000,000. In 1922, about 90 per cent. of the films exhibited were imported, but in 1928 about 85 per cent. were manufactured in Japan.

In China illiterates number still about 90 per cent. of the population; but the Nanking Government in 1930 issued its news and its views over the radio, through loud-speakers; and the unification of China thereby takes on a new meaning, not because of political theories, but because common folk can listen to the radio. China has been exporting more tobacco to the West, since women over here took to smoking; and so the exchange goes forward, transforming both parties to it.

As for Africa, a lecturer once remarked to his audience

¹ *Report*, 1926-7, p. 100.

that the people of a certain district were still savages, and one of the audience replied that he had heard gramophones playing in most of the huts in that district. But in order to buy gramophones the Africans must supply Europeans with more oil-seeds for soap and more rubber for motor-cars, thereby changing the character of local production. Primitive life is no longer what it was, in spite of the efforts of anthropologists to maintain preserves for their studies.

The last twenty years have thus introduced fundamental changes in daily habits and in mental outlook among most of the peoples of the world, and a general view of the whole movement may now be attempted. A new "industrial" revolution is occurring. As contrasted with what happened in a few Western countries a century ago, the new revolution is, first, a revolution in consumption or enjoyment rather than in production. A century ago what is called the industrial revolution meant only that old types of product were made in greater quantities. Now, not merely are the old cotton-goods of mediæval India copied in Manchester, but artificial silk and gramophones and radio-sets supply needs never even conceived a generation ago. We have passed from process-invention into product-invention. The revolution of to-day is, therefore, mainly a change in the ways in which men enjoy life. Its organization is a problem of the "market"—but not the old market or the existing market, for the most significant aspect of the problem is the possibility of creating new markets.

Secondly, this new revolution is world-wide in the sense that it is occurring simultaneously among all peoples. A century ago the industrial revolution was a hole-and-corner affair, in Great Britain first and in corners of Europe and North America. But the social effects of the new industrial revolution are to be seen not merely in London, New York, and Paris, but also in Tokio and Singapore, and even in the

backwoods of Africa. Contemporary industrialization has changed not merely standards of life and local customs, but also the relations between peoples in every corner of the world. Not only the same goods but also the same methods of producing them are available for all peoples: and therefore the peoples of the world are ceasing to be distinguished as industrial and agricultural, primitive, mediæval, or modern. All must be modern, or none can be.

The latest phase in civilization is obviously an immediate effect of the process which began in the early nineteenth century in Western Europe and North America. This process had two important aspects—(1) the use of natural forces to displace “man-power” and (2) the making of machines, to take the place of tools. Steam and electricity and oil were discovered to be more powerful than muscle—even the muscle of animals. But these new forces could use vast instruments—not hand-chisels, but shafts and wheels bigger than men’s bodies, devised by the minds of men. And of all the results upon men of this new mechanical age, the increase in wealth was the least important.

This older industrial revolution came into a world in which the majority were already enslaved and impoverished; but it did not relieve the slaves, nor enrich the poor. Its first result was an enslavement to machinery, a dehumanizing of occupations, an accumulation of wealth in a few hands, and the impoverishment of the manual workers. The “cost” of this industrial revolution must not be reckoned only in terms of the inhabitants of industrialized countries. The mill-workers of Great Britain indeed suffered; but so did the hand-workers of India and Turkey and China and Africa, who were deprived of their occupations by the new cheap products which the West sold outside Europe. Reform, however, was undertaken. It forestalled revolt—not merely

the revolt of the victims in European and American society, but the revolt of the victims of commercial Imperialism outside the Western world. At the close of the nineteenth century an advance had been made in social organization; and there was an increase in the well-being of the majority. Protective legislation lifted some burdens from the workers: financial policy stabilized speculation: a new "colonial" policy softened the rigours of Western domination: and education of a kind was extended among the so-called "lower" classes. But all that is already ancient history. The first industrial revolution—the mechanization of productive power and all its results—was coming to an end, with the exhaustion of complacency at the close of the nineteenth century.

At the beginning of the twentieth century a new movement had begun which greatly accelerated production, increased the variety of goods and services available, and gave political, if not yet economic, influence to manual workers and to women. New methods were adopted in education; and, in the arts, radical departures from tradition were noticeable in Western countries. But, as it was a century ago, the new movement came into a world dominated by ideas and habits relevant only to the past. Evils as old as the oldest recorded history were put to the debit side of the account against modern civilization. Poverty and war were obvious; and the cures proposed, charity and mutual defence, were applicable only to an obsolete state of society, while the fundamental issues, underlying politics and business, were being transformed. Common folk had no sooner attained influence in public affairs than they were told by those whom they did not elect as leaders that they had no ability to exercise choice. The younger generation, having been given an untried liberty, were told that they misused it. Cinemas were condemned as un-Shakespearian or un-Ibsenish. And in the

increasing unemployment caused by a shrinkage of old markets and an improvement in productive processes, the only effectual policy seemed to be for each Government to restrict the markets still further by tariffs, in the effort to capture the remnant of a home-market for its own subjects. In despair of being able to understand other peoples, each people increased its preparations for future war. The old ideas survived the transformation of the customs out of which they arose. The new industrial revolution did not bring new governing ideals with it; but the transformation of the bases of human society in the whole world continued, beneath the surface waves of politics and business.

FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL CHANGES

The fundamental factors in this "modern" world indeed may be such as lie too deep down to attract attention. For example, there is a change among all industrialized peoples in the proportion of children to adults; but it is difficult to say how important such a change may be. The facts are undeniable. The net birth-rate in the United States dropped from 10·6 per thousand in 1922 to 9 per thousand in 1927; in Australia, in the same period, from 14·2 to 12·2 per thousand. In England the average rate of growth in the population from 1904 to 1907 was 11·6 per thousand; and the average from 1922 to 1927 was 4·3. In Germany in the same period the drop was from 14 to 6·3; and in Sweden from 11 to 3·4.¹ In England and Wales "the number of children under 15 years of age in 1921 was much the same as in 1891, though the total population had increased by nearly 10,000,000 during these thirty years."² A similar situation exists in all industrialized countries, although the death-rate

¹ Loveday: "Quo Vadimus?" in *Britain and World Trade*, 1931.

² Carr-Saunders and Jones: *Social Structure of England and Wales*, 1927.

of children in precisely those countries has decreased. Fewer children are born as industrialization spreads; and industrialisation has not yet reached most of India, China, or Africa. The proportion of children to adults at any future period probably will be quite different from what it has been hitherto in all human history.

Some social results of this are obvious. Clearly if there are fewer children under 15, there will be less demand for primary foodstuffs and primary clothing. That is to say, fewer agricultural products in the simplest form will be required, for adults will buy "luxuries" when their own needs are met and there will be a smaller market for wool and wheat. Secondly, there will be fewer of the population depending upon each family income; and therefore more of the family income may be spent upon what used to be called luxuries. New kinds of food and clothing will be required. Thirdly, there will be very much less nervous strain upon women in households; and it must be remembered that at least sixty out of every hundred women in the world are household managers. Fourthly, more will be available for such children as exist; and therefore, if opportunities are wisely used, the new generation will be very much more intelligent and active than in earlier times. Fewer dependents in any country, more money available for luxuries, and more energy for spending the money—all these mean more people in the cinemas, more markets for "gadgets," and more dancing and singing. Dull preachers of traditional duty will have smaller audiences; and "business" men will complain that the public is unreliable in its tastes; men and women who buy luxuries rather than necessities will change their ways of buying more often and more quickly; and the market in any one kind of luxury product may suddenly at any moment disappear. Women at any moment may cease to wear hats.

Besides, there will possibly be fewer people about. Of the actual increase of the population of the world as a whole it is difficult to speak with any accuracy: but specialists in this matter seem to believe that the rapid increase of population during the nineteenth century was in any case abnormal and will be followed by stabilization or decrease of numbers. The expectation of life in non-modern countries is still very short: and if in China or India the diseases of mediævalism are overcome, a greater number may survive; and a larger population will therefore exist during the next ten years. But it seems that we cannot, with our present knowledge, expect men to live more than about eighty years; and when the expectation of life is "modernized" in the whole world, the birth-rate and the no longer rising age of survival will stabilize the situation, and the increase in the numbers alive at any moment will probably be stopped. Men in all countries will then live in a quieter and more stable, but not less active nor less exciting society. However, no one can now foresee in detail what that situation will be; it is enough for the present argument that we are at the beginning of an unknown development in the relation between the nations and in the dependence of men upon nature. Malthus is out of date. New pessimists are already writing about the pressure of overstocked granaries upon a diminished population.

The mere stabilizing of the number of people alive at any moment, combined with the increased efficiency of productive processes and transport, means that the whole world is actually richer, per head of population, than ever before. That does not imply the abolition of poverty; for distribution is still traditional; and it may become more, and not less, unequal. That implies a problem of policy. The plain facts are that there is already much more to be distributed in goods and services and that there are, or soon will be, fewer people to

use them. But the richer the world becomes, the less men will spend on necessities, the more they will spend upon what they can, at any moment, cease to buy. Therefore the character of the markets in the next twenty years will change more rapidly than ever before. The fashion for radio-sets may suddenly subside; new tastes may suddenly arise. It will be unwise, therefore, to "tie up" capital in productive machinery for any one type of product: and the nations or groups whose capital is not already fixed in the traditional machinery of production will have an advantage, as a man has an advantage who can wire his house for electricity without having to sacrifice the money he spent upon gas-piping.

Again, in non-essentials the number of possible consumers depends, not upon biologically calculable needs, but on advertisement, on the latest fiction, on new religions, or upon a new hobby. Therefore each manufacturer will have to look for alternative markets outside the circle he supplies at any moment. He will naturally look outside the frontiers of his own State, and therefore exports of new products will tend to increase. Such are the results of a change in the number of people living at any moment.

A SOCIAL REVOLUTION

Concurrently with recent changes in the state of the population in modernized countries, there have been revolutions in social custom—partly due to education, partly to new forms of mechanization. Education in this sense includes more than schooling. Experience of the possibility of influencing government has "educated" many peoples since the war—especially in Europe. Very few in Russia before the war knew that they could change the Tsar for a substitute: very few in Austria or Germany knew how flexible "the State" was, even with a backbone of civil servants. Newspapers—

not only by text, but by pictures—have opened men's eyes. And within the past twenty years the radio has brought music, new entertainments, and strange ideas into villages and farms and into corners of city life hitherto insulated. But above all, the new transport-system—the road life of motor-cars—has begun a revolution. The social effects of the motor-car will be analysed more closely in a later chapter: here it is enough to note that the motor-bus is delivering the villagers from local censors and local boredom; and the cheapest private car is establishing new relations between the sexes. Both sexual conventions and social castes are affected by motor traction. When a man or a woman driver can escape out of range of local gossip and caste-acquaintances, there is no telling what may happen; for most traditional morality depends upon the control over the individual by the little local group to whom he is personally known. The impersonal atmosphere of the city-area destroyed village-morality in the nineteenth century: the life of the road may now create a new morality of nomads. But that is not altogether bad. On the road there is equality of status, individual self-reliance, and welcome for chance acquaintance.

New forms of food have become available for the majority in the industrialized countries within the past twenty years. Tinned meat and fish and, above all, fruit and cereals, have diminished the amount of domestic cooking in North America and industrial Europe, and therefore freed women from some hours of labour. Variety of foods available—more fruit, for example—has diminished the quantity of meat and cereals hitherto used and probably improved the health of “manual” workers, who are the vast majority in all countries. Besides, women who do not cook or wash the family clothes and men who do not use so much energy in digesting lumps of bread and fat tend to think and act in new ways. New materials

for clothing, such as artificial silk and brighter dyes and new fashions, such as the lighter clothing of women, have made the body freer in movement and the senses keener. Economists do not notice such effects. But freer bodies and keener senses involve less acquiescent minds; and the new generation, therefore, is not likely to be so easily satisfied with the old conditions of work or the old rooms to live in. That has "economic" effects upon the market and upon the system of production, which may confuse both business men and politicians.

In the modern methods of production, everyone knows that processes have become much more efficient. In many industries, such as shipbuilding, engineering, or textile-production, the same amount as in 1913 can now be produced with only 60 per cent. of the labour then required. The 40 per cent. of workers no longer required for the old amount of production in many countries is now standing idle, because the markets have not expanded to take up the new productive power: and as more stand idle the market shrinks still faster, for unemployed men and women have less purchasing powers. But omitting consideration of the unemployed, the workers still employed are in mills and factories of new types. Carrying and lifting of weights is less common: the delicacy and intricacy of machinery is greater: lighting is better and the speed of work is increasing. There are many more places for women in production and other paid services. New kinds of occupation exist, such as typewriting, motor-repairing, machine-driving, and machine-tending. The whole level, therefore, of the intelligence and adaptability required in the making of goods and the rendering of service is much higher. Indeed, it is hardly any longer possible, if it ever was, to distinguish "manual" labour from brainwork.

In agricultural production the whole situation is being

transformed by the disappearance of the horse and the coming of agricultural machinery. In the United States in 1917 there were 60,000 tractors manufactured, some for export: and in 1928 there were 850,000 on farms in the United States and 57,865 exported. In 1929 the exports of tractors to Russia numbered 12,245 and of combined harvesters 435. To Argentine, in 1929, 8,956 tractors and 6,214 combined harvesters were exported from the United States. This involves not only greater production in all these countries, but also a surplus of feeding-stuffs for the fewer animals now required; and a change will follow in the mentality hitherto characteristic of agricultural life. The new industrial revolution affects areas, therefore, hardly touched by the industrialization of a century ago.

Another great change which has recently occurred in the Western world is the reduction of the amount of heavy manual labour owing to the introduction of new power-supply and new increase of transport. This implies a reduction of the number of men of great physical weight and strength; and, therefore, in general, a larger proportion of the more delicately adjusted type of man and woman. But this again leads to changes in the food and clothing required—which also affects agriculture. The primary traditional foodstuffs had to supply heat and wastage in hard labour. Beer and beef and wheat may have been useful industrially in pre-modern days; but now they are less useful and in fact less required. The consumption of beer, for example, has greatly decreased in Great Britain—not only because of high prices and unemployment, but also because there is a new type of manual labour. Similarly, in clothing, heavily built bodies can carry great weights of wool. Tradition counts for almost everything in clothing; but a slighter type of body tends to adopt lighter forms of clothing—again affecting the demand for agricul-

tural products and the proportion of income spent upon what used to be called luxuries. The change in women's dress alone—in the dress, that is to say, not of ladies of fashion, but of millions of factory girls—implies a social transformation; and it is a sign not only of better education and new tastes, but of the needs arising from new occupations. The typist, the machine-tender, the driver of a motor-car, cannot conveniently wear shawls and veils and long skirts.

NEW RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLES

Perhaps, however, the most startling aspect of contemporary industrialism is that it is world-wide. That is to say, the same new tastes and the same new types of occupation are being established in Africa and in Asia as in Europe and America; and not only so, but the sections of population in each continent, which are called "nations," are setting up at the same time the new processes of production and transport and the new ways of life. That is to say, Russia and Rumania, as well as the United States and Great Britain, are establishing large-scale production and the new forms of enjoyment in cinemas and radio-sets. By contrast with this simultaneous change in all countries, a century ago industrialization occurred in Great Britain almost fifty years before it occurred in France or Germany; and the new habits of life were possible in Europe for almost a generation before they became known to Asiatic or African peoples. The change in the situation is to be seen in the export of capital. New industries are set up and new enjoyments made available in new countries by the increased export of capital from the countries industrialized in the earlier period. Thus motor-manufacturing in many different countries is now directed by the owners of the same accumulations of capital.

Both in ways of enjoyment, therefore, and in methods of

gaining a livelihood, Japan and China are more like Europe than they were, and Czechoslovakia is more like France than it was. This has two important effects. Social habits tend to become similar in many distant countries. A motor-car in Japan or Kenya has the same sort of social effect as in America. The same screen-drama becomes intelligible to diverse peoples. But this destroys the situation on which the nineteenth century depended, in which one part of the world differed fundamentally in social outlook from another. When men in China and men in Europe used the horse in the same way, they were on a level: when men used the railway in Europe and in China men still used the horse, the levels on which they lived were so different as to make mutual understanding difficult. But when both use the motor-car, the level is again the same; and it is a higher level for both, because each can do more and their contacts are closer. Modernization, therefore, tends to assimilate the basic habits of diverse peoples.

Again, the new system tends to destroy social caste in all countries. The lord in his coach might throw pence to the pedestrian; but the motor-bus is not so far inferior to the high-powered private car. In the motor-bus the "lady" sits beside the girl from the cigarette-factory; and their dresses become similar. The city clerk travels with the motor mechanic. Even in India it is difficult for factory-workers to maintain caste segregation. The range of movement is great for all classes; and all depend upon mechanisms. Again, in order to serve the lord, it was necessary to groom his horse. Now most of the occupations of a mechanized world are impersonal in the service they render: and they require keenness of intelligence and quickness rather than strength of muscle. Straker in Shaw's *Man and Superman* is much superior to Sam Weller in the *Pickwick Papers*. And the engineer mechanic lives in a mental world unknown to the maharajah or the mandarin,

the feudal lord or the priest. In a mechanized modernity he may even have the advantage.

Localism and caste are survivals which are being undermined by new habits: and yet the dominant ideas controlling public policy in most countries are survivals of localism and caste. It has been said above that all must be modern or none can be. But in practice each is trying to be modern at the cost of the others. Each nation wants cinemas and motors; but its business men and politicians seem to aim at obstructing the use of other nations' cinemas and motors. Politicians and business men are therefore attempting to modernize the old village pump; the majority still believe in the old pump; and an antiquated history and an obsolete sentimentalism are decorating it. But what we need is a new water-supply. The trouble is that the village pump cannot do the job.

Similarly, with regard to social caste, although modern life is equalizing men, each new group which seizes advantage, apes the exclusiveness of the "superiors" it has dethroned. In France there is an ardent discussion of *la chasse démocratique*—"the democratic shoot." In the old days the local lord preserved the local birds for his pleasure-shooting. But now that "democracy" can shoot, there are no birds left. It is not yet understood that pleasures available in an obsolete state of society are no longer available. Modernity has undermined the banquetting-hall as well as the keep of the castle; but the Englishman's house is still said to be his castle—although a castle is a bad sort of house. Caste in the peculiar form of snobbery and flunkeyism survives longer in some countries than in others: but it is doomed everywhere.

Solemn talk about the younger generation has always occurred. The aged shake their hoary heads outside the talkie-palaces. And the modernization of the world goes on—so

fast that the critics are left behind, condemning what is already obsolete. It remains possible to look more closely at what is occurring in each country and to discover guiding principles, or at least to attempt the discovery. The first necessity is to see that the new industrial revolution has changed the relations between the peoples of the world.

MODERN CIVILIZATION AND PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

THE soap and the rubber which modern life needs do not drop from heaven. Most of the material we use is by no means "raw" material. A table or chair may have been in its former life a tree; but its shape has been given to it by forcing into the wood some human brain and muscle. Thus blood and bone, which make the spirit of common folk, go into the "goods" which we use; and the men that are hidden in the chairs and the tables and the walls of our rooms are never known to those whom they have served. It is difficult enough to have a sense of the carpenter, whose skill made the chair you sit upon, although he may have spoken your language and used the coin you spend. But it is many times more difficult to have a sense of the African or the Malayan, whose blood and bone is in the soap we use or in the rubber of the tyres on the motor-bus or the private car. And yet the modern world depends upon the labour of these primitive peoples.

Suppose the soap, dissolving, revealed the men who had made it available, standing as ghosts to receive thanks due for their service. Suppose the tyre exploded into Africans and Malayans, telling unintelligibly to the Western world the story of their labours in the collecting of rubber. Would a world of such ghostly revelation be less "real" than the surface of things which we use unwittingly? Is not that labour real which has gone to make available the materials of modern industry and to establish the bases of civilized life?

But as industrialization proceeds, the needs of the modern world press more heavily upon the peoples of tropical areas.

More motor-cars and more soap require more rubber and oil-seeds; and therefore more labour of men, women, and children in tropical Africa and Asia and America. As our standard of life improves, our dependence upon them becomes greater; and it might be argued that the advantages they derive from the civilization which their labour maintains should also be greater. But are the modernized peoples of the world even aware of the incidental effects of what they derive from tropical peoples? The wage-earners of Europe and America may themselves exploit primitive peoples by using the materials necessary for industrial production; and the advantage of modern transport for European villagers and American farm-workers may be purchased at the price of enslavement in distant countries among peoples who have no voice in the government under which they live.

The areas inhabited by primitive folk who provide our raw materials are in general colonial. That is to say, they are under the jurisdiction of one or other European nation. The direct responsibility therefore is divided. The British are morally responsible for the system maintained in Nigeria and Kenya; the people of the United States for the system maintained in Porto Rico and similar territories. The French are morally responsible for what is done in French West Africa, the French Congo, Madagascar, and Cochin-China. Similar responsibility lies with the Belgians and Portuguese in parts of Africa and with the Dutch in the East Indies. That direct moral responsibility for the maintenance of a system, necessary to the modern world, is the fundamental problem in colonial government. But there is also an indirect responsibility shared by all industrialized peoples, who use the products of these colonial territories: for many peoples who have no colonies under their jurisdiction use rubber and oil-seeds which are obtained partly at least because of the system of

government maintained in tropical areas. The fate of primitive peoples, therefore, is a responsibility of the whole modern world.

Rubber and cotton and oil-seeds may have in them a "free spirit" expressed in the free labour of primitive folk; but a century ago most tropical products were obviously slave-products. It is now too often conveniently forgotten that the forced labour, by which some minerals and some agricultural products are still obtained in tropical Africa and in parts of the Americas, is slavery in all but name. And yet modern civilization is economically dependent upon the maintenance of supplies, for which either the old or some new system must provide. The character of the labour used in tropical areas is, therefore, formed by the pressure of modernization among European peoples, who consciously or unconsciously maintain the system so useful to their progress.

The existing systems of economic organization and government among primitive peoples are not new. They are indeed the results of the mentality of the nineteenth century in European countries; and they are only just beginning to be modernized. It will be useful, then, first to review the methods now actually in use and afterwards to discuss what changes of method are being introduced. The purpose is not to teach colonial administrators their duty. It is only to assess for the benefit of modernized peoples the cost to primitive folk of the services which are necessary for us. Presumably it may be assumed that the cost should not be disastrous to them; and perhaps it may be argued that the services they perform should lead to some direct share for them in the advantages which accrue to us from our control of their fate.

Economic policy in tropical areas is now dominated by the desire for export of raw materials and foodstuffs from those areas to industrial centres. Many such areas have been used

quite frankly as "estates" for European advantage. In one very striking instance, the Dutch in Java, eighty years ago, were extracting vast quantities of foodstuffs for Europe from their territories. By direct pressure the Government increased the plantation of export goods; and the growth of foodstuffs for the population of Java was restricted. The result was a great famine, in which a third of a million people died in lands of great fertility with a numerous and active population.¹ That evil policy has been abandoned; and the Dutch in the Indies have recently made great advances in colonial government. But this old policy, for the extraction of the products needed by the West, continues in many parts of Africa. Europe and North America still press upon tropical areas, in which the peoples are turned from the production of foodstuffs for themselves in order to labour for raw material to be exported. The result may not be actual starvation; but in many cases it involves a delay in the development of the human vitality in these areas. Some wealth, no doubt, is gained by the natives in those areas in exchange for the raw materials exported; but probably a more generally distributed well-being would accrue to the natives of tropical areas, if less of their energies were devoted directly to our service. In any case, Europe and North America obviously impose great burdens upon these peoples.

CONCESSIONS

The most drastic method of meeting our needs is that of "concessions."² The exploitation of the resources of the Congo, as organized under King Leopold, seems to have ceased, after having reduced a population of about 12,000,000

¹ Clive Day: *Policy of the Dutch in Java*, 1904, p. 315.

² For the earlier history of these methods, see my *International Politics*, 1920, Chapter IV, "Undeveloped Countries"; and Parker T. Moon: *Imperialism and World Politics*, 1927.

to 8,000,000 in twenty years, for the supply of rubber to European civilization. But concessions still cover the Portuguese and French colonial territories. That is to say, companies of European capital-owners pay agents in tropical areas to collect raw material for industry from primitive tribes. The company pays good dividends derived from the sale of its products; and the shareholders ask no questions about the way in which the products come into their possession for sale. But the primitive peoples, deserting their villages, flee into the bush or stay and feel their race dying under the pressure of civilized industry.

In 1899 the appetite for rubber led to the formation of forty companies in Paris, to which areas in the French Congo, greater in extent than the whole area of France, were granted as concessions. This meant the complete control—so far as any control at all was possible—in those areas given to agents who extracted rubber for sale in Europe by the most brutal compulsion of the natives. A judgment of the French court at Libreville in 1901 says “the rubber belongs to the concessionaire companies and not to the native who gathers it. The latter, in bringing produce to the company, does not sell that produce, because he does not own it, but receives a bonus or salary as a remuneration for his services.”¹ The results were described in a Report of 1909: “The Congo natives live in a regrettable situation. The concessionaire companies make them labour for a trifle, using threats and violence to secure their services; and the Government without rendering a single service, crushes them with taxes and forced labour. Instead of being drawn to the Europeans, as they used to be, they are suspicious and flee from them as far as possible. The routes used by Europeans are almost denuded of villages, whereas formerly the natives used to cluster

¹ Quoted in S. H. Roberts, *French Colonial Policy*, I, p. 351.

there. Regions described by the first explorers as inhabited and fertile have become deserts.”¹ Cruelty, starvation, and conscript labour caused rapid depopulation. Some of the companies failed to maintain their dividends; and reforms were introduced between 1910 and 1923. A decree of 1930 appears to bring an end to the granting of concessions by the French Government. Nothing, however, makes amends for the change in the numbers of the population from 4,950,000 in 1911 to 2,821,980 in 1921. Such are the “casualties” in the modernization of European industry suffered by primitive folk. And besides, the evil pressure upon the natives still continues. In 1927 M. André Gide travelled in the French Congo; and he has described what he saw. “We passed a great number of porters. Then, escorted by guards armed with five-thonged whips, a line of fifteen women and two men, tied by the necks with the same rope. One of the women carries an infant at her breast. These are ‘hostages,’ taken from the village of Dangolo, where the guards had gone to demand forty porters by order of the administration. All the men, seeing them coming, had fled to the bush.”² But in spite of such pressure “the trade of French Equatorial Africa in 1925 was only half of what it was before the war.” The death-rate is so great that, as a French doctor declared in 1920, unless the Government increases the food production and furnishes medical assistance, “the disappearance of these native races is only a question of time.”³ Similarly another Frenchman writes that “the native has lost all force of reaction against causes of loss which he cannot analyse.”⁴

Similar methods used for the supply of tropical products to the markets of the Western world are still used in the

¹ Challaye: *Le Congo français*, quoted by S. H. Roberts, *id.*, p. 353.

² André Gide: *Voyage au Congo*, p. 141.

³ Georgelin: *Notes médicales*, quoted in Buell, *Native Problem*, II, p. 228.

⁴ Buell, *id. ibid.*

Portuguese areas in Africa and in the hinterland of Liberia. And the results are everywhere the same—not merely a gradual decrease in the supply of tropical products, but a destruction of the native labour upon which this supply depends.

As an additional pressure, besides that arising from the desire for profits in trade, the natives in French territories have had to bear compulsory military service;¹ and during the past ten years this burden has been increased, owing to the decrease in the population of France and the primitive conception of "security" which controls French policy. The first efforts to obtain about 100,000 recruits led to a great exodus into British colonies, to complaints from exploiting companies, and to violent riots; the French Government therefore reduced its demands. About 10,000 young men are now taken annually from French West Africa for military training. There were in 1925 about 125,000 men of nineteen in this area; but most were granted exemption as physically unfit. The best are taken from productive services. They spend three months in a barracks in France, and altogether are three years away. The death-rate from tuberculosis and other diseases is high. The dissolution of all the social traditions among these men is still more disastrous. Those who survive their military service on their return to Africa spread tuberculosis and syphilis; their conception of European women is the reverse of respectful; their attitude to the dominant race is often resentful; but they have been trained to arms! What will happen if, after another ten years, there are about 100,000 Africans trained in the use of rifles and a black Napoleon arises in Africa? European peoples will be faced by something more serious than a lack of raw materials.

¹ Full details in Buell, *Native Problem*, II, p. 2 sq.

WORK ON EUROPEAN ESTATES

A second method of extracting what we require from tropical areas is work for white employers on estates or in mines, dependent upon wage-labour. This is a more refined method: it provides a more certain flow of the commodity needed by Europe and America—gold or diamonds or copper or, in agricultural areas, coffee or sisal. Trouble sometimes arises in maintaining the supply of wage-labourers; but arrangements can be made across frontiers between European peoples—as between the Portuguese and the South African Governments, or hut taxes can be imposed to compel natives to be civilized enough to have money, and therefore wages instead of food, or pressure can be used by administrators upon chiefs to supply the persons of their subjects for labour under Europeans.

A typical instance of work under European employers is in the Belgian Congo. There the Union Minière has increased the production of copper from 2,492 tons in 1912 to 89,323 tons in 1925. New production-processes gave the latter amount with the labour of 14,000 natives. In addition to copper, the Congo exports gold, diamonds, and tin, from the mining of which the Belgian Government derives some revenue. But the resultant pressure upon a decreasing native population is very great. By recruiting-agents the number of men working for a month was increased from 28,500 in 1913 to 131,500 in 1924. About 80,000 were employed in the Katanga in 1924. The shortage of labour, however, is so great that a British company operates in Rhodesia to raise labour for the Belgian mines. The Belgian administrators assist; but it is reported that “notwithstanding the order to the chiefs, recruiting has been null and may even have been marked by incidents.” “When it was announced that a recruiter was coming, the population would fly into the forest.”¹

¹ Buell: *Native Problem*, II, p. 541.

Similar inducements have long been very subtly used in obtaining labour for the mines in South Africa; and new problems in the supply of a decreasing labour-force will soon be raised, if the mineral resources of Rhodesia are to be developed. Mineral products needed by modern civilization necessarily involve labour under white employers who have the requisite engineering, financial, and commercial knowledge. But even for agricultural products, labour under white employers is till largely used. The British soap firm, Lever Brothers, has a subsidiary company, the Huileries du Congo Belge, which employs about 20,000 men in the Belgian Congo. They cut 38 tons of palm-fruit a day, put kernels in sacks, and press the palm-oil at the mills. They live in specially constructed villages, and about one-third of them are married or have their wives with them. Disease and semi-starvation result from the absence of women; but in the mining villages, where efforts have been made to induce the men to bring wives with them, these efforts have been unavailing. The separation of the sexes and the dissolution of native village-communities occur in Eastern Africa also, where, under British rule, the supplies bought in Europe and America are raised by native labour under white settlers. "The British colony of Kenya has a larger number of men under European employment in proportion to population than has the Belgian Congo. But because of the comparatively small territory which Kenya natives occupy, and the easy and quick transport facilities by which they may reach European centres, the effect of European industrialism upon the Kenya native population is probably not as severe as upon the Congo population."¹ The same problem, however, is involved here as in the mines of South Africa. Industrialization of the Western world presses hard upon primitive peoples; and, under white employers,

¹ Buell: *Native Problem*, II p. 544.

their intellectual, social, and economic development are delayed, even if their race does not actually die out. The immediate demands of Europe and America, enforced by masters and owners in tropical areas, do not allow for the future of primitive peoples. They are treated as instruments of a civilization whose benefits accrue to others.

NATIVE PRODUCTION

A third method of obtaining materials for industry is by direct native production of exportable goods, as in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. On the West Coast of Africa the white man has found it difficult to live for long periods; and, therefore, he has been inclined to induce the native rather than compel him to produce the goods required. The method was inevitable in the absence of resident white employers and the prejudice against undertaking the risks of production among those who made money by commerce. But the method has been more successful than that of concessions or that of European estates, both in its financial results and in its effect upon African populations. That effect may be indicated, for example, by the increase of the trade of the area with the modern world. From Nigeria the export of palm-kernels rose from 174,000 tons in 1913 to 272,000 in 1925, and the value of the rubber exported from £1,000,000 to £2,000,000 in the same period. Exports to the United States in 1925 were valued at £1,624,000, and exports to Germany at £3,600,000. Similarly the Gold Coast exported in 1922 about 61,000 tons of manganese, and in 1925 about 388,000 tons, thus assisting to develop modern engineering tools. The United States had from the Gold Coast in 1925 goods valued at £2,369,000. That native Africans can derive gain from this trade is shown by the legacies of an African merchant in Nigeria, who in 1930 left £58,000. He gave £250 to the Church Missionary

Society, as well as other sums to seven wives and the 42 children of 22 wives named in his will.¹ Clearly some advantage does accrue to Africans from the method of native production and native commerce, outside the area of concessions or of wage-labour under Europeans.

But the influence of the modern world is to be seen even more clearly in the figures for *imports* into these African territories. Cycles, motor-cycles, and motor-cars are very recent inventions. The imports of these increased as follows :

			1921	1925
<i>Nigeria.</i>	Cycles	2,171	17,611
	Motor-cars	233	878
<i>Gold Coast.</i>	Cycles	485	2,118
	Motor-cars	294	1,291

The incidental results of this rapid advance are of immense importance. The native demand for roads is vigorous and, in fact, "many roads in the Gold Coast and Nigeria are built entirely by natives, and at their own expense."² The road, indeed, has become the instrument of freedom and escape from the isolation and "menacing atmosphere of the forest." And more roads have a direct effect upon the "demand" in Africa for the goods of the modern world. "Without roads you will not get the itinerant trader and village shopkeeper who play such a large part in creating new wants and stimulating production to provide the purchasing-power for those wants."²

Clearly neither the concession method nor employment under European employers, whether agents of companies or settlers, has so far caused the natives of tropical areas to increase greatly their consumption of industrial products. The method used in British West Africa, however, where the

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, October 27, 1930.

² Ormsby Gore: *Visit to West Africa*, Cmd. 2744, 1926, p. 30.

natives have produced goods for export on their own land or under their own organizations, has led to some expansion of the markets among native peoples. The modernization of primitive peoples, which would lead them to use electricity and gramophones, motor-cars, and radio, seems to be quicker and more complete, when they themselves organize the production of the goods needed by the modern world. The dominant economic issue of the modern world is the increase of markets; and here in tropical areas are large populations which will not, indeed, take coal or clothes, but will take gramophones and cinemas and motor-cars. But if primitive peoples are to be regarded, even for our advantage, as "markets," policy must be such as to raise their standard of life.

The conception of tropical areas as markets is not new. Indeed, the second phase of European activity in Africa, after the slave-trade, was the sale of cotton-goods and intoxicating liquors. The new industry of the nineteenth century with increased productive power, "captured" the markets in tropical areas from the native producers. Manchester merchants sold the "sweated" products of pauper children and impoverished women to the Africans, the Chinese, and the Indians. And it was regarded as good for the buyers that they should have cheap products. Besides, missionaries favoured clothes. Commerce and Christianity co-operated; and the effects upon native producers and native social life were not noticed. The amount paid for the raw material from negro labour in America and for the factory labour in Europe, subtracted from the amount gained on the sale of "dumped" goods to backward peoples, left a good margin of profit on which the complacent belief in progress was based, in Europe and America. The wealth of the world increased and some scraps did, indeed, fall among tropical peoples.

But the new commodities which Europe and America now have to sell are more disturbing in their consequences than gin and cotton-clothes. Those kept the peoples inert, unhealthy, and submissive. Cycles, motor-cars, cinemas, and radio have different social effects. Africa has so far been ruled by the old method of division among conquerors. The tribes had no common language or attitude. They were divided by impassable forests. Each was ignorant of the world outside its own "clearing." But within the past twenty years a fundamental change has begun. Modern mechanisms are uniting Africans, stirring up new ideas, and enforcing new customs. It may well be, therefore, that the very methods which increase the value of the tropics as markets may make them more difficult for Europeans to govern. No evidence from the history of the past is relevant; for the old divisions and isolations are disappearing. An entirely new situation is being created by the motor-car, the cinema, and the radio. Such recent inventions have a very great social effect even in the industrialized areas where they originated; but they will have even greater effects upon peoples who have not hitherto had either literary education or large-scale organization. The economic policy, therefore, which Europeans use in their dealings with primitive folk, whether as producers or as purchasers, involves a consideration of the methods of government under which this or that economic system is maintained.

COLONIAL GOVERNMENT

The terminology so far used has been that of "economics"; but political science is also involved, since the relations between modern industry and modern government are very close. Government was introduced among backward peoples, as it was said, in order to protect them from unscrupulous traders—and to make the success of honest traders more secure. Govern-

ment supplied order and, as the instruments of order which are useful to commerce, roads, health services, and support for missionary "education." In some cases government was the chief agent of commercial enterprise; but even where it was only a benevolent onlooker, the results of order and roads were not all good. Security reinforced native tyrannies, and new contacts brought new diseases. Even benevolent supervision and the provision of model dwellings have in some cases been accompanied by that strange "failure of nerve" which seems to diminish native populations. And again, the pressure of government in developing resources by roads and railways, often using forced labour for "public" services, the benefits of which accrued to Europe, in some places "took the heart out" of a native population. Thus once again, as in the case of economic enterprise, the advantage of government among primitive peoples does not seem always to have accrued to them.

SURVIVING POLICIES: (a) ASSIMILATION

The policies now surviving from the nineteenth century can be distinguished from those introduced during the past ten years; but all policies, which were not mere excuses for the raising of cash, have been benevolent. There was first the policy of assimilation, followed by the French, Belgian, and, after the early exploitation, by the Dutch. This implies, in practice, an attempt to make the African or Javanese into a European. The result has been the formation of a small class or caste, within the mass of "backward" peoples, speaking and almost thinking in French or Dutch. The same kind of policy has produced, in British India, the politically minded intellectual Indian. But it has never been possible for more than a very few in a non-European population to adopt the manners and customs of Europe; and therefore the Euro-

peanized non-European was tied to his teachers and masters and separated from his ancestors and his relatives. All went smoothly until the selected intellectuals discovered that they could make common cause, not with their foreign masters, but with their relatives, and that has occurred only in our own day. For almost a century the educated non-European was the instrument of European domination over his fellows.

The policy of assimilation was implied in early missionary efforts. Africans were made not merely into Christians, but into Protestants and Catholics, in accordance with the religion of the European race which happened to descend upon them; and not merely into Protestants, but into Baptists and Methodists, and into that strange form of Christian which flies the British flag over the cross. Again, however, only a very few were Europeanized; and yet all went well until non-Europeans discovered the arguments against domination in the gospel preached by Europe. Resignation was a useful doctrine: and excuse could be found for it in some European versions of religion. But in Europe revolution also had come out of commentary; and when non-Europeans began to use Christianity as a basis for claims to equal status, it began to be felt that the assimilation of native movements to the "levelling" tendency of an earlier or a Puritan Christianity might be inconvenient.¹

The policy of assimilation is ridiculous—biologically, psychologically, and socially. But it has been now recognized to be also impracticable, chiefly because it gives no guidance in regard to the treatment of the vast majority, upon whose labour Western industry depends. Even if ten out of every hundred natives are made into French Catholics or British Protestants, the other ninety are no more amenable to the

¹ See the chapter on Africa in my *1918-1928: A Short History of the World*, p. 384. The reference is to the Israelite movement and other similar "revivals."

influences by which government and industry increase the wealth of Europe. Therefore the policy of assimilation has been generally condemned, if not yet abolished.

SURVIVING POLICIES: (*b*) DEVELOPMENT OF NATIVE INSTITUTIONS

The alternative is the development of native institutions, with advice and correction from Europeans. The earlier writers and "men on the spot" seem to have thought that native institutions were all summarized in a modernized version of the chief's rule according to Tacitus in the *Germania*. It was understood that natives had chiefs: so—the rule was—first catch your chief and then support him. That was intended to develop "native institutions." Men on the spot ignored religious organization, and thought sexual rituals improper. They knew nothing of the influences underlying the apparent acquiescence of primitive peoples in a native tyranny, forced upon them by European good intentions. The natural growth of native institutions was prevented by a policy of maintaining the obsolete; and the young men of the tribe were enslaved to the old who, but for European misunderstanding, would have long ago been deprived of power.

THE MANDATE PRINCIPLE

A new stage was reached when the sacred word "trusteeship" became popular. Policy was then ideally to aim at the special advantage of native populations; and it was assumed that Europeans knew best what that advantage was. It is, no doubt, to the advantage of primitive peoples to be brought into contact with those who have advanced further. In any case, it is impossible to preserve them from such contacts. But it is foolish to suppose that industrialized peoples have supported their traders or their officials among primitive

peoples for the purpose of doing them good. It is for the sake of modern industry that "trusteeship" is adopted—by the self-appointed trustees. We need rubber and cotton and copper and palm-kernels, just as our forefathers needed slave-labour; and the only difference is that we are more kindly or more imaginative than they were. The perception upon which trusteeship is based is that industry cannot obtain its raw materials without natives to produce them; and it is therefore essential to preserve tropical peoples in health and energy in order to obtain what is needed in London, New York, and Paris. Trusteeship is not pure benevolence, but good business; and that is not necessarily to its discredit.

The working out of this policy has fallen into the hands of a few European peoples. Each has been cultivating an "estate." Some peoples have used their estates as economic "reserves" either for capital investment or for extracting raw materials or for markets for themselves only. Every nation in control of colonial territory has derived special advantage for itself from that control. Hence the desire for colonies. But all industrial peoples, with or without colonies, have come to depend upon tropical products, and most of them also upon tropical markets. Some moral responsibility, therefore, for the getting of rubber and oil-seeds rests upon those who own capital in the enterprises concerned, and upon those who use the products of those enterprises—that is, upon all of us as consumers and producers, and not merely as citizens. Therefore the responsibility for the power which is exercised by modern civilization over primitive peoples is one which should be shared by all modern Governments. This does not imply that the United States, for example, should be obliged to make its case good before the world at large for the government of the Philippines or of Porto Rico; but it does imply that all modern peoples can co-operate by sharing the available

knowledge of medicine, economic organization, and educational methods for the use of primitive peoples.

Some recognition of this fact may be involved in the working of the *mandate system*, under which the government of certain areas is reported upon to an international authority—the Council of the League of Nations; but the territories under mandate are few and scattered, and the reports do little more than inspire or refute criticism. No constructive international system yet exists for the formation of a policy of co-operation in the government of primitive peoples. No understanding yet exists among the peoples of the modern world with regard to their responsibilities for the goods and services they derive from primitive peoples.

The system of criticism under the Mandates Commission of the League is only the first step in the organization of modern government for primitive peoples. The next step should be the extension of the survey, now confined to mandated areas, to all colonial territories. Such an extension would not open the doors to more complaints, but would assist each Government in the more skilful development of all the resources, natural and human, of the territories for which each is responsible. No reason either of policy or of justice can be found for the refusal to present Reports upon every colonial area to the Mandates Commission; for surely neither France nor Great Britain is ashamed to say publicly what is being done in any colonial area by its administrators? And it can hardly be regarded as a valid reason for refusing to make such public statements that the Portuguese Government, for example, might regard the making of such a statement by itself as an infringement of its sovereignty.¹ But in addition to the presentation of reports, the new system should involve the use for

¹ This was the excuse offered to the I.L.O. Conference, 1930, by Portugal for refusing to express opinions as to "forced labour."

each Government of specialists from any modern nation, who might assist in the solution of this or that problem among primitive peoples. The Mandates Commission should be, not mainly the recipient of complaints, but the agent in promoting the use of the best modern knowledge and modern ability in the effort, in any colonial area, to raise the standard of life among primitive peoples.

An obsolete conception of government will naturally dominate, for many years, those who are expert in ancient ways. And critics of government will, no doubt, continue in the old manner to use the Mandates Commission or some other organization for complaints. But the modern problem is not the voicing of grievances : it is the sharing of knowledge and co-operation in health policy and education among the peoples controlling tropical areas. The Mandates Commission might be made into a modern instrument of government if, with its assistance, any Governments concerned could obtain medical, agricultural, financial, commercial, engineering, and anthropological ability for use in the several colonial areas. The art of government would then be conceived, not as a mere organization for keeping order to facilitate profit-earning, but as a means of increasing human vitality and intelligence. Is that change too great to be hoped for?

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

A new movement has indeed already begun. The modern world has discovered the nature of tropical diseases ; and these diseases are the fundamental factors in the relation of tropical to industrialized peoples. "The bush native in West Africa is a vast reservoir of peculiar diseases : his average physique is poor and his health as a rule deplorable. He is afflicted in immense numbers by appalling diseases and de-

formities resulting from them.”¹ Malaria, leprosy, and ulcers, to which Europe has added syphilis and its results—these are the immediate problems of primitive society. Bad diet, innumerable parasites, and ignorance of the simplest necessities of health keep Africa poor, weak in productive power, and defective as a market. “Ill health in Africa, as in Europe,” says an expert, “is primarily dependent neither on climate nor on country, but rather on domestic circumstances.”² The immediate needs, therefore, are roads, which make treatment possible, clinics, and the simplest medical training; but also education in public health and personal hygiene. The European sanitary inspector must teach first how to make a door and a window or a concrete floor; for the conditions which make health possible are dependent upon the daily habits and current practical knowledge of Africans themselves.

Again, security from disease in tropical areas has become possible only within about twenty years. Manson and Ross discovered the insect-source of malaria at the end of the last century. The first Schools of Tropical Medicine were set up in London and Liverpool in 1899. But only since the Great War have any important steps been made “in the field,” since the Rockefeller Foundation in 1917 began the expenditure, which has so far amounted to about \$150,000,000. The French Government set up a Medical School in West Africa in 1918; and the British Government one in the Sudan in 1924. Mining companies in South Africa and the Belgian Congo are attempting to decrease disease among their workers, and in one area in Angola there is a strict discipline by doctors.³ But this is only a small beginning of an immense task; for if tropical peoples can be freed from disease and its consequences—

¹ D. B. Blacklock: “Health in West Africa,” *Lancet*, April 19, 1930.

² *Tropical Diseases Bulletin*, May 1929, p. 407.

³ *Ibid.*, January 1930, p. 33.

apathy, inertia, and continual suffering, the situation in the whole world will be changed.

No Government, however, powerful, can afford to dispense with assistance in its task from the ability available under other Governments; and no Government, however vast its territories, can succeed unless other Governments in neighbouring territories co-operate. The first steps in international co-operation in this field were scientific. "Manson, a British subject, in 1877 in China, discovered that filaria undergoes development in a mosquito. Laveran, a Frenchman, in 1880 in Algiers discovered the parasite of malaria. Smith and Kilborne, Americans, in 1893 in America showed that protozoa in the shape of *Babesia* could be transmitted by ticks. Bruce, a British subject, in 1895 in South Africa, associated trypanosomiasis of cattle with the tsetse fly. Eijkman, a Dutchman, in Java showed that fowls took polyneuritis when fed exclusively on decorticated rice. Ross, a British subject, in 1897 in India showed that human malaria parasites commence to develop in anopheline mosquitoes; in 1898 he proved the whole cycle of bird malaria in culicines. Grassi, an Italian, in 1899 in Italy confirmed Ross's work on human malaria. Looss, a German, in 1901 in Egypt demonstrated how hookworm occurs. Carrol, Reed, Lazear, and Agramonte, an American Commission, in 1901 in Havana proved that *Aedes* transmits yellow fever."¹ With such an example before them, perhaps administrators and politicians may cease to be primitive in their methods and purposes, and learn to co-operate internationally.

That African peoples welcome modernization in this sense is to be seen from such instances as these, referred to in the official Report on Tanganyika: "The Masai have, of their own initiative, contributed towards the cost of the water-works

¹ D. B. Blacklock: *Lancet*, April 19, 1930.

in their country. . . . They fully realize the difficulties, which are great, of their present mode of existence, and are very appreciative of the efforts which are being made to solve them. To this end they will pay generously in cash and very often in labour" (p. 14). Again: "The Wakwimba, who are in urgent need of fresh pastures for their cattle, displayed great energy in clearing their new land, and a large and fertile area was in a short time freed of tsetse fly" (p. 17). Again: "On receiving a report that hoppers (locusts) had been discovered on the Sibiti River, Chief Majabere at once collected some four thousand of his people and proceeded to the Meatu country, which is about sixty miles from any habitations. Taking their food with them, the Wabinza remained for nearly a fortnight in the wilderness until supplies were exhausted, having accounted during that period for millions of hoppers, and having destroyed twenty-eight separate swarms which would otherwise have wrought havoc not only in their own area but also in other districts far to the east and south" (p. 18).¹ Thus modern government in tropical areas is not compulsion to make primitive folk do what they are unwilling to do; it is rather an assistance for them in their own efforts to improve the conditions under which they live. Similarly, even in South Africa, where the modern policy is hardly understood by the spokesman of the dominant European groups, it has been shown that the competence of Africans is quite adequate for the sort of training, occupation, or understanding of public affairs which are the bases of civilized life.²

The immediate issues, however, are not only economic and political: they concern the social attitude of Europeans towards primitive peoples. The French may have been very defective in their colonial methods; but they have given the

¹ Colonial No. 46, 1930.

² See C. T. Loram: *Education of the South African Native*, 1917.

educated African an equal status with the European, and they have far less "colour prejudice" than the British or the Americans. More than this, their literature shows a profound appreciation of the spirit of primitive and Eastern peoples, of which there is no sign in contemporary English literature.¹ The British and American tradition has maintained benevolence to those who were obviously inferior in knowledge or skill, but no friendliness nor, in some cases, even politeness, to those of non-European races who might claim equality. Thus no one European race can pretend to have discovered or to have practised the sort of contact with non-European primitive races which alone can be regarded as consonant with modern civilization.

THE NEW EDUCATION

Another phase of the new movement in the government of tropical areas is practical education. The old-fashioned teaching of reading from books, generally concerned with historical facts of very doubtful authenticity, is giving place to the development of skill in daily life, cleanliness, efficient planting, care of animals, manipulation of wood and metals, dancing, and singing. The new method in education, especially as applied to adults, is not Europeanization, nor is it the preservation of obsolete native institutions. It is modernization upon the basis of an existing social tradition.

The social tradition of primitive peoples is still inadequately understood.² The basis of social structure, even in purely economic terms, is strange to us; for the division of occupa-

¹ Similarly in spite of the great number of primitive peoples under the jurisdiction of the British, there is no understanding of primitive art in England which is comparable to the French or German, as shown in their collections.

² See G. H. Driberg: *The East African Problem*, 1930, for examples of misunderstandings.

tions between men and women is not merely a passing phase of society in Africa or Malaya.¹ Both health measures and educational methods must depend upon a much more extensive knowledge of facts than we now possess. But the principle is not in doubt. The existing social structure must be the basis for education. "The attempt to preserve old methods may be and will be interpreted by many Africans as an attempt to withhold the benefits of civilization and keep them a subject race."² But the actual effects of the new methods should be the modernization of the primitive. That cannot be achieved by artificial imitation in Africa of the customs of the British public school; and it may be achieved by the actual use of traditional ceremonies of initiation, in spite of the fantastic objections of missionaries ignorant of the history of Christianity itself. The new methods are only just beginning. They are experimental. They are limited by our ignorance of the primitive. But they are flexible enough, in view of the purpose to which they are directed.

Education in the modern world is not merely instruction in the literary arts, which were suitable for a governing caste in mediæval or early industrial society. Modern education is based upon bodily and intellectual and emotional activities of normal life. Thus among primitive peoples also such education as Europe and America can provide is no longer in the old fashion of mission schools for converts. The more educated missionaries and the still more important new educators among the officials of Governments are teaching health and efficiency in agricultural pursuits.³ The British Colonial Office now has an expert Advisory Committee on Education. The

¹ See two articles in *Africa* by R. Thurnwald, April 1929, and July 1929, on "The Social Systems of Africa."

² W. B. Mumford: "Education and Social Adjustment of Primitive Peoples," *Africa*, April 1929, p. 154.

³ See the Reports of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, *Education in West Africa* (1921) and *East Africa* (1924).

Dutch Government has established full educational facilities for those who are going to its eastern colonies.

The results of the new methods in education are indicated in the following letter written by African village teachers in Kenya after they had had a month's course of additional training:

We wish to thank the Director of Education who showed us which is the most important matter among these three: to do; to know; to say. We wish to thank the Director of the Medical Department who let us see the best ways of preventing disease and who showed us, in the museum at Nairobi, the dangerous animals which cause disease. We saw these things openly. We wish to thank him especially because we saw the Native Hospital. We are so glad to know that the Government are our friends. We thank the Director of Agriculture because, through his kindness, we learnt how to plant seeds, to cultivate the ground, and to grow good crops. Mr. N—— deserves our best thanks because he came here with some of his pupils and he taught us that we must not forget our good traditions, such as pottery, songs, and stories. We know that a tree without roots cannot stand. . . . We were also taught to help our poor people and the elders and the women. . . . We should like to thank Miss N—— for her inspection of the houses and for showing us how to be clean and tidy.

P.S.—We do not want you to think, when you read this letter, that it is written simply to please. These thanks are in our hearts.”¹

Out of such beginnings a new world may come.

The modern world, which affects primitive peoples, is not merely the world of motor-cars, cycles, gramophones, and cinemas. It is also a world of new purposes and new methods, hardly yet known to the majority of “men on the spot,” who claim to be authorities upon the treatment of native races. The evils incidental to the first impact of industry upon the resources of Africa and Malaya are by no means remedied. The proportion of taxation taken from natives, which is spent for

¹ Extracts from paper on “Recent Tendencies in African Native Education,” by J. H. Oldham, in the *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, May 27, 1927.

their advantage, is still very small.¹ The balance of gain, which accrues to the dominant white races, is still very large. But a new principle is already operative. It is to be seen chiefly in preventive medicine and education; but it is also implied in the administrative and economic policy which promotes a rising standard of life among tropical peoples. This is the characteristic effect of modernity upon the relation between us and them.

The modernization of tropical areas will obviously be slower in its social effects than the modernization, for example, of Asiatic culture; but it by no means follows that what is characteristic of Africa or Malaya will be destroyed. It cannot be too often noted that what is characteristic of such peoples is *not* malaria, cholera, and leprosy; nor is it ignorance, superstition, and pervasive fear. All such things existed in Europe some years ago; and their abolition has not destroyed—it has, in fact, increased—the significance and value of the European tradition. Similarly, to modernize primitive peoples is not to destroy the best in what Africa or Malaya has to contribute to civilized life. Certainly modernization will not make primitive peoples easier to dominate; for a healthy and intellectually active African or Malayan community will not readily accept the European view of the share due to them, from the store of wealth or well-being which African and Malayan labour produces. These peoples may even demand to use their own raw materials in their own manufacture. They must eventually have control or, where Europeans reside, share the control of the government under which they live, as indeed is implied in the principle that trusteeship is not permanent, but is exercised only until these peoples can “stand by them-

¹ “The maximum amount that could be considered to have been spent on services provided exclusively for the native population was slightly over one-quarter of the taxes paid by them.” *Report of E.A. Commission* (1925, Cmd. 2387, p. 187).

selves.”¹ But that is in the future. The next step is that Europe and America should recognize the advantage to be derived by industrialized peoples from healthier, better educated, and freer tropical peoples. Then perhaps the European peoples will begin to see that the best “governors” of such peoples are not ex-military officers, but experts in preventive medicine and modern education. That obviously would involve a revolution in Western thought; and so far no thought at all is devoted by Europe and America to the responsibility which ought to be theirs for the services they exact from primitive peoples. Not only the men on the spot, traders, missionaries, or administrators, but also the workers and capital-owners in industrialized countries will have to change their traditional habit of unconscious exploitation. The modern principle governing the relations of industrialized and primitive peoples is not, indeed, to be expressed in terms of economic science. It is not wealth which is in question. The underlying aim is the development of a tradition entirely alien to ours—significantly different from that of Western Europe. We need a civilized Africa. But the perception of that need involves a working hypothesis unfamiliar to economists and political scientists—the hypothesis namely that tropical peoples have a cultural, artistic, or even religious consciousness which may be as good as ours and is entirely different. Negro rhythms are now familiar in Europe and America at least in their “slave” forms, as “Spirituals,” or in jazz-music and dancing. These rhythms have been twisted or tainted by European domination; but they are distinguishable and may be still more clearly so, when observers in Africa itself have sufficient percipience. The African dance is already known to Europeans. African plastic art is beginning to be valued in the West. And exactly the

¹ See the striking statement to this effect by Sir Donald Cameron, the Governor of Tanganyika, in *Principles of Native Administration*.

same change has occurred in Western estimation of Javanese or Polynesian arts.¹

It is too soon to speculate upon contributions to the scientific view of the universe and of man, to be obtained from the hitherto undeveloped peoples of tropical areas; and, indeed, some Europeans are so innocent as to imagine that the general character of science is already fixed, in spite of the historical fact that it has so far been characteristically Western. Both from the arts, however, and from the new insight of non-Western races, the whole of human experience may be enriched. That is the ultimate purpose of the policy which promotes the development of primitive peoples.

¹ See a report on Javanese dancing, by Eileen Power, after her visit on a Kahn Fellowship.

supplanted them. Similarly out of China and India and Turkey and Egypt will come new forms of social life, not derivative from the West, even if they are produced under the influence of Western success in this or that aspect of life. The establishment of such new forms of social life is what is meant by the modernization of the East.

CHAPTER V

THE AMERICANIZATION OF EUROPE

THE old farmer, having left his horse-cart for a Ford car, cannot stop the process which transfers him from the old model to the new. Even this second change may leave the man himself unchanged for a while; but the pressure of changes around him has to be faced. Industrialization is a continuous process. That it involves rapid change is one of the chief problems for civilized life. Serenity and security, which are fundamental needs of culture, are more easily to be found in a society which maintains the same habits from one generation to another. But in the modern world habits change in less than one generation. How then can men retain that serenity from which alone comes the finest Art and the most fundamental Science? How, in a world of movies, changing into talkies, can we avoid superficiality?

That is the problem, in the change from the first to the second industrial revolution, which is most clearly to be seen in the United States and in the influence of the United States upon Europe.¹ The roots of Western civilization in the primitive and the mediæval hardly exist in the United States. Until the industrial era was established, that country was hardly more than "colonial" in its outlook. It depended for its arts and its sciences upon the old sources of its civilization in Europe. But since the industrial era, which may be supposed to have become a distinctive type of civilization about 1870, the United States has ceased to look so continuously to Europe. The new post-mediæval culture which was there

¹ For a general view of American influence upon Europe, see *The Giant of the Western World*, by F. Miller and H. Hill, 1930.

established, however, as it was established in Glasgow and London, Lyons and Paris, had a greater "pace" in America than elsewhere. The resistance to change was smaller there; the social conditions more fluid and the pioneering spirit more widely spread. But whatever the causes, modernization, as expressed in the latest inventions and the newest types of "consumption," is at present more obvious in the United States than in any other country: and from the United States new influences, distinguishable from those of nineteenth-century industrialization, are spreading everywhere.

The word "Americanization" is used to indicate the most obvious source of those new social influences, which are results of the gramophone, the motor-car, and the cinema. It is supposed also to include reference to the influence of repetition-processes in production, to automatic machinery, the band-conveyer, and similar recent inventions. But it is superficial to suppose that any of these new influences are characteristically American in the sense that they are due to some special industrial ability in the United States. The most American aspect of the new processes and the new products in Europe is the supposition that they are American. It is worth while, therefore, to note in what sense they are not, and in what sense they are, due to influences operating on the world from a source in North America.

The cinema has seemed, until very recently, to be obviously American. The typical screen-story, the peculiar language of "captions," and the actual financial control of films were in fact American. But this was a direct result of the Great War. The cinema first became a business proposition in 1910. In the following three years Europe made some advance; but the shadow of approaching war in 1911 and 1912, and the actual collapse of the European system from 1914 to 1918 prevented the industrial development of the new invention,

Therefore the United States had an open field for developing the new idea: and the cinema was Americanized. The development of the motor-car was hampered in Europe also by the war: and again the United States used the opportunities of a market in the new product—the cheap, standardized car, while Europe was making standardized shells and rifles. The gramophone is more truly native to America; but in this case, too, the European market was limited by concentration upon war-services. Clearly it is by no means to the credit of Europe that it had to make rifles instead of cinema-films. The United States were in a more civilized situation, because their vast territories and active population were not dominated by the ancient evils of war. But the point is that what occurred in the utilization of new products and new processes between 1910 and 1920 would have occurred in any case; and but for the Great War, they would have occurred in Europe as soon as in America. The most recent phenomena of industrialization, therefore, are the natural results of the process which began a century ago and are not characteristically American, except, as it were, by accident.

The same fact is to be seen more clearly in the new automatic or repetitive processes of production. The Great War actually promoted these in Europe and also gave women new openings in industry. Munition-making and uniform-making in Europe were first steps in the industrialization of some hitherto agricultural districts; and they were also steps forward in the standardization of all products. America did not, in fact, teach Europe standardization in manufacture, although it may have developed the standardization of the products of peace more rapidly, while Europe was standardizing war.

Again, the greater proportion of unessentials now available for wage-earners, for example cinema-drama and gramo-

phones, depends both upon cheapened production and upon the maintenance of wage-rates while prices fall. The wealth accruing to America from the sale of food, clothing, and munitions to Europe during the war gave America the first chance to practise a more "democratic" system of consumption. In Europe just at this time millions were drawn into the unproductive and destructive activities of war. What they had to use were not cinema-dramas and gramophones, but bayonet-charges and high explosives. It ill becomes European scholars to say that the products of America are uncultured! By comparison with the worst screen story a bayonet-charge is extremely barbaric. However, an increase in available wealth would have accrued to wage-earners in Europe too between 1910 and 1920, but for war.

These notes on what is called Americanization in Europe are not final conclusions. They are intended only to suggest that the present influence of America upon Europe was not inevitable. In so far as it is objectionable, it is due to Europe's own incompetence. For the wars from 1911 to 1920 were not accidents: they were the inevitable results of political incompetence and blind national emotions—both of which are much more widespread in Europe than in America.

AMERICA AS THE LATEST PHASE OF WESTERN INDUSTRIALISM

But what is this America which is now influencing Europe? Most obviously it is a series of very recently invented, standardized products. The import of American films into Europe is well known to be extensive. The French, the Germans, the Czechs, the Italians, the Spanish, and the British are at this moment attending performances which originated in the thin air of Hollywood culture. The names of the chief performers, known over all Europe, are American. European nationalists become angry at this; and local manufacturers

see a chance of using nationalism for profit. But the vast majority of those who attend cinemas enjoy American stories and American comedy. The background of American life becomes familiar to villagers and dwellers in the poorer quarters of cities in Europe. European scholars and their patrons who had the use hitherto of the only available theatres and opera-houses, are aghast at the low level of Hollywood drama. But America is only Europe uprooted and translated into new soil. The defects of Hollywood are defects exported from Europe. The lack of "culture" which may possibly—but not certainly—be observed on the screen, is a deficiency of Europeans who left Europe in order to escape worse evils and left the majority of their relatives precisely where the cultured in Europe still leave them. However, let it be granted that the level of American influence in Europe, exerted through the cinema, is not high.

Similarly the cheap motor-car in Europe is largely American, either by direct import or by the use of American capital in standardizing older European types. Again, the old-fashioned European feels that a conveyance is a gentleman's privilege: the highly finished, expensive car is a worthy object of reverence: but the "lower middle-class" car is filling the roads in Europe, as in America. The habit of using motor-cars is spreading rapidly among all social classes in Europe, with strange results upon the social prestige of the self-styled "upper" class. The motor-bus is giving to Europeans the sort of outlook which the cheap private motor-car gives in America.

Tourists from the United States spend annually abroad about \$600 million, of which a great part is spent in Europe: and this money also may be reckoned among American influences. Again, the flow of income for wage-earners in Europe, coming from relatives in America, is now normal again after

the confusion of war. For the years 1920 to 1930 money sent out of the United States by ex-emigrants amounted to four billion dollars (£800,000,000), and the annual average seems to be about \$250 million in both cases for all countries in the world. But Europe receives most, and, among European countries, Italy.¹

American influence in Europe is also dependent upon the use in Europe of American capital in production.² In Great Britain this has led to the reorganization of some motor-car manufacturing enterprises and the establishment of some retail-stores. Great social changes have accompanied the appearance of Woolworth's stores in European towns and the standardizing of some older types of motor-car. The purchasing power of wage-earners has been given new outlets. In Germany the exhaustion of the war and inflation has made dependence upon America more urgent. The situation in 1928 was as follows: three great loans amounting to \$32 million had been raised in New York in 1924 and 1925, for Krupps, Thyssen, and the A.E.G. The Reich, the States, and the Cities had raised nearly two thousand million marks in loans, chiefly in New York. The Saar District had raised three loans, amounting to about \$12 million, in New York. And there were also innumerable smaller loans to German manufacturers. Of the total foreign loans in Germany since the Armistice of 1918, about 70 per cent. have been raised in America amounting to about \$800 million, and about 19 per cent. in London or about £45 million.³

American capital has gone into many other European countries; and in some cases it has been accompanied by

¹ G. E. Anderson: *New York Herald Tribune*, quoted in *Manchester Guardian*, October 2, 1930. Amounts approximate, in millions: Italy \$46, Greece \$25, Poland \$18, Ireland \$11, Czechoslovakia \$10.

² See U.S. Department of Commerce, No. 731, "American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries, 1930.

³ *Deutschlands Auslandsanleihen*, J. Pfitzner, Berlin, 1928.

reorganization of business upon an American plan.¹ American enterprises in the manufacture of agricultural implements, shoe-machinery, cash-registers, telephones, motor-cars, and electric refrigerators have been set up in Europe. American cameras and cinema-films are everywhere in use. And all this has come within the past twenty years, indeed for the most part within the years since the Armistice of 1918. The relations between America and Europe, which prevailed during the first industrial revolution, have therefore been radically altered.

The most obvious cause of the flow of American capital into Europe is that the United States, which used to import labour by migration, has now very much reduced the numbers permitted to enter. The labour, which before the war used capital in America, now uses capital in Europe: and in that respect it is an advantage for Europe to have compensation in the form of capital for the blocking of its emigration. But that involves more rapid industrialization in Europe to balance the increase of population. The pace of industrial change in Europe, therefore, will probably be greater than it was in the late nineteenth century: and that pace will partly at least depend upon American influences.

Again, the new processes in the new industrial revolution are most lucrative when the products are standardized and marketed in great numbers. But that involves a business policy, playing for the large market in cheap products rather than for the small market in expensive goods and services. And that policy is familiar in America. Thus Europe "learns the trick" of advertisement, and of marketing immense quantities of standardized goods, from America. As a result, the wage-earners, and those with small incomes generally, have more to spend their money upon. Thus opportunities for the

¹ See L. Domeratsky: *American Industry Abroad: Foreign Affairs*, July 1930.

use of leisure become more important than before; there is greater resistance to lengthened hours of labour or reduced wages; and there is a much more widespread sharing of such advantages as industrialization has to offer.

Rationalization, involving mass production and standardized products, has been conceived in Germany as American. As a policy for cutting out waste effort it is indeed connected with Scientific Management, in the form popularized by Taylor. But for success as a business policy in the production of large quantities of cheap goods, it depends upon the amenability of the purchaser to advertisement. Americans are easily swayed by advertisement—so easily as often to be misled.¹ But advertising has the useful function of making known new ways of living, thus sometimes raising the standard of life: and in a population which still retains, as in the United States, the experimentalism of a frontier and the energy of pioneers, new ideas are welcomed. Europe is not yet as skilful in advertising as America: but besides, the “sales resistance” is greater because tradition is stronger in Europe. Europeans do not want to eat or wear anything new. In Germany, for example, the attempt was made to “rationalize” the manufacture of men’s hats, and the styles available were reduced to six: whereupon, the German men ceased to wear hats. They compelled the return to unrationalized diversity. Nevertheless, the tendency to standardization increases even in Europe.

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW INDUSTRIALISM

Thus, both in the new forms of consumption and in the new processes of production, Americanization involves important social consequences: and it may be well to note what those consequences have been in America itself. In a country of

¹ A good study of this is in Stuart Chase: *Your Money's Worth*.

over 120 million inhabitants, in many different climates and of many different racial stocks, almost any social condition can be found, from the crudest barbarism to the finest culture. Hence enough is to be seen by any traveller in America to excuse the pessimism of one or the optimism of another. Local critics also seem to be divided. Some foresee the collapse of civilization in a welter of standardized nonentity. Some point to democratic education and an enlargement of social consciousness. But for the purpose of the argument here, in the contrast between different stages of civilization, that of North America may be taken to show both the advantages and the disadvantages of modernization in an industrialized society.

The rapidity of change in a modern community unsettles habits and makes the formation of new habits, especially of a constructive or progressive kind, more difficult. But the change throws more responsibility upon each generation. A certain self-reliance may be the result, which goes very well with the pioneering spirit; for the pioneer is willing to undertake new experiments and to run risks. But if the settled areas from which he departs are themselves changing, the universality of change may make it impossible to retain any sense of direction. In such a situation, those who are reckless may attract most attention. In every generation and in every community there are some who are less stable in character, less closely coordinated, or more amenable to every chance impulse from within or stimulus from without. In times of rapid change an unco-ordinated character in any person acts as a social solvent. Hence the recklessness of some of the younger generation in America; and hence also the increased importance of new methods in that instrument of social direction which is called education. In America the high value placed upon education is obvious, even if the actual process of education seems to

be, so far, unable to overcome the "resistance" of the material to be dealt with. Divisions of language-groups and of unrelated social backgrounds make the task of social direction most difficult; but modern America seems to show an immense vitality in experimentalism in sexual life, in business policy, and in ways of using leisure, combined with an increasing effort to control the process by education.

Again, the very general recognition of the right of each member of society to derive direct advantage from the goods and services available, creates a democratic "tone" in American society. The relation of worker to "boss" is by no means feudal or reverential, as it is even in industrial Europe.¹ On the road, equality of status is assumed; and the motor-car has made Americans increasingly "nomadic" with the virtues and some of the defects of the nomad. An ease of companionship, an open-handedness in converse is combined with a certain innocent superficiality. A race which is always moving on never sees anything clearly and may not feel deeply. And yet in "business" the habit of "getting together" destroys or limits the secretiveness which is so prevalent in the industries of Great Britain and France. The comparative scarcity of population in America makes "labour" more fluid, since a worker can change easily from job to job. And the whole of society seems to be in continuous internal movement, so that each man tends to make and break new relationships with his fellows.

Undoubtedly, however, the finer culture of European centres of civilization is not to be found in North America. Individual instances of great learning and exceptional artistic ability occur; but there is no highly developed cultured society in America, on the level in culture to be found in Paris, or London, or Berlin. New York and Boston still import their music. The physical sciences and the social sciences in

¹ See the evidence given in H. de Man: *Joy in Work*.

America still depend upon direct "fertilization" of ideas from Europe. But the more striking contrast is not in the very highest levels of intelligence or imagination: it is in that level of social intercourse at which the controllers of economic enterprise and political machinery usually meet. The ability and acuteness of individual Americans in business and politics has not produced a society comparable with that of the European cities, at the same level of practical interests. Politics is socially without a cultural background. Business seems to exist in a vacuum of its own, where the most childish ideas of the arts and sciences occasionally supplement the vaguest idealism and the most hard-headed calculation of profits. The America, therefore, which is influencing Europe, is in its basis at a higher level than Europe, but in its best features at a lower level in civilization than is to be found in certain corners in Europe. American influence tends to raise the lower levels of life in Europe: but it is not strong enough to affect seriously those levels which are above its highest tide. The best products of the fine arts of to-day, the most illuminating scientific and philosophical thought, and above all, that intimate converse of equal, well-trained, subtle, and percipient persons which is the flower of civilization in the Western world is in Europe and not in America. The serenity and security of aim needed to make a civilization out of any material circumstances or social conditions are absent, not only from the business but also from the educational activities of the United States; for the mistakes of ill-directed experimentalism are to be seen as much in certain schools as in the mass prejudice which maintains conformity at all costs.

It is, however, most unfair to contrast the music and painting and poetry of Europe with the drainage and bathtubs of America. To say that in Europe the finest opera is enjoyed and in America the shoddiest film-drama—that is

to omit reference to the vast majority of the inhabitants of Europe. Granted that a civilization is to be estimated by reference to its finest products, a candid critic of the product should not fail to notice the conditions under which it was produced. The sculpture of ancient Athens does not excuse its slavery. In any case, industrial Europe even to-day is for the most part at a very low level of intelligence and vitality. The finest culture in Europe exists side by side with degrading poverty, dirt, and ignorance, upon which the scholars and scientists and highly educated business men and politicians have had practically no influence. The industrial system in Europe was established in a society already divided by caste or social class. In each nation an "upper" class seriously and honestly regarded themselves as naturally the beneficiaries of the established order: it was believed to be good for the others to serve, in their places, the civilized life of the few. A French scholar has said—not as a joke—that in Europe one can have domestic servants; but not in America. It would indeed be impolite to remind him that only one in every hundred households in Europe has any domestic servants at all; and that in Great Britain, for example, ten million women, as wives, are tied for life to house-labour without servants. Domestic service is not common even in Europe. Again, the different social classes of European society had different "consumption standards" long before industrialism. This survived in the manufacture and sale of rare goods such as French silks and dresses and British motor-cars for the rich. The peculiarities of pre-war Europe, as contrasted with pre-war America, were (1) that the majority of Europeans were those who had not managed to escape to America from poverty and authoritarianism and (2) that complacent flunkeyism was established everywhere. Then came wars and revolutions. In all industrial Europe, except Great Britain and France, a

social revolution has occurred since 1918—not perhaps in the structure of society, but certainly in its dominant tone. Flunkeyism still survives in Great Britain and complacent bourgeoisie in France. But elsewhere in Europe the old order has been more violently shaken: and everywhere, even in France, the Great War changed methods of production and standards of consumption. Women entered engineering shops and repetition processes were developed. A rising wage-scale led to rapid expenditure; and the lower levels of wages were raised. Men in armies and munition-workers, outside Central Europe, were better fed than before; and everywhere the emotional strain led to a desire for distraction.

VITALITY AND A SENSE OF DIRECTION

Into this Europe came the new impulses from America: but America was only Europe freed from its past, more adventurous, and more practical. If the war had not stopped industrialization outside of war-services, Europe would, perhaps, have been “Americanized” before America. The motor-car and the cinema, for example, would not have come from America to Europe, if it had not been for the Great War. That war, however, was part of the European social system of complacent acquiescence in a situation whose advantages accrued to very few.

On the other hand, the America which came upon Europe after the Great War was a social system, where war and the preparation for war played little or no part in the consciousness of common folk. The people of the United States had entered the Great War, and at the end retired in disgust from what was generally felt by them to be European confusion. The devotion to commonplace well-being, which is annoying to scholars, was significant in American life; and it was attractive to the majority of the inhabitants of Europe, whose

relatives, before the war, had been able to escape to America. Hungary and Rumania remain in active preparation now for future conflict in Europe; but Hungarians and Rumanians live in the United States without opposing defences, enjoying a much higher standard of life than is possible for their relatives in Europe. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that commonplace well-being seems more attractive to America than European war. Nor is it strange that some Europeans should think so too. For the majority in post-war Europe, America remains a better land—not less so because what they knew of America came to them in their moments of leisure.

But the new uses of leisure, as indicated above, have tended even in Europe to make social customs less stable. Europe has now to face, what America has already faced, experimentalism in the younger generation, disregard of old standards of morality, disrespect for the older established authorities. These are the results of the cinema, the radio, and the aeroplane. Acquiescence in what is received from the past will become less common even when, as in Europe, the past has on it the beautiful and magical "tone of time." In America, the past was not so well fortified by the sentiments which maintain tradition; for there are no mediæval cathedrals or Greek temples in America. And there, therefore, the new customs could flourish at once. But even in the midst of an historical past, acquiescence is less certain when new habits become attractive. It is necessary, therefore, to look not at the mere distinction between the past and the future, but at the principles of action which may make the future come most advantageously out of the past. What has made the tradition valuable, which has now produced out of its own store the forces undermining it? Or again, upon what conditions can we have what is good in what is new without losing what is good in the old?

The fundamental issue is not a mere rivalry between Europe and America. It is an issue which the whole world has to face sooner or later. It is the latest phase of the problem of industrialization—Does increased mechanization and standardization promote or obstruct civilized life? In more exact terms—Under what conditions does industrialism improve the type of man and the type of society into which it is introduced?

It is more than possible, it is likely, that if no thought is given to this problem, the passive acceptance of industrialization as good in any case may reduce human life in any community to banality and mediocrity. On the other hand, the futile opposition to new customs wastes the little energy that idealistic traditionalists seem to possess. Given the industrial system, the conditions tending towards improvement by modernization are, first, a much more equal distribution of benefits and burdens as between man and man, nation and nation, group and group. Thus the most important problem of economic policy to-day is distribution—its kinds and its methods. Even in purely economic terms obviously the *market* is the most urgent problem. But the problem under consideration here is more than economic. It is not merely the *amount* of wealth available to each person or group, but the *use* of such wealth, which is in question. The new uses for leisure and purchasing-power, which have been discovered first in America, are not all of them good. Vitality is wasted by ignorant and incompetent experiments. Ancient errors are repeated by those who ignore the past. We are watching, in fact, a crisis in Western Civilization.

America and Europe are indeed only names for two aspects of that same civilization; and the contact between them is the most fertile occasion for modernizing a tradition which still leads the world, even though it is itself undergoing a

transformation. In this sense of the contrast, Europe is the established tradition in its latest phase. America is Europe uprooted and transplanted in new soil under freer air. Europe is strong in its roots, weak in its upper branches. America flourishes upon insecure roots. It has escaped some of the limitations of the past, but it lacks the sense of direction which comes from the past.

European civilization, taken to-day as one social whole, including feudal vestiges, acquiescent poverty and "aristocratic" culture, represents a principle of *direction* which has carried civilization from mediævalism, through the aristocratic domination of the eighteenth-century enlightenment. Industrialism in Europe did not, indeed, destroy the tradition of culture: but it produced no new culture. The Classical tradition contended or combined with Romantic mediævalism; but in the nineteenth century all culture was traditional, in one or other form. The city-area and the factory were untouched. Culture was not for the streets, but for the elegant survivals in Universities which had been established in the Middle Ages, or in drawing-rooms which the Enlightenment had decorated. And this, but for American influence, is Europe to-day.

On the other hand, the people of the United States, having escaped from the domination of land-owning upper classes and mediæval institutions, founded "in the wilderness" a middle-class oligarchy which eventually gave place to a democracy of business men and skilled workers. It was therefore a society comparatively free from the limitations natural among those who grow up in the shadows of long-established institutions. Thus it came to be regarded as "free." Liberty welcomed the immigrant from Europe, if not the earlier arrivals from Africa. But in such a society, whatever its defects, European peoples developed a new

vitality; and they retain that vitality in the newest phase of industrial civilization.

The modernization of the industrial world has now brought into closer contact the vitality of America and the sense of direction peculiar to Europe without which vitality is wasted. It follows that the defects of each may be amended by the co-operation of both. But it must be a genuine co-operation. Europe must learn from America. The civilized life of the future must be "democratic" in its social assumptions and it must be experimental. Culture must be in the streets, made out of the material of to-day—cinema-films and steel and concrete—not a mere survival among modern habits and modern material. And some elements, not only of the material basis but also of spiritual insight in modernity, may be learnt by Europe from America. On the other hand, America is neither so clever in the use of material as her business men seem to think, nor so idealistic as her rhetoricians declare. She may learn from the older tradition of skill and fine insight in Europe. America may well civilize Europe, when Europe civilizes America.

But such a conclusion makes it all the more important to discover the inner forces which operate as "principles" in the structure of modern civilization. An attempt therefore must now be made to analyse in their native homes the political, economic, and cultural tendencies which combine to make modern civilization.

CHAPTER VI

DICTATORSHIP

WITHIN the past twenty years the machinery of government, as it is now significantly called, has been as rapidly transformed as the types of industrial machine. New models of command and obedience, control and co-operation, are being tried in countries where mediæval customs were dominant until the Great War. The three great European Empires of Germany, of Austria-Hungary, and of Russia have collapsed; and in China and Turkey ancient monarchies have given place to Republics. The Son of Heaven and the Caliph have followed the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire into the past. Dethroned and exiled emperors, kings, and princes, have taken refuge among the democratic societies of the West. Personal or party dictatorship has been set up in Russia, Turkey, Persia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Italy. Veiled dictatorships of the same kind are to be found in China, Egypt, and elsewhere; and in Spain, government has been carried on for some years under a post-war Dictatorship. Is this part of the development of modern civilization? Or is it a reaction against modernity?

The forms of government arise, within a social atmosphere, out of the body of customs and beliefs in this or that area. And if on the map of the world the area covered by democratic or quasi-democratic government is marked off, it will be found to include only North-Western Europe, the northern part of North America, and Australia and New Zealand. All the rest of the world is under dictatorships, of one kind or another. There are "pockets" of mediæval autocracy in

Abyssinia, Siam, the Indian States, and some parts of China. There are military dictatorships in South and Central America. And a "colonial" type of dictatorship under alien dictators exists in India, the Dutch Indies, Tropical Africa, and other colonies and dependencies. But all these are survivals from the nineteenth century or earlier. The new forms of dictatorship have appeared in the countries directly and deeply affected by the wars of 1911-22, outside the small area which was governed democratically before the war. Dictatorship in itself is not modern; but the modern version has a special importance. Here, therefore, excluding other forms of dictatorship, the post-war type will be considered in its relation to modern civilization.

Similar social conditions prevail in all the countries in which post-war dictatorship has been established. Dictatorship, therefore, has been established there and not elsewhere at least partly because of those similar social conditions. It was not inevitable or necessary; since a crude determinism of that kind is irreconcilable with the evidence of "accident" in personalities and events. But the common characteristics in all the post-war dictatorships may be connected with the prevailing social conditions in the areas they control. On a map of Europe the area governed democratically can be surrounded by a line drawn from Stockholm southwards to Prague, thence to Vienna and Milan, thence to Barcelona, and thence to Glasgow. From Glasgow eastwards to Stockholm completes the circle. The characteristics of social life within that area will be discussed below. But here the social life *outside* that area is to be considered; for *outside* are all the post-war dictatorships. The division implies that Italy and Spain are not homogeneous; and it also implies that the social life of Turkey and Russia have significant likenesses to that of Poland, the Balkan States, most of Italy, and most of the

Iberian peninsula. These likenesses, therefore, are important for the present purpose.

MEDIÆVALISM IN EUROPE

First, in all the areas of post-war dictatorship, there has been for generations and until recently a peasant population working on large estates, or upon land not owned by themselves. Their labour is exhausting: their tools mediæval. Now the social atmosphere of such a society of agriculturists tends to be fatalistic, as suggested above.¹ The worker on the land depends upon climatic conditions which he cannot control; and if, in addition, he is not his own master, he tends to acquiescence in the institutions among which he is born. Fatalism as to the gifts of the gods and acquiescence in the conduct of public affairs, which are conceived to be no concerns of his—these naturally lead to acceptance of traditional authorities. Men who feel that they cannot change their position are not interested in the institutions which they inherit. Such a social atmosphere reinforces habits of obedience to whatever persons contrive to exercise authority; and it prepares the way for that acquiescence which is necessary, if a few are to act in the name and for the sake of what they conceive to be the interests of the whole community.

Secondly, in all these countries the birth-rate is high and the death-rate, especially the infantile death-rate, also high, as compared with those of countries governed democratically. Whereas the decrease in the death-rate from disease in industrialized countries has been rapid during the past fifty years, in the countries now under dictatorship no such progress was made. For example, deaths from tuberculosis, still too numerous in England and Wales, were reduced from an average of 65,000 in the years 1886-90 to 38,000 in 1927, whereas in

¹ See p. 19 on mediævalism,

Italy the comparable figures for the same years are 63,000 and 54,000. In South Shields in Northumberland, where conditions are bad, the mean death-rate per 1,000 inhabitants was 25.5 in 1875-80, 17.9 in 1901-10 and 18.1 in 1911-20, during which latter years the epidemic of influenza occurred. In the areas outside industrial-democratic society the average has remained much the same since 1870. Similarly, in the case of the deaths of infants under one year: it is well known that the high birth-rate of mediæval Europe was counterbalanced by a high death-rate of infants, and this continues outside the democratic tradition. In England and France, which are more democratic, and in Italy which is under dictatorship, the deaths in the first year of life for every thousand births were as follows in:

	England and Wales	France	Italy
1910	117	126	152
1920	80	99	127
1926	70	97	126

The social situation is entirely different in these two types of country. The psychological effects are important for the present argument; for birth and early death bear heavily upon women. Hence women in mediæval conditions are unable to take action in public affairs: they are in fact devitalized or placed "in the home," in a very significant sense. Again, a society in which death is familiar is fatalistic; and the survivors in a disease-ridden society are themselves less alive than in modern communities. The halt and the lame and the ulcerated beggars of mediæval Europe survive outside the democratic tradition. The atmosphere of the grave spreads

upwards into poetry; and a society familiar with disease and death becomes more easily amenable to extreme measures of authoritarian control.¹ But in any case the whole social atmosphere, which depends upon the status of women and the vigour of a youthful population, is different in countries with different death-rate and disease-rate. When these are high, public spirit is low.

Thirdly, in all countries where now dictatorship exists, the percentage of illiteracy has been for generations very great. The social situation before dictatorship arises may be indicated by the illiteracy among recruits for the army.

PERCENTAGE OF RECRUITS FOR THE ARMY
WHO WERE ILLITERATE²

COUNTRIES WHICH ARE NOW DEMOCRATIC			COUNTRIES OF POST-WAR DICTATORSHIP		
<i>France</i>	1870	21.49	<i>Russia</i>	1875	78.8
	1890	9.07		1894	62.4
	1920	4.74	<i>Italy</i>	1870	56.7
	1925	9.16		1890	41.1
<i>Germany</i>	1875	2.37		1905	30.6
	1895	0.15			
	1920	0.03			
<i>Belgium</i>	1870	29.23			
	1890	15.92			
	1920	5.15			
	1925	4.39			

Illiteracy continues to be one of the chief social problems of countries not yet modernized, outside the Western tradition. For example, the countries with less than 10 per cent. of the population, from school age upwards, illiterate, are all Western democracies—Scandinavia, Great Britain, and the

¹ See Emile Mâle's study of religious art in the fifteenth century, when the decoration of tombs became most important.

² *Annuaire Statistique de la France*, 1928, p. 224 sq.

rest. Between 10 and 20 per cent. illiteracy is found in Hungary; between 20 and 30 per cent. in Italy; between 50 and 60 per cent. in Russia, which are all now under dictatorships. In Brazil and Portugal the percentage of illiteracy is between 60 and 70; and it is between 90 and 100 in the Dutch East Indies, India, and Egypt. No data are available for 733 million people, of whom about 500 million are in Asia; but it seems likely that the percentage of illiteracy in that vast number is also very low. Thus the modernization which comes from the very simplest education is not yet spread very far among the peoples of our generation. The area inhabited by persons who can read and write in some language is that of the modern State, which is, up to this time, a Western institution in the democratic tradition, except for the abnormal imitation of it in Japan.¹

In summary, the results of illiteracy are localism and ignorance of large-scale public affairs. Not being able to read or write renders a man or a woman dependent upon the talk of neighbours for news and views. Such politics as exists is the politics of the village pump. In this situation, it is unnecessary to urge a dictator to "divide and rule"; for the division is already made. Illiteracy divides society into segregate groups; and it prevents that contact of exceptional ability in one corner with similar ability in another corner, out of which modern government has arisen. People unable to read and write are more easily governed by a highly centralized authority which repudiates criticism. The "localism" of their interests and intelligence leaves large-scale government to any group which is able to seize it.

Finally, all countries where dictatorship exists have lived under authoritarian religions, until quite recently. Islam in Turkey and Persia, Orthodox Christianity in Russia, and

¹ "Illiteracy," Bulletin 4, 1929. U.S. Office of Education, Washington, D.C.

mediæval Christianity in Poland and Italy have prepared the way for the dictator who claims obedience as one who knows better than common folk what is good for common folk. The fact that in Turkey and Russia the dictatorship has broken with religious tradition, whereas in Italy the dictatorship has sought support from it, does not make less important the common atmosphere of religious authoritarianism within which both types of dictatorship have arisen. Similarly, the Brahmin and the Mandarin prepare the way for the acceptance of others claiming authority. In such a society most men look upwards by habit: they expect not discussion but commentary upon a received text—even if it be the text provided by Karl Marx. The speeches of a dictator are fundamentally different from those of a statesman in the democratic tradition; for they are not to be criticized. The “truth” in an authoritarian society is assumed to be already known.

In societies of this type, even the reformers or those who protest against authority also have peculiar characteristics. They are socially “fissiparous.” In an authoritarian society, the first revolts against authority suffer from the defects of the very condition against which they are revolts. The early Protestants, for example, divided rapidly into diverse sects; and so “liberal” movements tend to divide their forces, when they arise within an authoritarian society. This alone, gives a special advantage to any man or any group quick enough to seize a new authority, while the opponents of the old authority are quarrelling among themselves. The weakness of the non-Bolshevik reforming groups in Russia was like the weakness of the “liberal” and socialistic groups in Italy—the fissiparous tendency of heretics. If men will not co-operate with others who differ from them on minor points—not recognized to be minor points—they cannot expect to prevent

dictatorship. Discussion is certainly not government; and the "pure" gospel of reformers, which cannot be contaminated by compromise, divides reformers and gives power to a dictator.

The conditions so far described had existed, in the countries named above, for many generations before the Great War. Then, between 1917 and 1923, in all those countries, came an extreme form of social "neurosis"—a psychological unsettlement, due to lack of food, lack of security for life and property, and lack of certainty as to the future. Society seemed to be dissolving.¹ Germany, France, and Great Britain did, indeed, suffer psychological strain in the war and after, but their populations were educated and had been already deeply affected by industrialization; and therefore they did not face such an extreme crisis as Russia and Poland and Italy. In a social "neurosis" illiterate men cannot be expected to accept responsibility for government. They "regress" inevitably to the simplest forms of order by means of command and obedience. Thus many who otherwise would prefer influence to force as a method of government, accept the force of a dictatorial group as the only means available in their community for avoiding social chaos. Besides, the actual chaos followed a war; and during the war thousands of men had been accustomed to military command and military obedience. Some men are happier when they have not to bear the burden of deciding for themselves what to believe and what to do. They look willingly to authority for guidance. That type felt discomfort in leaving the army, where duty was simple and livelihood was provided at the small cost, to them, of suppressing their personalities. Hence, when such men look about

¹ Even in Spain, which had not fought in the Great War, industrial unrest in 1919, and the futile fighting in Morocco led to a peculiar psychological strain. In 1919 in Barcelona there were 500 murders. In 1922 conditions had become bad again when Primo de Rivera became military governor.

for government, they find it most easily in the old form of obedience to a commanding authority which is above criticism. Peasant fatalism, a high death-rate, illiteracy, and authoritarian religion—these are the conditions into which a great war introduced an abnormal instability; and the result—given the ability to organize a small group to seize power—was post-war dictatorship. That is the explanation why dictatorship has arisen in some countries and not in others. It entirely disproves the assertion that such dictatorship was due to a failure of democracy, or to any ill from which Great Britain, Germany, France, or the United States is suffering. The significant difference between the peoples of Europe is not a distinction between those who vote and those who do not, but between those who can read and those who cannot read, between a modern and a mediæval society.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NEW DICTATORSHIP

A similar difference underlies the characteristics of the system and the methods of post-war dictatorship. These characteristics are, first, control of public affairs by a highly organized group or Party, which claims to stand for the whole "nation" or, in the case of Russia, the whole of an exclusive "class"; and secondly the prevention of all criticism of the group or its doctrine. The devotion of the members of the Communist Party in Russia, the Fascist Party in Italy, the Kuomintang in China, and the National Party in Turkey, is undeniable. Their honesty also is clear, when they claim to know what is good for others, and to be specially able to attain it. So simple a claim is itself an indication of honesty. Such a group forms a new Clergy or an Order, similar to that of the Jesuits. Discipline in the Party is rigid; and the new generation is passed through a strict novitiate. No whisper of doubt is allowed to assail them. All personal energy of the members

is absorbed in the purpose of the Party, that is to say in the personality of its leader.

In some cases, as in Turkey and, less so, in Italy, the personality of a leader seems to give force to the Party and its doctrine. In other cases, as in Russia, the doctrine seems to be merely embodied in a leader, who may give place to another. But in either case, the Party-member becomes an instrument of a will not his own, for the common good of the Party and of the community for which the Party believes itself to stand.¹ It follows that those who cannot be persuaded to see that what the Party thinks is good for them is really so, must be coerced. Their defect is incurable: they must either obey or depart; for if truth and right action is known, any doubt is sin, punishable by damnation.

The suppression of criticism takes two forms; censorship of the Press and persecution of possible critics, which is dependent upon a spy-system. In the Press, in Russia, there is no news at all, except that provided by the Government for the good of the governed. In Italy and Turkey the method seems to be to allow the possibility, within narrow limits, of original efforts by journalists; but to suppress ruthlessly any venture outside narrow limits. In both cases the governed are not permitted to know what is being said by foreigners about their Government; nor are they permitted any foreign news which may be inconvenient for their Government. This naturally makes government easier, in so far as the ignorant are prone to blind obedience. But if it is seriously believed that the truth is known to authorities and that the Government's action is "inspired," then what is suppressed seems to be not liberty, but mere licence! A Group which acts for the good of common folk cannot permit them to be confused by news

¹ This is sometimes advocated as opposed to "Party Politics"—*lucus a non lucendo*. But clearly the evils of Party are much more extreme when there is only one Party.

and views which *must* be wrong, if they are not the views of those who alone know what is true and right.

Persecution of possible critics is highly organized in Russia and Italy, but less so in the more primitive conditions of Turkey and Poland, where effectual criticism is less likely to occur. The Russian OGPU is a necessary branch of government by dictatorship, inherited from the Tsar's system: its methods, however, are crude even for the need envisaged. An atmosphere of continual spying did not make for stability even under a Roman Emperor.¹ But spying upon private conversations is common in dictatorships. Public prosecutions have been highly developed in Russia, as demonstrations for the support of the dictatorship. Similarly in Italy, apart from the private violence of over-zealous Fascists, the dictatorship depends upon trial, exile, or imprisonment of any persons competent to criticize the conduct of public affairs. Extorted "confessions," the intimidation of witnesses, the social pressure upon friends of exiles or possible critics of the regime—all were well known under the mediæval Inquisition and in some eighteenth-century monarchies. Such methods were adopted by the French Revolution in the effort to substitute a new authority for the old; and they are the only methods conceivable by men trained in mediævalism.

These, however, are methods justified by supporters of dictatorship as necessary in the interval while society is being reformed. And modern dictatorship aims at the modernization of societies which, as described above, have all the characteristics of mediævalism. Efficiency, especially of an economic or industrial kind, is the chief purpose; but there is also a cultural ideal in view. The moral character and outlook of

¹ See Seneca: *De Ben.*, III, 26. Seneca had personal experience of eavesdropping. Tacitus and Pliny wrote under Trajan, about what was already past history. But see Tacitus: *Annals*, IV, 69, and VI, 7, and Boissier's chapter on *delatores* in *L'opposition sous les Césars* (1879).

the society controlled by dictatorship is to be remodelled. In some cases, as in Russia and Turkey, this is done by repudiating the religious tradition: in other cases, as in Italy and Poland, by seeking support from that tradition. But in all cases, the new generation is being carefully modelled upon the plan revealed by Karl Marx or other established authorities. Children, and especially adolescents, are more pliable than adults already "corrupted" by modern history and modern scientific methods; and therefore the new generation is brought up in quasi-military groups entirely ignorant of any point of view, other than that of the dominant Party in the State. The *balillia* in Italy carry arms: the Young Communists in Russia feed on bogies.

Again, in each dictatorship the control of the Press, the persecution of possible critics, and the disciplining of the younger generation—these have the effect of *insulating* the nation or the community from the rest of the world. In Russia, for example, only one view of Great Britain is possible—given the evidence supplied by authority; in Italy only one, and that the favourable view of Fascism held by persons outside Italy, is allowed to penetrate into the country. It is irrelevant for the present argument whether such a view is correct or not. The point is that, by contrast, many views of Russia are expressed in Great Britain, the United States, and Germany. That is to say, in a dictatorship "opinion" is insulated and homogeneous; but in any community of the democratic tradition opinions are many, changing, and always various. Thus the Government of a dictatorship has a readier weapon for war than any democracy can have. A homogeneous opinion, ignorant of what is going on outside the borders of a country, is very easily excited into a war fever. Also, it may be an advantage to a dictatorship at any moment to suppress discontent by rousing the population by a fear of war

or by the desire for a "just" claim to be settled—not by persuasion, which is democratic, but by force, which is the basis of dictatorship. Thus all dictatorships are dangerous to other Governments. And yet, such is the strength of the democratic tradition that, with skill in diplomacy, finance, and commerce, the non-dictatorial Governments derive more advantage from intercourse with the Dictatorships than these can possibly derive from their efforts at propaganda. Always persuasion is stronger than force and fraud, if it is skilful; and even reckless propaganda can be undermined by still more subtle methods. In any case the insulation of a nation by its Government is a policy of dictators: indeed, it is a confession of a sense of weakness on their part, as the suppression of criticism is a confession of inability to refute it.

All these methods are now used for the purpose of modernizing certain countries, and clearly some success in this aim has been achieved by dictators. Turkey is being modernized: so is Russia; in Italy the efficiency in some sections of transport has been increased and has impressed travellers. Indeed, one may go further. Order is being drilled into these populations and also a certain community of spirit. True, the order is dependent upon command and the efficiency is that of blind obedience. But if, as dictators assume, the majority are not competent to think or to associate in action for themselves in public affairs, then uncriticized command and blind obedience is the best form of government; and after a while common folk become accustomed to what is, in some ways, for their good. In such conditions, public health improves, the death-rate and disease-rate are decreased, education in its simpler forms is spread, new inventions in industry or in leisure hours are made available. Is not this modernization?

In a modern prison the situation is indeed very like that of a nation under post-war dictatorship. The prison warders

act for the good of the prisoners. The food is regularly provided; and work and leisure are well organized. There are even opportunities for the development of the fine arts; and besides, the great majority of the prisoners are, perhaps, happy—*faute de mieux*. Perhaps, also, that is the way to improve prisoners who are incompetent, with a proper use of psychological “suggestion” and a very necessary severance of the prisoners from contaminating influences which might disturb the prison routine and the stability of the situation. Some who are still outside may feel that they would be excellent warders, and may therefore suggest the introduction of the system for the good of other nations; and there may be some who prefer to receive orders for their own good, even as prisoners. There are, indeed, disconcerting similarities between dictatorship and a modern prison regime.

EARLIER EXAMPLES OF ESCAPE FROM MEDIÆVALISM

The modern prison regime, however, might be conceived to be a new system of government, if there were not evidence in history of similar efforts to escape from mediævalism, in Europe two centuries ago. Dictatorship, both as a form of absolutism and as a means of modernization, reminds one of the “Liberal” Monarchies of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These monarchies were welcomed by great numbers then as an escape from feudal anarchy. Centralization and “nationalization” of government was a first step out of mediævalism. Local rivalries and local laws and customs were nuisances to those who wanted to trade and, therefore, to the majority who derived advantages from expanding trade. Thus the Sovereign’s “dictatorship” was better than what preceded it. And, as in modern dictatorships there are “reforming” groups which oppose the new absolutism, so in the seventeenth century there were *monarchomachi* or

republican theorists or groups maintaining "local liberties" which seemed to the intellectuals of the time to be more progressive than absolutism promised to be.¹ But the opponents of absolutism in the *parlements* or the *cortes* or the *diets* must have seemed to common folk to be advocating division and wordy discussion and liberty "to go as you please," which were too similar to feudal anarchy. Thus the mind of that time swung towards Sovereignty, as men nowadays tend to support dictatorship without desiring the suppression of criticism, because they feel that strong government would be impossible under disputatious assemblies of theorists. Reformers and intellectuals "give away" their own case, in the eyes of common folk, by being more interested in abstract "principles" than in competent government.

Again, the monarchies of the new order following the Middle Ages in Europe were, in a sense, "liberal" and introduced reforms, as dictatorships nowadays introduce reforms in Russia, Turkey, or Italy. Peter the Great was the predecessor of Lenin: Louis XIV wrote the first variation on the theme now played by Mustapha Kemal and Mussolini—*l'Etat c'est moi*.² But liberalizing monarchs were not dishonest in their efforts to improve transport, trade, and the arts. That was their way out of mediævalism. So now, dictatorships improve the railway-system and the schools and "modernize" mediæval societies, because that is the most obvious and,

¹ It is significant but not reassuring that in Ruggiero's *European Liberalism* mediæval "liberties" should be associated with the "Liberalism" of pre-war Europe.

² The regime of Louis XIV, in Voltaire's sense or in M. Bertrand's mythology, is referred to here. No reference is made to the polygamous tendencies of that semi-educated sensualist, who was the actual *grand monarque*. Voltaire's studies of the other modernizing monarchs, Charles XII and Peter the Great, are also worth comparison with the praise of dictators in recent books; and the modernization was probably genuine. Abdul Hamid indeed built the Hejaz railway; but he did not aim at modernization. He intended to reinforce his own mediæval status. The position is not quite the same with Louis XIV or Mussolini.

perhaps, the most direct method of modernization for men who have been trained in an authoritarian society.

It is therefore conceivable that dictatorship may be a step out of mediævalism into modernity; but it is a form of government less highly developed than contemporary democracy, for Western Europe and North America have already passed through the very stage of development now prevailing in post-war dictatorships. The countries now under such dictatorship have never had any experience of modern democracy; and therefore they cannot in any sense be held to be proofs of its failure. The doubts about democracy, expressed in democratic societies by "disgruntled highbrows," are not the sources of dictatorship, although they may be utilized by its advocates, as doubts about scientific statements are used by reactionary theologians to obstruct all science. The success in the first efforts of dictators, however, as in the case of eighteenth-century monarchs, does not bring them "out of the wood." The more efficient the people they govern become, the more difficult they will be to govern by the simple rule of command and obedience. The lower the disease-rate and the more plentiful the food, the more vigorous the criticism which will arise. The more stable the social order, the less the fear of chaos will be to deter men from attempts at changing institutions. And finally, the more commentary upon a doctrine there is, the greater the variety among commentators. "You cannot chain the mind of man," as Renan says. "Tie it to a text; and it will escape in the commentary."

The very speed with which modernization can be achieved under the new dictatorships, by the use of methods and instruments discovered under democracy, may make the crisis in a dictatorship more acute when it comes. Public health organization, as well as the cinema and the motor-car give the modern dictator a power not possessed by the liberal-

izing monarch of two centuries ago; but the modern methods and instruments have social effects which it is difficult for any authority to control.

Again, modernization with recent instruments of transport and communication inevitably destroys localism. The first effect, no doubt, is to transform village-pump politics into the *sacro egoismo* of an ignorant nationalism. But the process, once begun, cannot be stopped at the limit which happens to be convenient to the dictator. If common folk learn to read and write in Russia, China, Turkey, Poland, or Southern Italy, it will be less and less possible to control what they think. Even the results of authoritarian education ferment into the new wine of critical discussion. Protestant theologies were the direct results of mediæval scholasticism: they provided an escape from mediævalism; and they fermented into modern science. Therefore after the eighteenth came the nineteenth century in European civilization; and it is more than possible that dictatorship will be affected by the motor-bus and the cinema and the radio in such a way as to undermine the absolutism which distinguishes it from modern forms of government. Prophecy is out of place here. It is only necessary to note that the pressure of contemporary social changes brings men together across great distances, that new ideas are in the air and that even a carefully governed younger generation tends to doubt the excellence of its teachers. If that is so, modernization by dictatorship may be the destruction of dictatorship.

THE MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIA

The modernization of the countries now under the control of the Soviet Government in Moscow may prove to be exceptionally interesting. But the evidence is obscure, if not contradictory; and the prospects highly speculative.¹ Therefore nothing more than a note can be attempted here. It is assumed in this book that modernization implies the further development of the same process as produced the Renaissance after the Middle Ages in Europe and the industrial era after the Renaissance. The methods for promoting the process are analysed in the following chapters. But the Communist Party is believed to aim at establishing some other form of society, not what is called modern here. Its methods have been so far those of eighteenth-century authoritarianism; and these methods may be useful for attaining a purpose not discussed in this book.

Some ordinary modernization of the peoples so controlled seems already to have occurred in the cultural, political, and economic spheres. In culture, an illiterate peasantry together with almost primitive tribes in Asia, numbering together about 150 million, has had, during the past ten years, the bare beginnings of education. Health conditions in some places seem to have improved from the mediæval stage of development, which still prevails in most of the area; but vodka-drinking, made legal again in 1922, seems to yield a large revenue to the State. A few automobiles, in the whole area only about 15,000, use the few roads which have an adequate surface. But the cinema and the radio are delocalizing the peasant mind.

In political organization there seems to be an increase, in small circles, of the consciousness that one can change institutions or public policy; but the criticism of any policy is confined within very strict limits, as in eighteenth-century Europe. The preparations for a purely "defensive" war for an ideal are the same as in earlier times for other ideals. But it is in industrialization that travellers seem to find most of the signs of modernization in Russia. Peter the Great learned about industry on the Thames: the Soviet Government seems to learn about industry in Detroit. The so-called "five-year plan," based upon speculative estimates and a very general enthusiasm, will probably succeed in making the

¹ See Emile Burns: *Russia's Productive System*, 1930; P. Haensel: *The Economic Policy of Soviet Russia*, 1930; M. Hindus: *Humanity Uprooted*, etc.

Soviet territories less dependent for their mechanisms upon the already industrialized countries. The accumulation of capital necessary for this appears to involve a shortage of "consumption goods," from which the peoples controlled may suffer—but suffer willingly. However, even if the "plan" succeeds, the result would leave the peoples under the Soviet still very far behind Western peoples in the utilization of their resources. A more equal distribution of such advantages as can be secured may make the communities concerned more satisfied than the very unequal distribution in traditionally industrialized countries can make their populations. But modernization—in the sense explained below—could only begin after the transport, the manufacturing power, and the available consumption goods under the Soviet Government, had increased many times as much as even the five-year plan contemplates. Modernization, however, in the sense of spontaneous group-life and advanced technical ability widely spread, may very well be hoped for in the whole of the Russian dominions for the advantage of all the peoples of the world.

CHAPTER VII

MODERN GOVERNMENT

GOVERNMENT is a process by which the normal relations between men in any locality and between men in different localities are maintained in accordance with public agreement or acquiescence. But government does not create those relations. They are the results of economic and cultural tendencies, which again arise out of climatic, biological, and psychological factors. Thus the form of government in one country tends to differ from that in another; and in communities which have already passed beyond mediæval authoritarianism, the form of government belongs to that tradition which is called "democratic." During the past twenty or thirty years the changes in transport, in production, and in the tastes and habits of men have so modified some relationships within what has been called above the modern world, that government itself is changing, both in its national and international functions. Indeed, the recent establishment of Republics in the highly educated, non-mediæval communities of Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia, is far more significant of the modernization of government than the reaction to dictatorships in authoritarian and illiterate nations.¹ And in the older democracies of the Scandinavian countries, Great Britain, Holland, and the United States, the recent changes in the functions of government and the spontaneous vitality of new political groups are signs of a genuine modernization.

It does not follow, however, that the democratic tradition can be allowed to drift upon the waves of political rhetoric which we have inherited from Gambetta and Gladstone. The

¹ See A. Headlam-Morley: *The New Democratic Constitutions of Europe*, 1928.

facts of contemporary modern life must be more closely observed in the countries within that circle referred to above, from Stockholm to Milan, thence to Barcelona, thence to Glasgow, and back to Stockholm. Within that circle are great city-areas, where industrial production, mechanical transport, and modern banking are dominant, where also the cinema and the radio are already commonplace.¹ These city-areas and the smaller industrialized towns are in continuous close contact by road-transport, rail, and, more recently, by aeroplane, as well as by telephone. The radio-transmitting stations of the circle are all reachable, across frontiers, by receiving-sets within the circle. The type of clothing is similar. The position of women is almost that of equality with men. The percentage of literacy is high; schools are numerous and are now beginning to use the same methods of "activity" education, as contrasted with the traditional book-education. The expectation of life is greater within this circle than elsewhere; the birth-rate is decreasing;² but the infantile death-rate has already decreased. The devitalization due to disease, common in primitive and mediæval communities, is being quickly remedied by better diet, more sunlight, and more leisure for all.³ The general tone of society implies that men can control the situation into which they are born and transform the institutions they have inherited.

In this industrial Europe the dominant religious groupings are Protestant, and therefore democratic, because any man in them can have his "say," and authorities are freely criticized. Politically, within the same area, there is voting for repre-

¹ This is well described by F. Delaisi, *Les Deux Europes*, 1930.

² R. Kuczynski: Birth-rate in West and North-West Europe per 1,000:

1874-5, 32.7	1911-14, 24.2	1924-5, 19.9
1891-5, 29.7	1922-3, 21.0	1926, 19.2

³ Summer-time, or daylight-saving, for which a Bill was first introduced in 1908 in the House of Commons, became law in Great Britain in 1916, and was made permanent in 1925. In the United States, the system was introduced by Federal Law in 1918, repealed in 1919; and since then it has been established by State laws in some States.

sentatives, in most countries by adult suffrage; and Governments are directly affected by a changing popular opinion or by the newspapers. Political parties exist which are opposed one to the other and yet able to support a single form of government. Industrially, there are powerful trade unions and still more powerful groupings of capital-owners. The close relation of financial and manufacturing groups in Stockholm, Berlin, Milan, Barcelona, Paris, Manchester, and London makes one Europe which is distinguishably industrial. And it is within this area that Americanization is proceeding most rapidly. Indeed, North America is part of the same world as that circle in Western Europe described above. North America is in closer contact industrially with Western Europe than with the Europe of dictatorship; and the social customs are similar. The forms of government within the circle of industrialized Europe and in North America, north at least of the Southern States,¹ are also similar; and they are called democratic, because of a peculiar development of thought since Aristotle.

Clearly there is only the very slightest resemblance between modern government in an industrialized community and the rule of a "parochial Sinai," such as fifth-century Athens, under a few adult males. The characteristics of modern government, therefore, are obscured by calling it democratic;

¹ Democratic government does not exist where, as for example, in Louisiana in the 1924 Presidential election the register contained 274,529 white voters and 980 negroes, out of a negro population of 700,257, of whom 359,251 were over twenty-one and 129,271 were literate. In the middle west and south-west 70 per cent. are voters; in the south 10 per cent. of the population vote and 18 per cent. have votes. See S. C. Johnson: *The Negro in American Civilization*. But here also there are the conditions suitable for dictatorship: illiteracy, peasant fatalism, an inheritance of slave mentality, a lower "expectation of life at birth," and an uncritical book religion. Even in cities such as Chicago and New York, the ex-peasants of 1870 and 1880 retain an authoritarian religion and a certain fatalism, combined with gang-loyalty similar to that of mediæval Italian cities in their local quarrels. Corruption in such a society is not a failure of "democracy," but a result of the absence of conditions requisite for democracy.

and yet—there is no help for it—we must use the traditional word and attempt to give it a new sense, in reference to factors actually operative to-day. Not a definition of democracy is required, but a description of the modern system of government which is operative in the area named above.

THE FUNCTIONS OF MODERN GOVERNMENT

Modern government includes some activities quite unconnected with government a century ago, some activities which did not exist at all fifty years ago, and some, especially in international affairs, which were hardly more than experimental until after the armistice of 1918. In order to discover what "the State" now is, in the United States or Great Britain or Germany, it is quite useless to go to Jefferson or Rousseau or even to Hegel, whose Absolute died about 1830. The way to discover the nature of modern government is to ask what is being done in the City Hall of Chicago, the Department of the Interior in Washington, or the City Chambers in Glasgow or the County Hall or the Ministry of Health in London. And it is to be hoped that if such a question be asked, the answer accepted will *not* be that government is for anything so vague as "the good life." The talkie and the motor-car are also for the "good life," according to Aristotle; and Aristotle is really dead. It is almost impossible to persuade commentators not to do body-snatching. Government to-day is not for flute-playing nor drama nor the appointment of bishops. It is for public health, educational organization, the promotion of industry and other such purposes in detail.

Obviously, modern government continues, in somewhat modified forms, the ancient activities associated with "order" and "defence." That is to say, before the State can do anything, it must exist and preserve its existence. Physical force is still believed, not without reason, to be useful for this. Thieves

and fraudulent bond-sellers still continue to operate; and although stealing is a traditional method of redistributing property, and property is indeed badly distributed, it is not found convenient to allow that particular method of change. Modern government, therefore, has developed the old Sheriff and his "posse" into a police force, invented about a century ago. It has developed mediæval prison-cells into modern settlements for segregation or re-education of criminals. The modern Court, best seen in the Juvenile Court of the United States or Great Britain, uses psychology as well as lawyer's rhetoric. But obviously in all these police-functions of modern government, the old traditions make modernization difficult. The trouble is not merely that the imagination of governmental agents is limited, it is that we have to deal with criminals who are mediæval or primitive, surviving in the midst of modern life and taking advantage of it. Caliban in Piccadilly is a "throw-back"; and it is foolish to treat him as though he were a modern man. He must be controlled by force, if he is not amenable to argument. But in general the importance of force is reduced under modern government.

As for that other traditional function of government—war, which is now called "defence," that will be discussed in the next chapter, when the relations between different governments and peoples are described. But it must be noted here that, in the performance of the functions to be seen operative in War Departments, government is still unmodernized. The use of modern weapons would not make the Black Prince modern. Defence, unless it means simply police-work, is an obsolete purpose of government, which is continued only so long as it is not seen to be obsolete.

In addition to functions inherited from the past, modern government includes assistance towards the development of industrial efficiency. This, no doubt, has its roots in the old

Mercantilism; but nowadays industry and commerce in a modern State are not regarded as sources of gold for those in control of government. Clearly the advantage of this or that State in possible future war is one of the reasons for tariffs or the "protection" of certain industries; but that again is a survival. For the most part government, with respect to industry and commerce, supplies services useful to economic production and consumption—in statistics, in unemployment, and invalidity insurance, in arbitration of industrial disputes, in protection of the life and limb of workers, and in research for industrial purposes. This group of activities of government is being adopted by dictatorships from the democratic tradition, where it arose. But the whole system is not yet a century old; and the general character of the development is hardly yet understood. It is enough for the present argument to note that within the past fifty years in the democratic tradition government has developed these new functions.

Again, modern government organizes preventive medicine in the widest sense, from drainage to sunlight clinics. By the action of the modern State the epidemics of mediævalism and the new dangers which arose in the city-area of industrialism were overcome; and in half a century the expectation of life at birth was lengthened by about fourteen years. It cannot be too often repeated that this was done under the Parliamentary system of local councils and national assemblies, voted for by common folk.¹ The impatience with popular control or with the ignorance of elected persons is inexcusable; for in spite of all the defects of the representative system, there have been fewer obstacles in the way of progress under democracy than there have been under liberal monarchies or dictatorships.

Finally, under the democratic tradition illiteracy has prac-

¹ For further details, see my *Democracy* p. 56 sq.

tically been abolished within fifty years, by a non-doctrinal, non-military education organized under the State through representative assemblies. In England and Wales the numbers of children on the registers of public elementary schools and the number of teachers in all "State" schools increased as follows:¹

	Number on Register	Number of Teachers
1870-1	1,802,419	14,446
1890-1	4,833,187	77,012
1900-1	5,777,631	118,925
1913-14	6,078,895	163,930
1920-1	5,904,496	165,722
1925-6	5,637,467	162,551

In the United States "in 1928 the public high schools enrolled 1,933,821 pupils, and in 1928 they enrolled 3,911,279." The enrolment in schools giving a statement of expenditure was 29,000,000 pupils and the total cost in 1928 about \$3,033 million, an increase of about \$290 million over 1926. In 1890 the public elementary schools had 12,519,518 pupils; in 1910 they had 16,898,791; and in 1928 they had 20,572,927.² The point is that, even allowing for increase of population, under democratic traditions immense and rapid progress has been made which was not made in the areas now under dictatorship. Similar figures exist to show the change wherever democracy has developed.³ The social effects of education since 1870 in all democratic countries are immense and fundamental—an uncensored Press, opposing political parties, a higher level of

¹ Educ. Statistics, 1925-6. Table 31, p. 28. The figures showing decrease after 1920 indicate the reduced birth-rate of 1914-18.

² Statistical Summary of Education, 1927-8, U.S. Department of the Interior.

³ Germany would perhaps have been a dictatorship after the war but for her education.

technique in industry, a great development of invention and scientific research.

RECENT CHANGES: (a) EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE

Within the area where modern government has been developing for fifty years, two new factors have changed the situation since the Armistice of 1918. One is the extension of the franchise to women and to all sane adults; the other is the growth of voluntary associations, of which the Youth movement and similar Student movements are the most significant. The facts are well known. Women have the vote in all modern States under democracy except in France and Switzerland, where the chief obstacle is a mediæval form of Christianity: for reformers fear to advocate the franchise for women because of the influence of the priests, and the orthodox maintain that the place of the woman is in the home.

In the German elections of 1930, 40 women were elected to the Reichstag, of whom 17 belonged to the Social Democratic Party and 13 to the Communist Party. Women's votes, however, where they are distinguished from men's, were preponderatingly for the "middle" Parties. Of every hundred votes for the Centre Party, for example, in Cologne 63.6 per cent., Berlin 61.5 per cent., and Frankfurt 62.6 per cent. were women's votes, whereas for the Communist Party, of every 100 only 38.8 in Cologne, 46.9 in Berlin, and 43.4 in Frankfurt were women's votes. From such inadequate evidence, however, the only general conclusion seems to be that the difference between the sexes is irrelevant as regards political opinion, except perhaps where authoritarian religion operates. Women now (1930) have the vote in Great Britain, the United States, the British Dominions,¹ the Scandinavian Countries,

¹ Only white women in South Africa, and no provincial vote for women in Quebec, where authoritarian religion prevails. New Zealand, the first country to give women the vote, has never had a woman elected a Member of Parliament.

Holland, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia. In Russia and Poland also, women have the vote; but the situation in those countries is, to say the least, peculiar; and in all cases the vote has been given to women only in the last ten or fifteen years. The very limited extent of the area covered by this new step in democracy and the very recent date at which it has been made, are both important, if the characteristics of the democratic tradition are to be understood. The women's vote has come in most countries which now have it at the same time as full adult suffrage for men; and therefore for the first time "the people" politically means all adults.

The most important issue, however, is the question what sort of function is performed by the person or group which votes. The history of the extension of the franchise has obscured the true purpose of voting. When women or unenfranchised men claimed the vote, they did so because they thought the vote was a means for making them happier. So it may be, but certainly not unless it is used intelligently; and it is not intelligent to imagine that in a "democracy" everyone will have his own way. Not very much more intelligent is the supposition that every small group with an "opinion" which can be "represented" can have its own way. The alternative to strong government—proportional representation, where one group is prevented from ruling by the fact that every other group has an equal power to rule, leads to complete inaction. What we want to discover by asking people to vote, therefore, is not how many plans can be imagined, but how many people will work together on one plan. The vote is only a sign that the voter will act in support of the person or group for whom the vote is given. The real task of citizenship begins *after* the voting is done. Hence the importance of voluntary associations for the pursuit of some public good, independent of the State or of any "official" recognition.

Spontaneity in public service is the distinguishing mark of democracy as contrasted with dictatorship.

The whole political situation of common folk has been changed since, quite recently, all adults of both sexes have had the vote. It is therefore important to note the principle which distinguishes a society in which few vote, as in pre-war Britain, from one in which all have the vote : for now the vote should no longer be an instrument of group interests. Women have the vote at last in all completely modernized States ; and so low an opinion of the past, under men's rule, is held by some of their rhetoricians, that one might imagine them ready to take the vote away from men ! The trouble with those who protest successfully against a denial of right, is that they go on protesting after they have established their right. Similarly, the vote was demanded throughout the nineteenth century by those who felt that the power of others, who already had it, was being used to their disadvantage. At that time democracy was the expression of an ideal, based upon a grievance. It was thought by those who had *not* the vote that men who had the vote used it to forward their own interests ; and thus, the success of the claims then made causes those who now have the vote to imagine that they can do nothing better than imitate their late oppressors and use the vote for *their* interests. The peasant in the French Revolution won the right to kill the lord's pigeons ; and now there are no pigeons left to kill, because the peasants could not think of anything better to do than imitate their late masters. Again, some peoples have been freed from alien rule after the late war ; and they now proceed to use their power to do to their subjects what was once done to them. Government once meant for them oppression ; so now, having control of government, they practise oppression. The farmer used his horse-cart to reach the local supply of drink : he now has the advantage

of a motor-car to take him—the same way. But that is no argument against a motor-car. And the misuse of votes or of the power to govern is no argument against voting or governing by a whole community.

Is there no hope that in a new situation men will think and act in new ways? That is the problem of what we call democracy; for many in America and Europe believe that democracy, if not skilfully practised, is at least in principle accepted as the basis of the modern State. The most obvious signs of democracy are adult franchise and the use of State organization for public services beneficial to common folk. But what do these involve, if they are to “work”? What is a “vote” for? It cannot be merely an instrument by which the voter’s “interest” may be promoted against some other “interest”; for then a democracy is less excellent than a dictatorship, since “the Party” in a dictatorship claims to stand for the interest, not of the Party, but of the whole community. Even in the old days, the few men who had the vote believed themselves to represent the whole community.

VOTING FOR THE COMMON GOOD

In the first place, then, the principles of modern government imply that the power exercised in voting must be used for the advantage of a common good as inclusive as the voter can imagine. And if those who have votes cannot think of any good more inclusive than that of their own family or local gang, they should not vote at all. The test of real democracy is not the number of people who vote, but the efficacy of the result of their voting in the attainment of some public good. No government at all is possible, if each man thinks mainly of himself; for government is a co-operative task and voting is a means whereby the common man may perform

his part in that task. Government is a game in which each man must play *for his side*: modern government is a modern school in which each man must acquire what education he can by assisting in the common task.

It is utterly useless to try to discover the principles of modern democracy by examining the peculiar habits of Ancient Athens or nineteenth-century France. When about ten thousand old gentlemen controlled the government of England in the eighteenth century and incidentally exploited Ireland, eviscerated Scotland, and lost America, they called themselves "the people." When the males of France demand "security," refuse public-health organization for their country, and prevent women from obtaining the vote, they call themselves "France." And any gang which will pay enough out of public funds for the votes of its supporters can call its policy or lack of policy "the will of the people." Sham democracies are so many and so various that it seems difficult to persuade the critics of democracy to look for the real thing. Thus modern dramatists can set up an "Aunt Sally" for their wit and persuade the Stalls, if not the Gallery, that they are discussing democracy. But political democracy, as regards representation of all common folk, has not yet operated for ten years even in the most highly developed countries; and it now operates in a jungle of ancient snobberies and intellectual obscurantism. In its most recent form democracy is still on trial; and it is ridiculous to charge it with defects which democratic communities have inherited from illiterate authoritarianism.

The extension of the franchise, however, does not change the functions of government. To plan and build a road-system, to organize a water-supply, to collect and destroy sewage and refuse—these are among the functions of modern government; and for these the skilled man, the technician, the expert are necessary. Roads cannot be planned by vote

nor water purified by debate: but that does not imply anything against either votes or debates. Voting and debating are only parts of a machine of which the other parts are administration and expert advice. The methods of democracy include the use of experts; but that should not interfere with the proper use of voting or debate among ordinary folk.

Again, as in other spheres, we are in difficulties because of ancient habits and customary attitudes. Knowledge has in the past been a sacred and almost a secret possession of a few authorities. The modern civil servant sometimes finds it difficult to avoid imitation of his predecessors in the mediæval clergy. And some who are "cocksure" of their own expertness are not able to see how expert, at least in criticism of them, the common man has already become. The views of the expert are often impressively true and also entirely irrelevant, especially when he says that nothing can be done, while something is being done by doing nothing. Whatever an expert may be, however in government, his function is to advise, not to command, as the function of the doctor is to advise the patient. Knowledge of facts is no ground for issuing commands.

But the abstract theory of the place of the expert is irrelevant. The fact is that, within the democratic tradition, during the past twenty years, the expert has had far more influence than ever before and more than he has had anywhere else, because in the democratic areas the standard of intelligence is higher, advice as contrasted with command is understood, and, with the growth of criticism, those ancient customs have decayed which are generally the chief obstacle to the use of science by the expert. Indeed it is in the democracies that the dictatorships are now seeking their experts in finance, industry, agriculture, education, and public health.

RECENT CHANGES: (b) INCREASE IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD

The second recent change within the democratic tradition is the rapid growth of organizations of the youthful. The importance of non-adult organizations within a democratic tradition lies in three factors of the contemporary social experience of the young: first, children are not suppressed and brow-beaten as they were until fifty years ago in schools and homes; secondly, children and young people are willing to help in social tasks; and thirdly, the young generally regard as commonplaces what to the older are still very new—the cinema, the radio, the aeroplane, and other recent inventions, all of them means of increasing social contacts. These factors seem to have produced a new eagerness for social co-operation in the young.

The actual changes that have occurred in youthful life are to be seen in the Scout Movement, the Youth Movement, and the various Student Movements. The organization of Boy Scouts and Girl Guides is usually not noticed by political and economic theorists; but it must be remembered that those who are from 10 to 15 years old in 1930 will be 20 to 25 in 1940, that is to say, voters or fighters and munition-makers in a new war or—something better. What they will do then depends upon what they do now. But the most important factor in these organizations of Scouts and Guides is the dominant ideal of service to be performed here and now. This is combined with the experience of enjoyment in company, in active and sometimes adventurous occupations. Also the conception of co-operation, as contrasted with rivalry, is extended across the barriers of social caste and nationality. The Scout Movement is international: it has periodical international gatherings in addition to frequent visits to foreign

countries and is therefore correcting the tendency to localism which has obstructed civilized life. Thus in the democratic tradition the tendency of the younger generation to "regress" psychologically towards barbarism may be corrected, but in Dictatorships the youth are separated from foreign youth and the younger generation is inspired with the old concept of conflict, as *balillia* in Italy or Young Communists in Russia, against other nations or hypothetical "capitalists."

The Youth Movement, especially in Germany, was beginning before the Great War.¹ The collapse of the old regime and the deaths among the older generation strengthened the Movement. For some years after the Armistice it was very powerful; and it stood for a new outlook upon life—co-operation even across frontiers. It was a distinct Movement, with its own characteristics; but it was obviously too important to be negligible for political and religious purposes. Therefore the Movement was soon divided into separate groups of youth under the conflicting banners of the old Parties and Churches; and whether the old will destroy the new or the new transform the old is not yet clear. For five years after the Armistice the youth of Central Europe was pacifist. It is so no longer.² Despair of seeing any new principle operative in the relations between social classes or nations is driving the youth of to-day towards both extremes. Communism and Fascism are gaining ground, not only because of discontent, but also because they offer that devotion to an unselfish purpose which youth desires. The problem, therefore, is whether a devotion to some public good can be made effectual without the old basis of such devotion—opposition to some other group equally

¹ See G. P. Gooch: *Germany*, in the chapter devoted to social and educational movements. See also the article in *The Times Literary Supplement*, April 19, 1929.

² This is not intended to deny the existence of small groups working for peace. Such groups were represented in the World Youth Peace Congress at Eerde, Holland, in August 1928.

devoted. That obviously depends upon the terms in which the public good is conceived. If it be health or good company, then one kind of co-operation is natural; but if it be power over others, another kind of co-operation—that, namely, of dictatorship—will prove in the end more attractive.

Democracy is now being tested. Can there arise within the democratic tradition voluntary groupings, especially of the young, aiming at some public good from which no race or group is excluded? Can we transform the tradition of conflicting interests into co-operation, even of a few, for a common good of others? Is the “Open Conspiracy” of Mr. H. G. Wells at all possible? The answer to such questions will be given by the resources of ability and imagination now available among common folk. It is not a question of “leadership” but of sympathetic imagination perhaps creating a future leadership, and for the present allowing variety of groups, equality of many diverse interests and persuasion rather than force as the instrument of public policy; for association within a democracy for the public good is fundamentally different from the formation of a gang to establish a dictatorship. Any gang can stand for itself: only a new form of society, more inclusive than that controlled by “honour among thieves,” can produce co-operation for the common good of those who may be opposed in opinion or custom.

The principles of political organization in such a society are as follows. First, there must be a free criticism of all “authorities,” which does not undermine the acceptance of direction or advice *ad interim* by any person or group that happens to be on the bridge of the ship of State. Such a social attitude is not developed in a day: still less can it be established by decree or plebiscite. It is not a creed: it is a habit. Attacks upon democracy as a creed are futile, for modern democracy is a certain “behaviour pattern” in social

customs. It may imply intellectual assumptions; but these assumptions are seldom consciously accepted. In such a society the "Opposition" is as much a part of government as the Government with a capital G. By a series of accidents, mediæval representative assemblies have been made in some countries the means for free criticism and joint maintenance, by advocates and critics, of the Government of the day. But Parliaments are less important for modern government than the whole body of adult men and women who elect them; and the chief problem is the maintenance and development of the art of government, not the security of those in control of the machine at any moment nor the ambition of those who desire to take control.

Secondly, modern government implies the abiding by agreements made, until new agreements take their place, without force as the chief bulwark of the agreements. This is the principle of socially created law. Law, in this sense, is a gentleman's agreement between equals: its maintenance demands, on the part of almost all, an eager acceptance and, for those who will not abide by the agreement, segregation apart from the good company of their fellows.

Thirdly, modern government requires the continual creation of groups of men and women, freely associated for the public good, in one or other particular. This is the principle of voluntary association. It is in contradiction to the French Revolutionary suspicion of voluntary groupings within the State. Free association is the peculiarity which Tocqueville observed in America. It involves the growth of such bodies as League of Nations Societies, Red Cross Societies, and innumerable other Societies for one or other public purpose which is not of special advantage to any of their members. Two aspects of this tendency are important. In the first place, the groupings referred to here are not for the purpose

of forwarding "interests," but for some purpose conceived to be good for others or for the whole community. They "stand for" policy to be adopted by the Governments or by the general public. The distinction between the private interests of members of such a group and the interests of the whole community is never clear—especially to the members of the group. Fraud and hypocrisy are possible. A man may support peace because it "pays" him: nevertheless, peace is a public interest. Thus groups do exist, which promote the public good, as distinguished from any special interests of members of the groups. In the second place, such voluntary groupings for public purposes should be born and flourish and also die—when their purpose is achieved. Every organization, however, created vested interests among its officials and among those who derive prestige from directing its operations. Thus, once created, voluntary associations tend to survive too long. However, the death of their members cures all; and in any case creative vitality in making associations is directed into new channels, to combat new evils or to work for new goods, in any living society. Indeed, it is characteristic of the democratic tradition that it shows its vitality in the creation of new associations and new forms of social co-operation.

It comes to this: the development of that form of government which is now called democratic may be delayed by the devitalization of public spirit. But energy in public affairs cannot be renewed by rhetoric. Pumping enthusiasm into apathetic citizens is like running mountain streams into sand. What is needed is clear thinking and definite detailed common action in public affairs. There is more democracy in suggesting a new book for a public library or keeping the drainage of your own house in working order than in applauding a politician's speech. The force of the democratic tradition is by no means exhausted. Its immediate future, however, depends upon the

“scale” upon which common folk can co-operate for the public good; and it is therefore necessary to consider the evil inheritance of war and preparation for future war, which has so far obstructed the development of co-operation between those who differ in language or custom, even within the democratic tradition.

MODERN WAR AND PEACE

WAR is old. It is not characteristic of modern civilization; but the resources of that civilization are now being used to increase the destructiveness of war. The existing relationship between States is fundamentally the same as it has been: for in spite of some co-operation between Governments, even those which co-operate are preparing for a new war. The problem, therefore, is whether the preparations which are making another great war more likely can be counteracted by a genuine modernization of the relationship between States.

It is not modernization to use new knowledge for old purposes; but the modern State does—so far as that goes—modernize war. Much more is spent upon preparations for future war than ever before. "Europe, as a whole, spends annually on armaments £524 million (13,230 million gold francs), or £40-£45 million more than in 1913, in spite of reductions in the armaments of certain countries under the terms of the peace treaties. If the amounts spent by Germany are deducted, the totals for the other countries are:—Pre-war £386 million, post-war £487 million. These figures mean that European countries, other than Germany, devote to armaments almost as much in real values (account being taken of the rise in prices) as they did before the war, and considerably more than their average expenditure in the period 1909-13."¹ Similarly, the United States spent \$316 million on armaments in 1913 and \$658 million in 1928; and the present expenditure is about 90 per cent. above the average for 1909-14.

¹ *The Economist*, Armaments Supplement, October 19, 1929.

Are we to say that the danger of war in 1931 is greater than the danger of war was in 1910? Certainly the preparation for future war has increased; and this presumably is because of an increase in the danger—unless it is futile waste. But if the danger of war in 1931 is as great as it was in 1909—we are five years from another great war! In the judgment of those who advocate and support the present expenditure on preparation, a great war is as near in 1931 as it was in 1909. And again, the preparations for the war of 1914-18, which began vigorously to increase in 1909, were among the causes of the war itself. So now, the increasing preparation for a new war is one of the causes tending to produce that war. This is not grasped by those who think of their own preparations only; and yet those very preparations seem to other nations to be dangers against which they must prepare. All armed force for the "defence" of its users is a potential threat to those whom it does not defend. A gun has two ends. From the breach end it looks like "defence," but not from the other end. Viewed from this other end, it is reasonable ground for the preparation of another "defence." Thus, not only do other nations hasten to prepare in proportion to the preparation made by each, but as the preparation of each becomes more effectual, all the others become more nervous. Increasing fear makes for tentative mobilization, for suspicion that the possible enemy is moving, for spy-mania, and hostility to foreigners in the Press and public utterances; and a situation is thus created in which war is almost inevitable. In this sense the preparation for war is one of the causes of war.

The actual expenditure on preparation for new wars is less important than the fact that we are getting more for our money. Great advances have taken place in the destructive efficiency of armaments, even in the twelve years since 1918. Keen intelligence and the latest science have been used to improve

gunnery, bombing, and gas. Indeed, if the intelligence which has been spent upon peace had been half so practical as that spent on preparations for the new war, peace would be secure. The destroyer of to-day could easily sink the battleship of 1890. To-day's bombing aeroplanes would make the ships and guns of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 ridiculous. The battleship is being discarded: and money is now devoted to aircraft-carriers which are much more dangerous to commerce. Similarly, the armies are now "mechanized." Tanks are much more efficient than they were in 1918; and the new rifles are as destructive now as machine guns were in the war of 1914-18.¹ Further, the use of poison-gas, for the destruction chiefly of civilian populations, has been improved by research in the British Universities, in Edgewood Arsenal outside Washington, D.C., and in similar institutions in all great nations. The best scientific brains in all countries are being used in preparing new methods of destruction.

The new war for which we are all preparing will involve bombing of women and children. Indeed it may bomb "women and children first," because troops will be protected by gas-masks or gas-tight dug-outs. Thus Surgeon-Commander F. G. Hitch of the Royal Naval Barracks, Chatham, Medical Officer to the Anti-Gas School, has said that "in wars of the future, the fighting forces engaged would enjoy a high degree of protection against battle gases: and that being so, an enemy might well be unwilling to waste his chemicals against protected troops when he could employ them to much greater advantage against unprotected non-combatants." He then proceeded to outline the action which should be taken by Municipal Authorities in preparation for this coming war. "As regards children," he said, "instruction in personal defence against gas should occupy a definite place in the school

¹ See on the whole question, V. Lefebure: *Scientific Disarmament*, 1931.

routine. Anti-gas drill should be carried out periodically, and could be conducted with the same success that distinguished the fire drill in most of our English schools. Inspection of primary schools should always include anti-gas instruction among its subjects of inquiry and report." So much for the use of schools, but babies in arms are not to be forgotten! "The question of the protection of young children presented another grave difficulty. The only possible method of protection for those of tender age would be to keep them, during the danger period, in a selected room of the house, the room having been sealed up and rendered as gas-tight as possible. A feasible modification of this would be the provision of large municipal dug-outs, in which children and their mothers could remain during an attack and the subsequent period of danger; but owing to the suddenness of attack, of course, the difficulty would be to get there."¹ The speech, from which these gems are selected, was made at Bordeaux, at a Conference on Public Health! But the Surgeon-Commander is quite right. That is the way to prepare for future war, not running about with model rifles! Anti-gas drill is much more practical than "forming fours" and blowing trumpets and saluting flags.

With advances in gas-warfare go the advances in bombing aircraft, which represent forces unknown in 1909. In the United States estimates for 1931-2, a sum of over \$29 million is allotted for new aircraft: and the total of war aircraft is 1,582. Similar destructive aircraft are being increased in numbers and efficiency by all great States. The expenditure on aircraft for war is increasing everywhere.

A further modernization of war is this. In earlier times research and invention of new weapons was carried on by private armament firms; and Krupps, for example, offered the latest model in guns to any Government that would buy them.

¹ Report of speech in London *Daily Telegraph*, June 6, 1924.

Thus most Governments knew what advances had been made in weapons. But since 1918, as a result of the experience of 1914-18, all powerful Governments have taken over research into new destructive weapons. They support such research by subventions to scientists, who seem to have no objection to receiving payment for devising death. And each Government keeps its results secret. The result is that no Government can feel certain that it knows what weapons its "possible enemy" may use. Hence a great extension of spying since the Armistice of 1918—practised even by members of the League, one against the other. That alone makes the friendship of Governments insecure; but besides, the best spying may not discover all the secrets. Therefore each General Staff must allow for the possibility that it does not know what the other General Staff will use in the next war. British gas-masks, for example, may be useless against a new French gas: French aircraft may be unable to deal with a new and secret type of British bombers. And the uncertainty of the General Staff in any country as to the weapons of a "possible enemy" will make it press its own Government to strike the first blow. Fear and uncertainty are increasing with the new weapons and the new methods of devising them; and the drift towards a new war therefore becomes daily more dangerous.

THE ARMAMENTS TRADE

The power of the private armament firms, which was proved dangerous to peace in the nineteenth century, continues to be exercised.¹ The *public* sale of arms in China has increased in value fifteen times since 1919. A case was heard in the British Courts in October 1922, arising out of an intended shipment of 20,000 rifles to Northern China, the seller consenting to

¹ See G. H. Perris: *The War Traders*, 1914. And for the period since 1918, see *Die blutige Internationale der Rüstungsindustrie*, by O. Lehmann-Russbuldt, 1929.

regard the sale as pro-British on being assured that it was anti-Bolshevist.¹ There was indeed a China Arms embargo; but some States, such as Norway and Germany, never agreed to it; and it was ended on April 26, 1929. Tanks and bombing aircraft supplied by the armament firms of all the Christian nations have made the civil war in China more disastrous, not only for Chinese, but for European sellers of cotton-goods. The British aircraft manufacturers in 1930 were supplying Greece and Belgium; and following the Preparatory Disarmament Conference of December 1930, new armament factories were begun at Bystritz in Czechoslovakia and at Krakow in Poland, while Rumania entered into new arrangements with the Skoda works and Bulgaria with the Italian armament firm of Zaproni.² The egregious Mr. Shearer, during the Geneva Naval Conference of May 1927, believed himself to have successfully impeded agreement, in the interest of the armament firms of the United States; and agents from all the great firms are always travelling in small States to increase the danger of war.

The sale of arms is promoted as follows. The Government of a small State which has no munition factories is perhaps induced for the sake of "prestige" to have a small fleet of bombing aircraft. The agent will then go to the neighbouring State and induce the Government there to buy a fleet for "defence" against the fleet which the same agent has just sold to the first Government. And each improvement of type similarly will be advertised in each State, the situation thus drifting towards war with the increase of nervousness or the growth of confidence in one General Staff or the desire to forestall possible action by neighbours. The League of Nations was supposed to deal with the danger arising out of private

¹ *The Times Law Reports*, October 17 and 22, 1930.

² See details in *Chicago Daily News*, December 12, 1930, p. 2.

trade in armaments; but nothing has been done during the ten years of the League's life. The trade is flourishing in spite of world-wide economic depression.¹ Thus both by direct action of Governments and by the activities of armaments traders, the relationship between States is becoming daily more precarious. The drift towards a great war is stronger as each nation's "defences" become more alarming to its neighbours: and the Governments seem to be unable to resist the pressure which is carrying them towards the collapse from which they piously avert their faces.

THE CONCEPTION OF "DEFENCE"

The modernization of war is continued by each people on the plea of "defence." Since the signing of the Kellogg Pact in 1927, it should have been assumed that no signatory State will be "aggressive." But no State has changed its armaments programme as a result of the Pact; and therefore each State, which says it is armed for defence only, is disbelieved by all the others which are co-signatories. Indeed, within two weeks of the signing of the Pact, British bombing-aircraft practised over London; and two weeks later French bombing-aircraft practised over Paris. Each was of course practising "defence;" but the authorities admit that the only effectual "defence" against aircraft is to bomb the enemy bases beforehand, which naturally seems to the possible enemy to be aggressive.

No one with any knowledge of modern psychology will believe that armaments are for "defence." The plea is a "cover"

¹ See Chairman's speech of Fairey Aircraft Co., *The Times*, December 23, 1930. "Within the last few months the company has obtained important contracts in Belgium and Greece and minor orders from other countries, and there appear to be good prospects for further orders in the future. . . . During the present economic depression it is considered that the time is not opportune for any further essays in *civil* aviation. . . . It is not proposed to make the company's new aerodrome available for *civil* use, as the company requires it for the testing of secret machines." See also *The Times*, January 5, 1931. Orders from the Belgian Government exceed £300,000.

to excuse a traditional habit. Armaments have always existed for victory, for prestige, for glory, and for the advancement of "interests"—undefined or commercial. All these old purposes still exist; but they are now called "defence." Clearly the majority of citizens in all modern States seriously believe that *their own* armaments are only for defence; and these same citizens also believe that the armaments of "possible enemies" are not for defence, whatever those foreigners may say. On the assumption that each State must be defended, all foreigners *must* be untrustworthy; for that is the ground for defence. And the British, for example, are not hypocritical when they say that the British navy is for "defence" and other navies are not. Hypocrisy is the conscious maintenance of contradictory attitudes; but most men are not intelligent enough to be hypocrites. Indeed, some in every nation assume that "defence" by armed force is necessary because it has been thought necessary by their forefathers, and the majority never think on the subject at all. Thus the traditionalist in this matter has control of policy in each State; and he plays into the hands of the traditionalists in other States. Each Government arms only for defence against other Governments also armed only for defence; and even the Kellogg Pact does not forbid war as an instrument for "defence"!

Since the Armistice of 1918, some advocates of peace have sought to escape from the contradictions involved in defending yourself against others who are only defending themselves, by proposing what is fantastically called "mutual" defence. They accept the false assumption of traditionalists and strive to reach a new conclusion. They say in effect that each State will defend not only itself but all the others—except . . . except, of course, the State which is the "possible enemy." Thus there remains some State as a possible enemy. Hypothetically, in the thin abstract air of this argument, *any*

State may be this "possible enemy," even your own. But psychologically a trick is contrived by which, in each State, the old assumption prevails, namely that "we" are trustworthy in our promise of "mutual defence," but other people, generally a certain other people, emotionally objectionable at the moment, are not trustworthy. Thus the atavistic emotional satisfaction of "defending" by force of arms is reconciled with the new effort to extend the interests of each people beyond its own frontiers.

Apart, however, from the new form of the ancient theory of defence, in practice the effort to obtain "mutual defence" since the armistice has not been the policy of the States disarmed under the Peace Treaties, but the policy of the most heavily armed States. And these same States have in fact already provided for "mutual defence" by special Treaties for the maintenance of the advantage they derived from the war of 1914-18. It is now their policy to extend such Treaties to include a greater number of allies, on the assumption, of course, that only those who have a grievance are likely to be "aggressive." The policy of "mutual defence" is not based upon an abstract theory but upon the old effort to secure allies in a future conflict.

Again, in practice the claim for assistance in defence has been used as an excuse for refusing to reduce armaments. The argument runs thus: if my armaments are for defence in view of possible danger, the danger would only be increased by my reducing my defence; therefore, every item of force I reduce must be supplied by the addition of your force, so as to leave the defence unimpaired. The argument is correct—on the assumption, which is false, that defence will always be needed. The very practical and indeed ancient policy of "mutual" defence has been innocently accepted by theorists on the purely hypothetical ground that each people has an

interest in the maintenance of the civilization of every other. Such theorists do not see that civilization need not depend upon "defence" of one instrument of civilization against another instrument which exists for the same purpose. Defence, however, *is* needed in every State so long as defence is *believed* to be needed in other States. There may be some slight reduction of defences, for economic "savings," if States can risk so much trust as that involves. Some reduction may result from the sense that increase of defences increases the danger; but it is very unlikely that any great reduction can take place so long as those whose duty it is to think in terms of defence are regarded as experts in reducing defences. Delay in preparing industry for war would make sudden war less likely.¹ But the fundamental mistrust of peoples will remain, so long as any preparation for war against other peoples is believed to be necessary.

Analogies and metaphors have always been the curse of political theory; and the same curse still obscures the issue in the problem of the relation of States. Hobbes said frankly that States were gladiators. Our traditionalists suppose them to be policemen; and in order to find a criminal for the police to arrest, they suppose one of the policemen to be a criminal! Clearly a police-force in one part of the country does not exist for defence against *another police-force*; but armies and navies exist for defence against other armies and navies. Therefore there is no analogy. Another analogy refers to the body of citizens in any State being hypothetically bound to assist any against assault. This implies that the fifty or more States of the world are a community of individuals. Waive the difficulty of treating the 150 million of the U.S.S.R. and the 400 million under British jurisdiction as two individuals, approximately equal in strength with the four million in a Scandinavian State

¹ This is the chief argument in Lefebure's *Scientific Disarmament*.

—there remains the difficulty that the citizens within a State can justly suppress force only when other means exist for actual redress of grievances. Hypothetical means, such as Minorities petitions, will not do! Such means are increasing in value, as in the case of the Permanent Court of International Justice; but no Great Power can yet be relied upon not to use force for the “defence” of its interests, and until that is an established custom its forces are not police-forces.

But the fundamental issue is this: defence arises out of *fear*. It is not “aggression” that has to be cured in the modern world but fear. Clearly there are “robber bands”—Fascists or other armed banditry, who actually would be aggressive. But the problem is not the relation of robber bands in Macedonia or Austria to their neighbours: it is relation between the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan. These are armed, not against “robber bands” but each against the other. Destroy the *fear* of French aircraft in Great Britain and the British aircraft can be reduced: destroy the fear of German aircraft and the French aircraft can be reduced. That fear evidently has not been reduced by the promise in the Kellogg Pact never to be “aggressive”, because fear arises out of what the British think of what the French call “defence” and out of what the French think of what the British call “defence.” The major problem of inter-State politics at the moment, therefore, is how to destroy the fear of the citizens of one modern State, lest the equally modern citizens in other States might attack them. This can be done only by—changing the subject. That is to say, policy must concentrate attention upon issues having no reference to “defence.”

CO-OPERATION AS A POLICY

This is psychologically sound, on modern principles. If a child fears an animal, you should not give the child “defences”

but make him play with the animal. If one man distrusts another man whom he does not know, they must work together for some common purpose in order to gain confidence mutually. If one group of men is dominated by ignorance and suspicion of another group, there must be some intercourse between members of each group to break the crust which separates the two. Thus in the relation between modern States war should be as unthinkable as it is in the relation between the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Canada is not armed for defence against Australia, nor is either "defended" against Great Britain. They differ in economic interest and they have distinguishable "national" sentiments; but these are developed without the appeal to arms on either side. Similarly in the United States, in so far as California and Pennsylvania are "sovereign" States, they are autonomous without any need of defence, one against the other. Neither in the British Commonwealth nor in the United States is there any "mutual defence" provided by one member against another; for such armaments as exist are directed against non-members. Similarly in the French Empire, in so far as the French dependencies are regarded as parts of France, Algiers is not armed against metropolitan France; and in the German Reich, Bavaria is not armed against Prussia, although each has a distinct character of its own. In the U.S.S.R. the Moscow Government is not supposed to be armed against the Soviet Government of the Ukraine or any other part of the Union; and in India the Indian States, which are autonomous as regards other Indian States, are nevertheless not "defended" against them. Indeed, in the modern world the old connection between the autonomy of a Government and its need for "defence" against other autonomous Governments is breaking down; and only the acceptance of a policy of co-operation for economic or cultural purposes is needed in order to reduce

to absurdity the "defence" of any Great Power against any other. It must be recognized, however, that the obstacles to the modern relationship between States are not in Belgium or in Bulgaria but in the United States, Great Britain, and France. The majority of the citizens of these great modern States still believe that armed force is needed to "defend" their interests against the citizens of other modern States. Thus the only possible modernization of the relationship is to be found in the practical experience of mutual trustworthiness which will make it ridiculous for any modern State to be defended by force of arms against any other.

Without concerted policy, however, a tendency to co-operation between autonomous Governments has been growing up for about a century. The story has been told many times and must not be repeated here. The closer relation of peoples in the industrial era led to economic organizations uniting those who lived under many different Governments. Shipping and banking became international services for commerce across frontiers. Certain groups of producers occasionally used their Governments as agents for their enterprise, either in imperial expansion or in tariff obstacles intended to injure foreign traders; but on the whole the level of health, life, and enjoyment in each industrialized country improved with the increase of the supply of goods and services from foreign countries. Thus an economic structure covering the whole world began to be consolidated. This had followed upon the interchange of ideas in pure and applied sciences at the end of the eighteenth century: and the new economic tendency promoted a further interchange of ideas. Meantime new evils arising out of the industrial revolution caused Governments to undertake new functions; and the advantage of co-operation between Governments was discovered with respect to the suppression of epidemic disease and the improvement of

communications. A succession of wars, in each of which new inventions assisted destruction, did not prevent an always increasing co-operation between Governments; and by the end of the nineteenth century an embryonic structure of progressive peace existed in the Public International Unions which the Governments used for the common advantage of all their peoples. This structure survived the wars of 1911 to 1922; and the latest addition to the new system is the League of Nations. Some great nations do not belong to the League, which is regrettable—as it was regrettable that North Carolina and Rhode Island did not join the United States in 1788, when the Constitution was ratified and the new system became effectual. But it will be remembered that North Carolina joined in November 1789 and Rhode Island in May 1790. They found it impossible to derive advantage from their own government without joining the system of co-operation.

THE LEAGUE SYSTEM

If the League did not exist, it would have to be invented; for it is a natural and inevitable result of the change in the character of government during the industrial era. Modern government requires co-operation between Governments, such as the League exists to promote. Indeed, if the Great War and President Wilson had never existed, a League would have inevitably come into operation perhaps before 1920, at least for the co-ordination of the many international services which had been increasing in number since 1850. And perhaps if the League had not been born in the atmosphere of fear, suspicion, hatred, and primitive violence, it would have been a better League for the purposes of a peace policy. For one thing, it would not have its debates confused by cries for “security” from heavily armed nations, trembling at the potential growth

of neighbours who have been compelled by defeat to submit for some years to military inferiority.

But as the League system now stands, it provides opportunities for the Governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and many other States to act together for certain restricted common interests. Thus war-prisoners have been restored to their homes, a typhus epidemic kept out of Western Europe, the finances of Austria and Hungary restored, the health of backward areas improved, and, through the International Labour Organization, industrial conditions reformed. The actual success of the League system is to be seen in the countries and among those common folk who have derived benefits from the co-operation of the Governments concerned. Some trains run more quickly because of the Transport Section; some children are free from malaria because of the Health Section; some workers in industry have shorter hours and more security against accident because of the International Labour Organization. Some common folk in Greece and Austria now have homes and food because of the Finance Section; and some people in London and New York are drawing dividends from loans guaranteed by the League.

Besides positive advantages derived from the League system, it is fair to reckon to its credit the avoidance of certain evils which would certainly have existed but for the League. The situation of some minorities in Europe and some natives in Africa would be worse than it is, but for the work of the Minorities Section and the Mandates Commission. Grievances remain and new difficulties arise; but in terms of actual men and women, there has been some betterment through the League system, if only because of the publicity it affords.

The experience of the advantage of co-operation for common interests is not, however, enough to modernize the relationship between States; for the majority of men still think of their

chief interests as local. Also, in spite of some common interests, there are many interests of any one nation which, superficially at any rate, are opposed to the interests of other nations. These divergent or opposing interests are the grounds for the survival of the "defence" of one member of the League against any other; and the League system would be ineffectual, if it did not provide some method by which opposing interests may be dealt with. This is done, in the case of "interests" connected with some legal right, through the Permanent Court of International Justice; and the Court has proved to be useful in deciding some issues which might in former days have led to war. Other opposing interests, not clearly connected with any legal rights, are dealt with in the League system by the process of conciliation, for which a new technique has been developed. The details are dealt with elsewhere.¹ Here it is enough to note the principle involved. The opposition between the interests of any States is acknowledged to be a matter of importance to all States. This opposition is prevented from leading to war by Conferences, the Council of the League, or other League machinery; and if the opposing parties can be brought to agree upon a settlement all is well: if not, they can at any rate be induced to see that no interest is promoted by resort to war. The fundamental policy of peace operating in this system is that it is more important to prevent a crisis arising than to provide for action in case a crisis should arise. The efficacy of the method is not certain. It depends upon the survival of reason and sanity not only among Statesmen but among the groups which believe in war. But the system and the method have so far proved efficacious in preventing resort to armed force on the part of any Government even for the "defence" of what it believes to be its legitimate interests. A general acceptance, in practice and not

¹ See particularly Conwell-Evans: *The League Council in Action*.

merely in words, of the principle that no "interest" whatever needs to be defended by force of arms would carry modernization much further than it has been carried by the Kellogg Pact. But then, it would be necessary for the United States, for example, to act as if it did not need any "defence" for its commerce against the Japanese or the British: it would be necessary for the French to act as if they did not need any more "defence" than the Germans now have. It would be necessary for the British to disbelieve the myth that the British navy is a means of securing peace. The world is still very far from such a situation: modernization of the relationship of States at present involves only the first steps in that direction.

Meantime, the League system and the new methods of co-operation and conciliation do not operate in a vacuum. They are parts of the very intricate system by which the Governments of the world are now connected—a system which includes all the Governments and not merely the members of the League. That system is chiefly represented in diplomacy; and one of the most interesting issues in the modernization of the State-system is whether the League system will dominate the older diplomacy or the old methods and manners continue under cover of the rhetoric of the Covenant of the League.

DIPLOMACY IN THE MODERN WORLD

The modernization of diplomacy involves reform in the "machinery" of the system and a still more fundamental change in the principles controlling the action of each Government in relation to others. So far as the machinery of diplomacy goes, the telegraph, the radio, and the new transport-system of motor-cars and aeroplanes for ambassadors as well as common folk—all these have greatly affected the business done in Foreign Ministries and Embassies. The more democratic

forms of government have affected the type of men and manners in the Offices and the Embassies. Many diplomatists of to-day have actually met carpenters and engine-cleaners, who would have been as distasteful to Mr. Adams of the United States in 1800 as they, no doubt, still are to Lord Fitznoodle, the attaché from London, dining in a foreign capital. Ambassadors to-day have to answer the telephone when politicians call: and if they are efficient, they know trade union meetings as well as fashionable race-courses. Also, the increase of commerce, the organization of social services and other new functions of the modern State have led to a closer integration of the diplomatic and consular services, to the appointment of commercial attachés, and above all to the direct contact of administrative officials of different States *not* through diplomacy.

Within the new system, however, the old survives. The most interesting survival is the naval or military attaché. These are attached somewhat loosely to ambassadors; but they generally report directly to war departments in their own countries. What do they report? The strength of the forces, the openings for the armaments trade, the new engines of destruction, the preparations against this or that "possible enemy" in the country to which they are sent. They pick up new ideas in armament or war-organization; and they warn their own war departments of new dangers. How do they obtain such knowledge? How much of it is regarded in the country in which they reside as secret? The answers to such questions would involve examination of the use of secret service funds by the chief States of the world. In Great Britain we spend about £250,000 annually on the "secret services." Spying is used by all modern Governments; but it is not a modern method of governing. Military and naval attachés are essential parts of the spy-system, which is, of course, essential

in the preparation for future war. Naval and military attachés abroad are very influential in a crisis, since they set the ball rolling in their own war departments: and as published official documents of the days preceding August 1914 show, naval and military attachés play an important part in bringing on war more quickly.

Modernization would involve the abolition of all naval and military attachés. But the effect of this must be faced. It would make any State, which abolished them, less powerful in future war. Germany, under Article 179 of the Versailles Treaty, is forbidden "to accredit or to send to any foreign country any military, naval, or air missions": and this is within Part V of the Treaty, whose preamble said that what was enforced upon Germany was "in order to render possible a general limitation of armaments"—that is to say, we others were to "do likewise"—which, of course, we have not done. Germany, however, has gone beyond the Treaty in abolishing all military and naval attachés; and it is time that other States followed that lead.

Changes in personnel, however, are of subordinate importance. The chief issue concerns the governing principle or tendency among professional diplomatists; for in spite of certain protests against the idea, there is an old and a new diplomacy.¹ The old diplomacy in each State rested upon the assumption that the agents of the State should aim at securing for their own State whatever advantage they could. The assumption, based upon Renaissance experience partially misread by courtiers and lawyers, implied that States are fundamentally in opposition; and it was held to justify the

¹ In Viscount Grey's *Thirty Years*, at the end, there is a complete misunderstanding of the contrast of old and new diplomacy. The old diplomacy is well exemplified in a new book by M. Raoul Genet, *Traité de Diplomatie*, 1931, where it is maintained that lying and bribery are necessary for "defence," but it is suggested that they must be done "with great elegance" (p. 131).

most immoral methods of lying, bribing, and spying. But in the improvement of moral sentiments, which followed upon the dethronement of eighteenth-century aristocracy, diplomats began to be more careful of the means, while remaining convinced that the end was the advantage of a particular State. Each State was felt to be a "closed system" of law and justice, having occasional and unessential contacts with other States; and the agent of each State in these contacts usually took what he could snatch in a pull-devil-pull-baker contest of "interests." This form of diplomacy still survives, especially in the arrangement of alliances; but the common interests of all peoples are beginning to be understood, and the terms in which interests are conceived are changing. Interests are not now always prestige or defence or even expansion, but public health, commerce, and intellectual advance. These can best be attained by conceiving the purpose of diplomacy to be the assistance given by each Government in a common task. Thus the new diplomacy assumes a State-system, in which each State is only a part. It assumes that the agent of a State contributes the knowledge and ability of his fellow-citizens to the promotion of civilized life in all countries; and the modern diplomatist therefore accepts neither the methods nor the purposes of the Renaissance. Indeed, he is part of a State-system of which the League system is the most significant element, and the principles of co-operation and conciliation therefore in the new diplomacy take the place of the balance of power and the secret alliances or agreements of the old world. The contrast between what is modern and what is not remains indefinite. In practice so long as the preparation for future war continues, each State remains a "closed system"; and the State-system of the world cannot develop. But there is a tendency towards peace; and it may overcome the recurrence of atavistic fears and the continuance of obsolete policies

among men who are not "modern" but have only survived too long.

The modernization of the relationship between States depends upon an understanding of the changed character of government in modern times. The preparation for future war is obsolete not because men die in war, nor because wars are more expensive, but because the State cannot fulfil its proper functions even with regard to its own citizens so long as war remains possible.

Modern government requires co-operation between States—first, because of the character of the situation in which such government operates, and, secondly, because of the newly developed functions of government in public health, education, and industrial progress. The scale of ordinary communication in the Middle Ages was comparatively small. Most of daily life involved contacts only within a village or township; food and clothing were locally provided; and such leisure occupations as existed were locally organized. Administration, therefore, was largely local. But as there were occasional contacts between the centres of daily life, in travel, in commerce for luxuries, in culture through the Church—government was a loose texture covering always larger areas. The State of to-day, as conceived in international law, diplomacy, and political philosophy, is a local organization within certain frontiers. It is in fact the State of the Renaissance, which was the latest phase of mediævalism. But in the twentieth century the normal and daily life of the majority in all modern communities involves contacts which are world-wide. Food and clothing, not merely for the rich, come from all parts: the occupations of leisure involve the use of material and ideas which are supplied by many nations. Wheat, cotton, wool, rubber, oil, wood-pulp, and cinema-films—these make the "situation" in which modern government must operate.

Therefore its operations must be world-wide. But just as the coming of industrialism made it necessary, for public health, for example, to create an internal structure of local government within each State, so now the complexity of the social situation, in addition to its extent, makes it necessary to have—not a world-government but a world-system of government. That is to say, there is not a super-State but a State-system within which the old units of government co-operate, and the relation of States within the State-system of the world is like the relation of governmental units within a Federation. Each State fulfils a function within its own jurisdiction, which is useful not merely for its own but for all citizens of all States: and each State makes it more possible for other States to act similarly.

Secondly, the new functions of government require co-operation across frontiers, as it has been shown in the case of public health. No modern State can provide for its own citizens what they have the right to expect from it, unless it co-operates with other States. This is indicated by the experience of Russia and the United States, which have not joined the League. They have been forced by the circumstances, when they desired the normal extension of governmental functions, to co-operate with the Members of the League. The Soviet Government may aim at destroying other Governments, but it desires health for its own people, and therefore it co-operated in the Warsaw Health Conference of 1922 and afterwards. The United States Government may desire to have no entanglements in Europe; but its citizens have investments there: and therefore it co-operated in certain financial tasks undertaken by the League. Modern government, fulfilling new functions, makes co-operation necessary between autonomous States.

TENDENCIES TOWARDS CO-OPERATION.

The modernization of the relations between States is a political problem; but its success depends upon the establishment of new ideas and new methods in commerce and still more upon new dominant conceptions of history and civilization in the schools and in the Press. Recent tendencies may deliver men's minds from the "localism" which is the source of war. But in that case, it would be necessary to advance beyond the localisms of the nineteenth century as well as those of the Middle Ages. In the early industrial era localism took two forms—Imperialism and Nationalism. Imperialism was the tendency to look after other people: Nationalism the tendency to look after one's self alone. Internationalism subsumes both: it is the principle that each must concern itself with the common interests of all.

Conscious repudiation of imperialism and economic or other nationalism is unlikely. But men's habits change more quickly than their ideas; and new tendencies are modernizing both the old imperialism and the new nationalism. The unnoticed effects of recent customs provide a basis for the delocalization of men's habits. Dress is becoming more similar in many lands. This, no doubt, has many disadvantages; but at least this advantage that men seem less forbidding, one to another. In most countries indeed most men never see a foreigner; and it is easy to excite fear or suspicion by pictures of strange clothing. The hostility of nations, as of classes, is often based upon bogies.¹ But if "foreigners" do not seem so inhuman in dress or manners, even on the films, they will be thought more trustworthy. The cinema is making men in all

¹ I was told by an ex-prisoner of war in Russia that, in the early days of the revolution, he had seen a Russian revolutionary shoot a man in a bowler hat in the half-darkness, and the simple-minded revolutionary, turning over the body, said: "I thought it was a bourgeois; and it is only a man."

countries familiar with scenes of foreign life. Again, the scenes may be undesirable, but they are human. Propaganda can make stage-villains of the Englishman or the Chinaman : but common folk are more immune to such tricks than is usually supposed ; and after all, most cinema stories are taken as entertainments, not sermons.

The aeroplane in peace-time "stretches" men's imagination. Even those who will never travel by air feel distances less ; and strange lands become only landing-grounds. The motor-car also crosses frontiers more easily than the railway-train : and many more travellers can see many lands by motor-car. The radio has still more certainly the effect of bringing men's minds out of localism. Men hear the music from countries whose language they would not understand. They learn to enjoy what foreigners supply ; and so far no customs-tariff obstructs the radio-song coming from abroad.

The cumulative effect of all this upon policy and government cannot yet be estimated. It depends partly upon the conscious use in education or in the Press of the new attitude, which alone makes the new situation intelligible and enjoyable. But that will be discussed later. Meantime, the changes in production and consumption, which have recently occurred, are affecting very deeply the outlook of the majority in all countries : and whether war is to be made more destructive or peace made possible, probably depends most of all in the near future upon the modernization of the economic system.

The policy of peace in the relation between Governments, therefore, depends partly upon education but mainly upon new conceptions of the purpose of increasing wealth and well-being. This policy of peace, however, is one which any country or people can adopt and maintain, without waiting for the whole world to be peaceful. It is not merely a policy of avoidance,

but a policy of positive co-operation. Such a policy is not a mere succession of noble acts at crises; it is a settled habit of co-operation in institutions established for the pursuit of common interests. The greatest political discovery made by Western Civilization has been that the habit of co-operation *can* be embodied in institutions which cover the whole habitable earth. However valuable the later contributions may be, which Africa and Asia may add to the common store of civilized human life, nothing can diminish the importance of the fact that Europe discovered not only America but *the world*. For the first time in human history, during the past century every race and every type of civilization has been in continuous contact; and in this latest phase of the new period, we are attempting to control and direct the forces which have been released by such contact. The policy of all nations is being adjusted, not merely to that of its immediate neighbours, but to a world-situation; and the only workable adjustment is the policy of peace.

Co-operation in the institutions of organized peace, however, requires skill: it requires also the formation of new types of personality. Not only Cæsar and Columbus, but also Nelson and Napoleon and Bismarck, are useless as guides or as models in a completely transformed situation. We need not men of the pugilist type which studies what in England was called "the noble art of self-defence," but men with the intelligence of scientists and the imagination and sympathy of poets. But such men do not grow except in a society amenable to new ideas and fertile in creating them. That is why there is so much more hope for the future in America than in Europe; for by a succession of accidents and not from any innate virtue, in America the abundance of natural resources, the absence of social castes, and the survival of the pioneering spirit, have caused flexibility of emotion and experimentalism in daily

habits. These are social resources upon which the future can draw.

The new types of personality needed will naturally appear in a society with a new dominant outlook. But this new outlook on life—this new attitude towards other men, must grow from the old roots of loyalty and affection; and the most deeply set of all emotional attitudes is affection for what is familiar. A man who lacks that is *déraciné*, a man without roots, disturbing, and always dissatisfied. The roots of each man are in his own land among his own people. But from that place a man may look out to see, not what he can take and hold but what he can give and how he can serve. To his mind his country will be great not in her wealth and power but in what she has done for the world at large. He will be patriotic, not because his country can win victories in future wars but because she can serve in the arts of peace. And he will desire peace, not as a mere security from foreign trouble but as the opportunity for active co-operation in the advancement of civilized life for common folk. The patriotism of war looks backward: the patriotism of peace, based upon knowledge of the services which one's country has done for the world, looks forward to the still greater services it may give in the future. All genuine and unshakable internationalism grows out of the love of one's own country; and from that deep root of affection for things familiar may yet arise an established, an over-arching, a flowering, and fruitful peace.

CHAPTER IX

MODERN PRODUCTION

A GIRL at a cigarette-machine is typical of the new industrial revolution. She moves gracefully, guiding the paper, touching small fragments of tobacco back into place, and keeping her eyes upon the knife which cuts off the infinite cigarette, which the machine is producing, into humane lengths. She is making more cigarettes in the same time than ten or twenty girls at a bench would have done ten years ago: she is healthier and more intelligent; and her hours of work are shorter than those of cigarette-makers in earlier times.¹ Also, she is making cigarettes for a new group of consumers—women who hardly smoked at all until lately. On the debit side, some grumblers say that repetition-processes are degrading and that machine-made cigarettes are bad. But on the other hand, those who now smoke could not have bought what was hand-made; and most grumblers would grumble if the change had been in the other direction—from the machine-made to the hand-made.

The debit side of the new situation, however, certainly does include a reference to the nine or nineteen girls who are no longer needed, if one does the work of ten or twenty. These others have lost wages—that is purchasing-power; and so there is less “demand” for shoes and food. The advantage gained by those employed under the new regime seems to entail a loss to many more, who are no longer needed. The same increase in productive efficiency has occurred, not only in cigarette-making, but also in engineering, shipbuilding, tex-

¹ The best analysis of facts is in H. de Man, *Joy in Work*, 1929, based on the experience of actual workers; Stuart Chase's *Men and Machines*, 1929, covers a larger field; R. M. Fox, *The Triumphant Machine*, gives an emotional reaction of some workers.

tiles, and transport-services. And further, it has occurred at the same moment in all the industrialized countries. Thus in the world as a whole the power to produce manufactured articles and the power to transport power and goods have rapidly increased. But by this same change millions have been deprived of wages; and therefore, in each country, the purchasing-power, which "takes up" the goods and services produced, has been reduced.

For the purpose of the argument here, however, those employed under the new system will be considered first. They too may suffer some disadvantage from the new machinery and the new methods: but it is worth while to consider in general the new type of work required in a modernized industry, before discussing the profit and loss of the new system in terms of human welfare. The modernization of the industrial system of production is affecting the character and outlook of men and women and the relations between them. This modernization includes new power-supply (chiefly electricity and oil), new automatic machinery (repetition-processes, band-conveyers, etc.), new forms of "planning the job," and larger financial units of enterprise to bear the larger proportion of capital charges. The significant characteristics of this new industrial production have appeared during the past twenty or thirty years. For example, the introduction of bottle-making machinery occurred about 1910: band-conveyers date from about 1900. Scientific advance in metallurgy, electricity, and chemistry became applicable to production about 1910.¹ And the making of munitions from 1915 to 1918 gave extended experience in automatic machinery and the use of women's labour in industrial production.

The modern mind is deeply affected by machines—machines for producing goods and machines for transport. The whole

¹ See below, Chapter XII, p. 252.

political atmosphere of a country may depend upon the domination of the mind of industrial workers over the mind of the agriculturist.¹ Thus the industrial mind is self-confident, quickly organized for effectual political pressure, and sectionalized so that a comparatively small group of men can feel some one definite policy to be to their own advantage. The history of modern "lobbying" is largely an account of the group-mind of persons in one occupation acting quickly together. On the other hand, agriculturists are diffident, slow to organize, and so uncertain about their own interests that they cannot put forward a definite agreed policy. The difference is partly due to the ways of life in different occupations. The social relations between the members of modern communities are very greatly influenced by the introduction of large-scale mechanisms a century ago; but over and above the contrast between a mechanized and a mediæval society there is a new form of industrial life which may be properly called modern which is the result of repetition work, automatic machines, and a large extension of the use of natural forces.

It is a commonplace that productivity has recently increased in all industrialized countries very rapidly. This increase in productivity so far has been greatest in the manufacture of automobiles and in the chemical, the cement, and the iron and steel industries. Its character has been summarily described as an increase in the volume of products, of the productivity of each worker, and of the amount of primary power and purchased power which is used. There has also been an increase in research, in the number of new processes and new materials available, in efficiency of handling materials and products; and an improvement has occurred in working conditions, especially as regards light and safety. Incidentally

¹ The machine now has an influence on the minds of those in agricultural areas. See above, p. 44.

there has been much less wastage of material, power, and effort, much lower costs per unit of product, and also a decrease in the number of workers required.¹

Far the most striking change, however, has been the rapid increase in the use of electrical power. In Great Britain since 1922 the annual production of electricity has increased two and a half times, and in the next five years a 50 per cent. increase is anticipated.² The average price per unit sold in 1921-2 was 5.75d., and in 1926-7 it was 3.55d.³ In France the amount produced in 1923 had been doubled by 1928: and vast new developments are now beginning, especially near Strasbourg, whence some of the power will be exported to Germany. In Germany the whole of the Rhine district has been electrified both from the coal area of Westphalia and from water-power in Switzerland. In the Scandinavian countries and in Italy great advances have recently been made; and new industrial and agricultural enterprises are based upon electrical power.⁴ In Russia the "five years plan" for industrialization and improved agriculture is based upon electricity. In the United States electrical motors formed 1 per cent. of the power plant in 1899; 17 per cent. in 1914; and 49 per cent. in 1927. In 1929 in the manufacture of machinery 95.7 per cent. of the power used was electrical; in transport 95.1 per cent.; and in chemical industries 64.8 per cent. was electrical. It is not too much, therefore, to say that an electrical age is following upon the steam age, with many important social consequences—decentralization of industry, greater cleanli-

¹ See a summary in *Recent Economic Changes*, I, p. 166.

² *Manchester Guardian*, February 17, 1931.

³ See *The Electrical Industry of Great Britain* (Beama, 1929), p. 151.

⁴ Italian output of electricity in 1928 was 9,750 million kwh., of which 9,450 million was from water-power (not including about 1,570 million produced for their own use by industrial concerns). Of this, 12.7 per cent. is for domestic use, 9.7 per cent. for transport, and 77.6 per cent. for industry. Consumption rose from 4,000 million kwh. in 1920 to 10,700 million in 1929.

ness, better light, and new fields for the manufacture of the machinery and apparatus required. The production of electrical machinery and apparatus in Great Britain went up in value between 1907 and 1924 by 404 per cent.; and in the United States by 540 per cent.

A significant new feature of this new use of power is the export of electricity across frontiers. In 1929 Switzerland exported 36 per cent. of the electricity produced into Germany, 34 per cent. into France, and 9 per cent. into Italy. There is some export across the Pyrenees and across the sea from Sweden to Denmark; and there is a very great amount of electricity exported from Canada to the United States, largely under the control of United States capital. The Transit Section of the League of Nations has negotiated an international agreement on the export of electrical power. Here, then, is the beginning of a new link between the nations which may make war and the preparations for war still more ridiculous. But electrical development is only in its earliest stages.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW PROCESSES.

There is already evidence of the psychological and social effects of the recent changes in production processes. On bodily structure, all forms of labour have their effects. As Sir W. Arbuthnot Lane has said: "A brewer's drayman, from the constant carrying of heavy weights on the right shoulder, develops a displacement of the vertebræ and a perfect curve in the spinal column. On the one side the vertebræ become wider, and on the opposite narrowed with a formation of lips or edges. The spinal column of the coalman, who carries sacks across the shoulders and tips them over his head, develops rigidity; and finally the vertebræ become hardened and joined together. These changes in the anatomy are developed automatically to meet the altered mechanical relation of

the individual to his surroundings, and also to economize the expenditure of nerve and muscle energy during the course of the man's everyday work." A great part of production is still mediæval or mechanized only at the nineteenth-century level. Thus in the building trade: "The method of man-handling things seems to die very hard. Woodwork, timber, and great plaster casts were among the things pulled and dragged by human brawn about this theatre (the building of which is described), until they reached their destination. It is not sufficiently realized that, in addition to the enormous and costly waste that this entails, it involves a great physical strain on the worker. A number of men with whom I worked on the theatre in question suffered from rupture, which is quite a common condition among non-craftsmen in the building industry."¹ Similarly, in Chinese mediævalism: "Nearly all the lumber used in China is hand-sawed, and the sawyers are exhausted early. Physicians agree that carrying coolies rarely live beyond forty-five or fifty years. The term of a chair-bearer is eight years, of a rickshaw-runner four years: for the rest of his life he is an invalid."²

In the building, transport, coal, shipping, and shipbuilding trades, the bodies of men are thus moulded and fixed by lifting and moving weights; and their intelligence and sense-reactions are therefore formed by the old occupations. But now new power-supply and new mechanisms are "taking over" from men. The amount of heavy manual labour is reduced. The trunk muscles, used in lifting weights, are no longer so essential in what is still called "man-power." The power of machines is still measured mythologically as "horse" power; but both man and horse, as mere forces, are disappearing from among the factors of production. Even digging is no

¹ *Journal of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology*, April 1930.

² Sherwood Eddy: *New World of Labour*, 1924, p. 18, quoted in Johnston: *Citizenship in the Industrial World*, p. 26, which gives other instances.

longer what it was: the steam-shovel is directed by a man standing at a lever, and it does the work of twenty mediæval stalwarts. The plate for the side of the new ship on the stocks in the shipyard is brought across the yard in a motor-truck, instead of being shoved along on a large barrow by ten men. Dock labour is changed by new devices. The proportion, therefore, of those employed in production, who are using the finer end-muscles of the hand or the eye, has greatly increased; and the heavy, muscular type is decreasing—as the mediæval war-horse disappeared when knights ceased to wear armour.

But the psychological attitude of wage-earners, who are more finely adjusted in nerve and muscle, changes also with respect to politics and culture. They are more easily excited—that is to say, their reactions are quicker; they are less acquiescent; and, although they may accept direction, they are less inclined to receive commands. They are less slow and sleepy and exhausted after their hours of work; and therefore have more energy to spare for other activities.

A second general effect of the newest type of machinery is due to its intricacy and delicacy. Compare, for example, the railway-engine with the motor-car engine; or consider the packing machine or the typewriter as compared with the steam power-house. The difference in the two kinds of mechanism makes a difference to the attitude of those who use them for production. The large-scale machine still continues to dominate the minds of great numbers. It dwarfs men individually, and gives them confidence socially. But the new type of machine emphasizes the importance of intricate inter-connection and the dependence of most men upon the “expert.” The spread of a general “expertise,” in a society affected by the new type of machines, is obvious in the contrast between North America and Europe. In North America there

is a very widely spread competence to adjust and to manage the new machines. The youth at the roadside garage in North America is familiar with the "make" and the idiosyncracies of a machine, to an extent noticeably greater than is the case with similar persons in Europe.

Again, the modern type of factory or workshop is one whole, organized upon an obvious plan, and sometimes connected physically in all its sections by band-conveyers or similar machinery.¹ The older type of factory, at any rate in the engineering and textile trades, was merely a single house for many separate machines; and in most cases there was no general plan for the placing of machines, for light and air or the relation of raw material to tools and finished products. The *plan* of the new type of factory has a psychological effect upon each worker, and upon the group-mind as the felt relationship of one to the other. Orderliness may be horrifying to the æsthetic; but for most men it is as pleasant as habit. In any case, the plan reduces waste of time and energy, increases light and air and gives an impetus to regularity. If in addition, as in some engineering shops, there is an upper gallery or passage overlooking the machine-workers where a process of "assembly" can be seen as a whole, then the psychological unity of the group at work is still more readily perceived.

The new methods, however, do divide the perceptive planning from the detailed operations in production: and in fact the proportion of "hard-hats" or of office-workers to manual workers is much larger than it was. Theoretically the old-fashioned craftsman used to think while he manipulated his material and his tools. Now, it is said, thinking is transferred to the planning department. But in fact the old-fashioned

¹ Much of the evidence for what follows is drawn from personal contacts with men and women in factories; but some evidence is contained in H. de Man's *Joy in Work* and in the *Journal of the National Institute of Industrial Psychology*.

worker did *not* generally think or plan. One in a million may have had creative tendencies: the vast majority followed "tradition"—which is not, indeed, the plan of an office, but is the plan of a great-grandfather. Modern methods have simply freed the planning function and given it greater power to initiate changes; and they have not injured the majority whose competence is in following a routine. It is psychological mythology to suppose that the modern system makes Robots: indeed, the modern method, giving the planner more freedom from routine, tends to change the form of the particular routine more frequently than traditional craftsmanship did. A certain sentimentalism covers the mediæval craft. It took four or five centuries for the mediæval shoemaker to discover that the two shoes of a pair need not be identical. The modern machine fits the leather to the foot more exactly than the supposedly artistic cobbler did; and in addition to having shorter hours, the worker at a modern machine has to be adaptable to changes of technique as well as of fashion.

Among the more general changes which are significant at the moment may be noted the change in the average age or vitality of those at work in the new processes and the new position of women. As for age-level, when "rationalization" decreases the number of workers required, the less efficient and the older lose their places first; and they are precisely those whom it is most difficult to absorb into new occupations. Again, younger workers are more adaptable: they are quicker in reaction and general perceptiveness; they "suit" the new machinery and the new methods of planning.¹ The old craftsman, at any rate in engineering, was accustomed to putting a "finish" upon the material; but now, either the machine does it or it is not required to be done at all. Exact gauges and measurements provide the individual worker with parts which

¹ Details in Lynd's *Middletown*, p. 31 sq.

fit; and apprenticeship in adjustment is no longer necessary. The young worker is quite "up to the game"; and sometimes, if the older worker does not lose his job altogether, he is "laid off" for longer periods than the young; and so he tends to fall in the scale or wage-rate of the job available for him. Many of the current objections to repetition processes, when they are not merely the imaginings of literary men who have never met an industrial worker or seen a modern factory, are based upon the feelings of older men. Modernization is easier for the young.

Secondly, as mechanization increases, there is more place for women in production. "In the more recent development of industry, the constant increase of light repetition work has greatly enlarged the field for the employment of women"—so says a British official report.¹ The improved position of women in society as a whole is due partly to earning-capacity, partly to the diminished power of the rougher type of male, and partly to the development of the abilities and energies of women in production outside the household. But add to this the mechanization of household-work: that is part of the new system of production, and more than 10,000,000 women in Great Britain in a population of about 45,000,000 are whole-time household workers. The number in the United States may be about 30,000,000. But these women now have electrical and other household appliances. As an advertisement in London says: "Take the work out of housework: use electricity." The more rational planning of kitchens, the improvement of shopping facilities and deliveries of goods, the better care taken of children by public authorities, the efficiency of modern sanitation, the improvement in modern dress—all these mean more time, more energy, and longer lives for the majority of women—not only in the West, but also,

¹ Cmd. 3508, 1930.

as industrialization increases, in the "women's movement" of China and Turkey. Obviously there is less of a gulf dividing the work of the household from that of the factory, and the openings for women outside household services are increasing rapidly.

If one looks more closely at the new methods of production, machine-minding is distinguishable from machine-tending. Consider again the girl at the cigarette-making machine—that is machine-minding. It requires more attention than such machine-tending as, for example, the feeding of a machine which puts the corks into bottles. Machine-minding is a skilled job: quite as much as driving a motor-car, which, in addition to the old skill in dodging others on a road, requires skill at the gears. To "mind" a machine is mental, not merely "manual" labour. It requires an alertness unnecessary for the mediæval craftsman at Gandhi's spinning-wheel. Incidentally, the machine-minder earns better wages, has shorter hours, and leaves work with much energy unexpended. A new outlook is the result. Both men and women acquire a sense of power and of freedom at machine-minding, which has made the position of the old trade union leader much more difficult to maintain. Platform oratory is not the "entertainment" for the audience which it used to be. And employers, who used to be called "masters," are not revered as they were once believed to be, at any rate by the moralizing economist. But this does not imply revolution. The machine-minder is inclined to suppose that management is a skilled job, and also that the system being "tricky," like a modern machine, is therefore not altogether in control of the employer.

This sense of power combined with scepticism is common in the new trades, such as the production of electrical power. The Electrical Trade Union in Great Britain has the reputation of willingness to "blow the fuses" in the social system, when

its members have a grievance. And as for the "public" or the "consumer"—the machine-minder has not much respect for those who accept services without in the least understanding how they are rendered. In Eugene O'Neill's *Hairy Ape*, the stoker on a ship says that the passengers "don't belong"; but he is the soul of the ship. That may be poetic exaggeration, if it is taken to represent the mind of the low-grade labour which is employed for stoking; but the attitude is typical of the more skilled machine-minder. He or she is by no means reverential with regard either to the organizer of the "shop" or to the consumer who is ignorant of the machine.

Machine-tending, by contrast, has a bad reputation among critics of the new industry. To move the hand for several hours in the same curve in order to place a cork in passing bottles, that is regarded as monotonous. Repetitive processes are typical of some new industrial production; and since 1918 the unskilled or semi-skilled have increased in numbers with the increase in automatic machines. Great numbers of women learned the trick at munition-making. If, however, one asks the girl at the machine what she feels or if one watches what she is doing, new phases of experience are obvious. Day-dreaming is prevalent among machine-tenders. One can see in their eyes that their "minds" are not on the work at all, and therefore they do not feel repetitive processes to be monotonous—unless they are continued so long as to cause fatigue.

If the work is completely mechanized, the physical actions necessary become unconscious. The use of a fixed habitual "pattern" in tending a machine may be positively pleasant; and besides, the "mind" is free to gossip about the movie-stars or Mary's young man. Even in the midst of noise conversation can be carried on in low voices, aided by unobtrusive signs. Even sorting letters, which is by no means mechanical, can be reduced to such a low level of consciousness that it

can be done correctly by men who meantime carry on a political argument. The mind can evidently function simultaneously at different levels. But short of conscious gossip, day-dreaming fills a great place in the work-time of the modern machine-tender. This dreaming creates an alien world in which the worker plays at revolution or personal advancement, or, more generally, enjoys personal delights quite outside the sphere known to economists. The new methods of production fit in very well psychologically with the increased variety of the use of leisure available for wage-earners. And again, it is doubtful whether the majority in the sentimentalized "old days" had their mind on their work any more continuously than is the case now.

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE NEW PROCESSES

Another effect of the new system is the likeness between jobs in different kinds of service. For example, the motor-car industry uses the band-conveyer, and so does the great mail order office, where the letters are carried from one girl to another, and even through holes in the walls between offices, by a band-conveyer, to be put into envelopes and sealed and stamped. It follows that where mechanization spreads, it is easier for workers to pass from job to job, out of one industry into another. This destroys "craft" communities; but it makes the community of all industrial workers much more homogeneous in outlook than it was in the nineteenth century. The fluidity of labour tends to diminish the difficulties which arise from the "caste" differences, for example, between engineering workers and textile workers and clerks in offices. Even adding figures in banks is now a machine-minding job—and sometimes it is only machine-tending done by girls.

Another effect is the disappearance of the old-time foreman,

and all the tyranny and subservience connected with his function. It is true that some skilled foremen were teachers and "fathers"; but many more were slave drivers. The skilled craftsman used to set the pace: now the machine does it. All that is needed is a skilled man to adjust the machine occasionally. A time-sheet takes the place of the foreman's idea of the time a job ought to take. The process is de-personalized. But the reaction on the worker is not altogether pleasant. In some moods a man would welcome even a bullying foreman, as a purple patch in hours of monotonous "drive." And besides, when the "office," with its plans and time-sheets, takes the place of the foreman, the margin of leisure "on the job" may be lost. For example, in the old days twenty years ago, if a man finished his job late on Saturday morning he hung on till noon, and nobody cared, for nobody knew exactly when the job ought to be finished. But now even momentary "slacking" seems impossible in a modern factory. Under some systems of payment, if the job should end at ten-thirty, the worker ceases to earn pay then, and thus loses pay for the time till noon. Economically efficient, no doubt; but as a worker puts it: "A man feels as if his soul had no time to turn round." He has an uneasy sense of being in the grip of an unsympathetic automaton. This is the effect upon those who have been accustomed to the foreman and the old pace of working: but the younger generation does not seem to feel the regularity of a system to be more objectionable than the varying moods of a person watching.

The exactness of the time-sheet, however, tends to cause the feeling, among those still employed in an increasingly efficient system, that no man is safe. Rationalization may involve unemployment for anyone, any day, and that not only among manual workers but among the office staff also. Nobody knows when the process is going to stop; and it may mean the

shutting down of whole factories in certain districts. Fear and suspicion have strange effects, not only on productive efficiency but also upon political movements; and if efficiency in the process is necessarily accompanied by insecurity of those who work under it, the sense of insecurity will act as if there were an increasing friction in the process.

The effect of the past twenty years in public education is also beginning to tell upon the men and women who work at the new machines under the new system. The effect of social services in modern States has also increased their vitality. The exactness of modern timing and the subdivision of work, which makes the worker feel more helpless with regard to his own future, is not accepted as "the nature of things"; but is felt to be the result of a conscious plan. And the purpose of the plan is felt to be a concern of those who are its necessary instruments. Thus it is significant of modern production that some trade unions should support out of their own funds the replanning of work by "employers," and that some employers should develop "suggestion schemes" by which the workers are paid for ideas which may improve machinery or methods.

The best example of the organization of workers playing a part in the business and financial policy of the firms which employ them is in the history of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. In their case the trade union leaders and organizers have actually supported firms or provided money for their reconstruction out of union funds: and the members of the union have grasped the importance to them of the success of the business policy of the industry.

As for contributions of ideas from workers, a good example is in Mavor and Coulson's, of Glasgow. "The greatest source of waste in the engineering industry is the comparative stagnation of the reservoirs of latent mental abilities and

mechanical aptitudes of the men in the workshops.”¹ The number of suggestions for improved mechanism or methods amounted to about 2,500 in 1930; about 36 per cent. were adopted, and payments made, varying from 2s. 6d. to 30s. for each suggestion. Similarly in the United States, in 1927, the Newport News Shipbuilding Co. had from its staff 2,770 suggestions for the elimination of waste. The result is said to have been a saving of about \$250,000.² The integration of the worker into the new industrial system will probably take place upon some such lines as this.

The most distressing effect of the new system on the mind of the men and women employed is certainly the insecurity in their work. Unemployment to the extent which has prevailed in most industrial countries recently is not a permanent feature of modernization; but uncertainty of tenure and therefore of income may be. Production is much more efficient and taste much more changeable. Possibly, therefore, the changes from pressure of work to “lay off” in any modernized enterprise may be more frequent and more rapid. Works councils, suggestion schemes, and even some influence upon business or managerial policy may not give workers the security they need for a civilized life; for the world-market seems to be beyond the control or even the clear understanding of any group of managers or directors. There is, therefore, an increase in the interest of workers in general economic policy on a large scale, and also an increase of the feeling of helplessness. This may be only a phase of rapid change in economic values; but modernization seems to involve sceptical thinking upon a larger scale. The belief that voting can bring prosperity is fading, and even the belief that anyone in particular is to blame. But this is not a return to mediæval fatalism: it is a basis for experimentalism.

¹ “Suggestion Schemes,” by Sam Mavor, in *The Machinery Market*, October 19, 1928.

² See *Recent Economic Changes*, I, p. 119.

CHANGES IN "BUSINESS POLICY"

In management or the direction of business policy modern systems of production have increased the amount of capital required for many enterprises both because of the more elaborate machinery and because the obsolescence of machinery is more rapid. Again, the scale of production by repetition-processes is larger, and business policy therefore must envisage larger, more variable markets, and production over longer periods of time.

The result upon men's minds is that those capable of using statistics rather than personal contacts in devising policy have a greater influence. But the use of statistics for practical policy is nothing like the calculation in academic theses. It involves ability to discover general facts relevant for immediate buying and selling; and such general facts may be world-wide. To contemplate the world-market without turning dizzy is a new form of business ability: the calculation of variations in demand is then not a mere "sense" derived from watching one's grandfather buying tea from a clipper-shipment. If, on the one hand, the issues are less "personal" in the mind, they are, on the other hand, much more clearly envisaged as tendencies. Similarly in the organization of the process in any factory, the type of mind which "tells" is one able to read statistics of daily variation in output by this or that group of workers. The old-timers in industry regret the days in which the workers were "Bill" and "Tom," and the "master" was—"the master." Now Bill and Tom are items on a sheet, or perhaps not even that—only points on a curve. The "old man" cannot see them at all there. A new type of mind sees them, but perhaps does not see the cut of their trousers. Irrelevancies may be decorative: but the modern world is a structure, not a decoration. To de-personalize the relation of

workers and organizers is not necessarily to degrade either, if the efficiency of production and the rates paid for service are improved by the process.

Again, the larger scale and the quicker change in recent production involve what the Americans call "getting together." Sometimes this habit generates "hot air"—as at some meetings of Rotary Clubs. But on the other hand, discussion of trade problems and pooling of information level up the average business Executive. One can "see over" an American or a German works much more easily than a British works. Trade secrets in Great Britain seem to have survived the guild system of the Middle Ages into the nineteenth century: and mediævalism in policy continues in some parts of British industry. During the war, for example, the British Government wanted to have a certain article made by co-operation between manufacturers; but the manufacturers each said, "We have a secret process, which we cannot divulge." An emissary of the Government went round and said to each manufacturer: "Tell me your secret and I promise not to tell the others." And they all told him—the same secret. Much tradition is simply obstructive.

Another remnant of mediævalism is small-scale bribery—called "commissions," or even Christmas gifts. The nineteenth-century system involved small payments to agents for giving orders. Here is the situation. "Lord Melchett said that there had been a great improvement in the matter of bribes and commissions since he first entered business. He remembered the time when it was impossible to sell chemicals without offering some kind of present or consideration to those using them. 'I remember one competitive firm,' he said, 'that has long ceased to exist, which used to distribute Cheshire cheeses, geese, and cigars to the managers and foremen with the idea of obtaining orders. Of course, with the great organization that

exists to-day, all that kind of thing has died down or ceased to exist; but there is still a good deal of room for improvement. The work of buying chemicals, for example, is not in the hands of uneducated people, but in those of scientists who judge the goods on their qualities and results and are not to be deflected in their judgments by a goose or a cheese.' He suggested that if a black-list of firms who had been discovered offering bribes could be published from time to time, it would help in the suppression of the practice. Publicity was the best help to a movement of this kind."¹ The point is that modernization of business or manufacturing policy gives the advantage to large-scale vision, and to minds that are not frightened nor trivial.

The principles, underlying practice in the new system, are sufficiently clear. We need a new type of worker at machines, a new type in the office, and above all a new type in the manager's or director's room. The slow-witted, lethargic worker has a smaller place: the alert, agile man or woman, with no extraordinary power of muscle but quick command of reactions is increasingly valuable. In policy men and women are needed who can take long views. The policy even of a single enterprise may have to be based upon a "five years plan". Certainly directors are needed whose field of mental activity is too large to allow them to worry or wonder whether somebody else may possibly be utilizing some trivial piece of information concerning a particular process.

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN GOVERNING IDEAS

The change in the character of persons employed in production, whether as "workers" or "directors" indicates a possible change in the governing ideas in industry. Workers

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, Dec. 19, 1929.

who are less lethargic and acquiescent than in the past, directors who can think on a larger scale than their grandfathers, may of course use their increased abilities for the old purposes, just as Governments use modern science for the ancient barbarism called war. And it is not certain that new opportunities will be used in new ways. Modernized industry may collapse in conflicts between those who are scrambling for its proceeds; or it may cause wars or other conflicts between national groups which leave devastation to be shared between victors and vanquished. But if the modernization of industry is to promote civilized life, new principles of daily action and of public policy will have to be operative.

First, the work done in production for gaining a livelihood will have to be taken as a "public service." No revolutionary reorganization is necessary. Certainly the worker or the business man will not cease to think "what he can make out of it." But "what he can make out of it" may be subordinated, as an accepted social ground for policy or practice, to the general advantage of the public served by the production of clothes and food. This involves a domination of "the consumer" in each man, in his outlook upon the industrial system; but that is too abstract a statement to have any "bite" upon the understanding of common folk—who, after all, are more important than professional moralists. In plainer terms, the income a man gets from his work is indeed a very good reason for doing the work; but the ways in which that income can be used are more interesting than the ways in which it is earned, and the ways in which income can be used are the goods and services available. To make such goods and services available must become the dominant "motive" in industry. That is to say, just as munitions-making in war is a public service from which all are supposed to derive advantage, so hat-making or bread-making is a public service performed by the

worker and the director of the firms concerned. There is already a vague feeling to that effect: less grandfatherly minds may be able to make that feeling less vague—not by speeches or “resolutions”—indeed, possibly by saying nothing about it.

In public policy modernized industry should make men's minds amenable to co-operation across the frontiers of States. But this would imply the cotton-worker's being able to perceive where the cotton he uses came from and where his product is going to. Suppose, as suggested above, that the rubber used in making a motor-car could speak the language of those who collected it or the language of those to whom it is exported as a tyre. Then the worker, using the rubber to make his living, would hear at least murmurs of those other workers on whom he depends for his livelihood. It is almost impossible to suggest an imagination in a director strong enough to grasp where the capital he uses comes from, namely the general flow of credit throughout the world. But the modernization of commerce and finance is so obviously a tendency towards greater interchange between the citizens of different States that perhaps “policy” will not always be an effort to resist that tendency for the supposed advantage of this or that small group. Tariffs are intended to injure foreigners or at least to help “us” without helping “them.” By no fiction can such tariffs be regarded as a modernization: they were old dodges in the eighteenth century. And if the final purpose of any enterprise in industry is to supply wants, then it is irrelevant that the wants supplied or the means to supply them are local or foreign.

On the other hand, old gentlemen who knew Cobden cannot make us believe that the tendency towards interchange “goes of itself” to make everyone happy. Merely standing aside is not policy, when standing aside involves that the law of

supply and demand leaves the possible consumer without any income. It may be good for other people that cheaper production elsewhere should make it difficult for me to sell the goods I produce: but it cannot be good for me, and it is hardly good for others that I should produce nothing. The problem, then, is how to cheapen production; that is to say, how to render more service, without injuring those who have been or are already rendering services. If each State secures safety for its own citizens only, it decreases the total amount of services available for all. The best way therefore of protecting and indeed improving the prospects of each is by agreement between as many as possible. The Governments should act together to promote co-operation between the industrialists and workers of their States; or at least the Governments may throw their weight into the tendency of those groups in industry which thus co-operate instead of being, in accordance with an obsolete tradition, agents of contending parties.

This is not the place to describe in detail a commercial policy: here the chief concern is the change in mental attitude essential for modernization. Men are not yet looking that way. The first need is to look to the positive promotion and direction of commercial interchange. And, as implied in the earlier discussion, the terms in which co-operation should be rendered are not those of competitive production, but those of a rising standard of consumption. What is needed is a plan by which the depressed or backward areas shall have more purchasing-power or such kinds of purchasing-power as will preserve and develop the services rendered in more advanced areas. Africans and Chinese and Indians and South Europeans do not buy enough manufactured articles. They cannot buy enough, partly because of incompetence in their methods of production, but partly because we do not pay them enough

for their services nor advance credit to them adequately. The further mechanization of production and the rapid increase in productivity which is significant of the modern world are both futile unless the "markets" are modernized also; that is to say, unless the power to consume the products of the new era is also on a new scale and of a new kind.

CHAPTER X

STANDARDIZATION OF TASTE

SUPERIOR persons complain that factory-girls now look like ladies of fashion and that so many motor-cars on the road are like their own. What such persons mean is that their happiness depends upon their feeling that they are "superior." They belong to the small caste that fears democracy. Minor novelists, art-critics, and the more brainless of those who have inherited wealth are agreed that it is not "nice" to have so many people near them, who do not defer to them. These few survivors of an earlier civilization complain that modern life is standardized.

It seems to be thought peculiar that so many people wear the same sort of hat and live in the same sort of room. This may be regrettable; but it is not new. Nothing is more standardized now than the poverty of the majority was in the past. The goods and services obtainable by ninety-nine out of every hundred in all forms of civilization, long before our own, were standardized. Mediæval knights may have had various forms of armour. Mediæval villeins all over Europe had the same sort of wollen smock and the same kind of hovel to sleep in. Chinese mandarins wore silk clothing of many colours and shapes; but the vast majority in China have always had only a little cotton clothing. The aristocrats of the eighteenth century had brocades: the majority had the same sort of cloth in all countries and a large proportion only rags.

True, national costume and national foods differed. The peasantry, standardized in their own locality, differed from the standardized peasantry of other parts. In modern life all the men wear trousers, all the women cheap stockings; and

all take tinned food. That is to say, the poorer sort in each locality have adopted the common standard, which in the eighteenth century united the "upper" classes in international fashions; and since there are more poor than rich, the extent of the standardization makes it more striking. Similarly in food, the rich in earlier times had the same variety in all lands: now those who are not rich can escape local famine by using products from anywhere. But it is better for them to eat tinned food than to depend upon a standardized local supply which may fail. Two corrections, then, must be made if standardization is said to be characteristic of modern life. one is that the goods available for great numbers have always been standardized, and the other is that the scale of standardization to-day is an accidental result of the improved standard of life for the majority. No life is more completely standardized than one in which the majority have no choice at all: and some of the complaints against standardized taste should be directed against the lack of purchasing-power, which makes it impossible for most men to obtain non-standardized goods. As for the ugliness of the actual standard of clothing and house-decoration, that is largely due to the first phase of industrialism and not to influences which can be called modern. The cut and colour of Western clothing are largely the results of the age of smoke. In that age nobody could see clearly and men wore dark tubes for clothing "to hide the dirt," that is to say, to carry it about with them. But the practices of the past century are not modern. Colour is coming back again in a world of electricity and internal-combustion engines.

But again, it is not true that modern conditions always cause standardization of taste. Many thousands buy the same sort of food; but the variety of food from house to house in any working-class street is much greater now than it was twenty years ago. Many kinds of fruit, new forms of cereal,

a far greater number of different kinds of drink, and a possibility of daily change in the kind of food eaten—these are the significant characteristics of the households of to-day, as compared with the standardized national types of meals in the last generation. It is true that a great number do choose the same kind of goods; but each has a greater range of choice than ever before. The fact that men choose to be alike is not new: it is in fact an inheritance from the past. And it is not altogether regrettable. The common man prefers to avoid notice—in that way being unlike the superior person. The common man has a great respect for other people's opinion of him: but that respect is the basis of all human society. Within the limits of what is not noticeable, however, the common man likes to be distinguishable by small differences in the details of clothing, food, or house-decoration. And in fact it is this desire for distinguishable details within a single common standard of taste which is most characteristic of the consumers' influence during the past twenty years. Variety of colour in wall-decoration or in clothing is correcting the taste of the mechanical age in the nineteenth century. Experimentation in new foodstuffs weakens the hold of national rituals, such as bacon-and-eggs for breakfast in England. Thus the most recent tendencies seem to indicate an increased standardization in basic needs and an increased variety of taste in non-essentials.

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN CONSUMPTION

The whole of "consumption," however, is rapidly changing its character; and this change is affecting the personalities of men and women and the relations between persons.¹

¹ See *Recent Economic Changes*, two vols., 1929. *Consumption*, Vol. I, p. 1319. Changes in United States there recorded include decrease in use of cereals; increase in use of dairy produce, sugar, fruit, and vegetables; diversification of diet; increase in use of electricity and motor-cars.

The general change in the past twenty years in *transport* has been marked by the decline in railway receipts. Passenger-revenue of United States railways in 1929 was about \$400 million less than in 1920: and in the same period the numbers of motor-trucks increased from one million (1920) to 3,379,000 in 1929: the number of motor-buses increased from 10,000 to 92,000. A new night-life has arisen on the roads. Along the main roads connecting great cities in the United States, Great Britain, and Western Germany, there is a continuous procession of motor-lorries carrying goods between about 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Young men—a new “class”—take the lorries to stopping-places, where drivers are changed in the night, where the waiting drivers snatch moments of sleep on benches in coffee-stalls or garages. The noise of this night-long traffic is to be heard in country places, where a generation ago the railway goods-traffic or the night express made the only sound.

Other social effects of the motor-car are of fundamental importance. The inexpensive private car has changed the proportion of income generally spent upon houses and clothing. Where instalment buying has been common, especially in the United States, great numbers have decreased their expenditure upon what used to be called “necessaries” in order to have immediate use of a car which they could not hope to own fully for many years. The social effects are obviously both good and bad. An extension of enjoyment is good; but insecurity as to the future and too great restriction of food or clothing is bad.¹ Again, the car has made it possible for a man and wife and perhaps the children to take enjoyment together: it has increased the number of those who desire to take a holiday

¹ See *Middletown*, p. 256, for the attitude towards purchasing or keeping a car, at the cost of having less food. A study of instalment-purchase in the automobile industry is in Professor E. R. Seligman's *The Economics of Instalment Selling*, two vols, 1927.

or some hours away from home. When, however, the children grow to adolescence, they seem to take refuge in other cars from the company of parents. The private car, then, is changing the relationship of members of a family, especially in America.

Outside America, the inexpensive private car is not so common: but important social changes are due to the motor-bus and the charabanc. In Europe, for example, these provide new means for taking holiday away from a locality. The custom of the majority of workers has never allowed much time for travel; but now the motor-bus and the charabanc provide reasons for leisure. In some cases motor-transport has made it more possible for workers to have homes which are distant from their work-places. The effect is to delocalize interests. But a more important social effect is the bridging of the gulf which separates the "upper" from "lower" classes in a mediæval or aristocratic society. In this the motor-car combines with the cinema and the radio to make the range of imagination similar for all persons in a community. In the case of the motor-car, the man who was "tied to the soil," so long as the means of transport were expensive, has now an experience similar to that of richer men. In the United States the life on the roads is democratic to an extent not yet possible in Europe.¹ The motor-car is said to have "freed the United States from provincialism, though at the heavy cost of increasing standardization of manners"; but manners may well be standardized as the basic necessity of personal communications. In any case, a world on wheels is not like the old world of men driving or riding horses past most other men on foot.

The other striking instance of a change in transport is the coming of aircraft, which has been touched upon above. In

¹ See P. W. Slosson: "The Saga of the Motor Car" in *The Great Crusade and After*, p. 219 sq. The tourist cabins by the roads in North America would provide a good subject for a study of new social habits.

the whole world in 1929 there were two thousand aeroplanes on regular routes, which carried 600,000 passengers.¹ The increase in the United States alone was from 700,000 kilometres flown in 1919 to 83,000,000 in 1929. The number of civil aircraft produced in the United States in 1925 was about 260 and in 1929 about 5,500.² The social effects are, for example, that the time for the journey from London to the Indian coast, which was six months in 1840 and was reduced in 1920 to three and a half weeks, in 1930 takes about four days. From Berlin to Moscow the journey took 45 hours by rail and now takes 15 hours by air. But apart from shortening journeys, aircraft have been used for rescue from disease in Persia in 1927, from shipwreck in the Baltic in 1928. Pests were destroyed in uninhabited areas in Louisiana in 1925; and forest fires, sometimes caused by lightning, have been fought by aircraft. Fishing has been helped by sighting from aircraft; smugglers have been caught; sowing seed over vast areas has been attempted; and mapping has been facilitated by aircraft in Canada (1925) and Africa (1929). But all this is only a first stage in the development of many possible uses of aircraft.³ Not many travel by air yet: but already the imaginations of man are delocalized by aircraft. It is not strange to hear of journeys across half the earth made in a few days: and in Europe it is common to think of different countries only as landing-places. International Conventions have been ratified and an International Aircraft Committee (CINA) has been active for some years.

A second great change has been in the use of power-supplies. Electricity, for example, has become available not only for industrial production but for household use. The tungsten

¹ See League Report, *Enquiry into International Air Navigation*, 1930.

² See *Aviation*, March 22, 1930, E. P. Warner (editor) presents in this number full statistics of American aircraft.

³ See C. Rocca: *La Navigazione Aerea*, Milan, 1930.

lamp was put on the market in 1902: and ductile tungsten was made available in 1909. The development of gas-filled lamps followed soon after.¹ The use of electricity for light is "probably the least efficient of its applications": and yet for cleanliness, for saving labour in the household, and because the light is movable, the advantages are obvious. From telephones the chief social effects seem to be a more rapid provision of services, closer contact between friends, and very much less effort expended in communication. Outside North America, however, the telephone does not seem to have yet reached the common life of the majority of those with small incomes. Electricity has also made possible in the household many new appliances for cleaning, cooking, or preserving food, the chief social effect of which has been the increase of the leisure and surplus vitality of women. Again in this case the change has only just begun. The household is still the most traditional and the most incompetent of all our social organizations: but intelligence is reducing waste even in kitchens. The result, if women still continue to bear the chief burden of household management, will be to give more women energy for public affairs, for the maintenance of their own careers and the development of ability in the arts, the sciences, or industrial enterprise.²

In domestic life a recent change has been the introduction of the steel window. This has followed upon the use of concrete and steel in building generally, which preceded 1900. In the last twenty years, however, in Great Britain the steel window has been increasingly used for dwelling-houses: and in South Africa, where the white ant

¹ For a history of the application of electrical science, see Professor G. W. O. Howe's paper, *A Hundred Years of Electrical Engineering*, British Association, Section G, Toronto Meeting, 1924. For the United States, see *Recent Economic Changes*, I, p. 56.

² See "Women in the Modern World," *Annals of American Academy of Political Science*, May 1929.

destroyed wood, the steel window is almost universal for new building.¹

The actual use of food and clothing in the modern world has not been adequately analysed.² What follows here, therefore, can be only suggestions as to tendencies. The fundamental change affecting taste is due to the application of science to the provision of new commodities such as artificial silk and the use of science in the preservation of foodstuffs. The discovery of cheaper means of conveying perishable goods in new metal containers and with swifter transport has made possible the extension of inexpensive restaurants and cafés. Metallurgy and the internal-combustion engine have, therefore, affected the use of food.

Chilled or frozen meat, fruit, and vegetables are now available for great numbers in all modern countries. Canned or tinned foodstuffs of all kinds have increased the variety available for quite small incomes, and made men in any locality aware of the foods provided by far-distant lands. Thus nineteenth-century tea, coffee, and cocoa have now been followed by the introduction into Great Britain of oranges, bananas, and grape-fruit. The imports of raw fruit into the United Kingdom in 1913 were almost doubled in 1928.³ In all modern countries the old foodstuffs are less used;

¹ The figures for steel windows sold show the increase. In Great Britain in 1913 about 1 per cent. of new dwelling-house windows were made of steel; in 1930 about 50 per cent.

² See the German analysis of family budgets in *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, No. 20, 1929.

³ Statistical Abstract, Cmd. 3465, 1930, p. 326. Imports of raw fruit:

	1913	1928
Apples	3,257,000 cwt.	6,089,000 cwt.
Bananas	7,539,000 bunches	12,965,000 bunches.
Oranges	5,792,000 cwt.	7,760,000 cwt.

and new foods are being taken, partly as a result of new customs in work or leisure.

A change in Scotland shows the interaction of customs. "The consumption of oatmeal has fallen in twenty years by more than 30 per cent. This is a result of the change in working hours, particularly the elimination of work before breakfast. A change in habits also has occurred. The housewife is attracted by more quickly cooked and even already-cooked articles of diet."¹ The demand for packeted foodstuffs has rapidly increased in spite of the increased cost. In America it has been calculated that "the average excess cost of food bought in packages over the cost of food bought in bulk of the eleven articles investigated was 54.01 per cent.": but the new form of demand is increasing.² The increase in tinned or canned foodstuffs has been very great since about 1910, even in non-European countries. Cost of food has been increased by new facilities for delivery, which are more commonly demanded by persons with secure or larger incomes. But in country parts the motor-van, the motor-omnibus used for shopping, and in the United States the extension of the mail order business, are abolishing the village shop-keeper and making purchase simpler even for those with small incomes.³

In furniture, utensils, and household decoration changes have not yet spread very far; but steel furniture is available in Germany and Holland, new metals are being used for cooking utensils, and, in Great Britain, the lace-curtain, which used to be a sign of respectability, is disappearing. In clothing, the change since 1900 has been most startling in what women

¹ From a report of the Scottish C.W.S. These and other details I owe to the kindness of one of the directors, my friend, Mr. D. Cameron Thompson.

² Harrap: *Education of the Consumer*, p. 52.

³ For detailed evidence in England, see article on "Village Traders," *The Times*, February 11, 1930.

wear. The contrast is best seen in copies of the illustrated papers for 1900, 1910, 1920, and 1930. Not merely is the cut of the clothing less voluminous, but the materials, for hosiery and underclothing especially, are lighter. In European industrial areas the shawl of the factory-girls has almost disappeared; and social distinctions are less marked by differences of dress. The effect on the vitality of women has been remarkable. Sir Walter Fletcher, of the Medical Research Council of Great Britain, says: "The new clothing and perhaps the new habits have destroyed the anæmia, causing pale faces among young women, which used to be common twenty years ago." And the Chief Medical Officer for New York City says: "The new clothing is making women into the stronger sex." All these tendencies of consumption directly affecting women—the decrease of household labour, the improvement in clothing, the greater vitality available, and the more continuous contact with men, because of the motor-car, the cinema, and the radio—may well be causes of a revolutionary change in the status and influence of women in social life. Such a change, affected by new customs in consumption, may be more fundamental than the grant of the franchise or even the increased number of occupations for women in industry.

Perhaps, however, the most striking modernization of this aspect of social life is the recent application of thought and experiment to practices which have been hitherto traditional. Thus colleges of domestic science and the arts of household management have been established; and the schools have begun to yield a place for the study of diet, cooking, clothing, and household appliances in the deserts of the literary tradition of education. Exact studies of diet are now made.¹ Not

¹ See Cathcart: *A Study in Nutrition*, Medical Research Council, 1931, and *Recent Economic Changes*, Vol. I, p. 24.

only are new foodstuffs available, but many are on the look-out for new foods and new ways of using food.

This experimentation in daily life differs from country to country. In North America the frontier-mind and the risk-taking of the emigrant make new habits easier to introduce. In Great Britain the traditional bad cooking may drive men to new habits. In France customs are not easily changed, especially as the French believe their domestic habits to be the most civilized in the world. But the mere increase in the variety of supplies available is slowly changing the ways in which people use food and clothing.

The great increase in advertising in recent years, chiefly through the Press, is partly a result of the effort of the producer to market goods in new places or in new societies: but it is also a sign of the willingness of the consumer to change his habits. The consumer, especially in America, is on the look-out for new ways of using his income or for alternatives to the traditional method. Greater skill in the use of food and clothing will reduce waste, especially in the case of small incomes; it will increase the amount of vitality, raise the real standard of life, and even improve productivity. A difference in money-income cannot be taken as a difference in the real standard of living: for example, the wage-earner in France can cook food more skilfully than the wage-earner in Great Britain, and therefore from a smaller income he may derive a higher standard of living. The introduction of domestic science in schools may do more to raise the standard of living than an increase in money incomes. The traditional students of economics and politics do not yet grasp the importance of this new behaviour-pattern; but men and women thus freed from tradition in daily custom will be as free in their attitude towards institutions.

CHANGES IN THE USE OF LEISURE

In the modern world, however, changes in the use of daily necessities are less striking than changes in the use of leisure by the majority of men, women, and children. Among the new opportunities for the use of leisure, apart from the motor-car, which has been discussed above, the most important are the cinema and the radio. The extension of the use of cinemas has been already noted: it is said that about forty million persons every day attend cinemas in the whole world. Here the social effects may be considered.

Clearly the proportion of income spent on leisure has been increased by cinemas. The proportion spent on intoxicants and perhaps also on brothels has decreased. In some industrial areas the owners of drinking-saloons are opposing the construction of more cinemas. Again, in cinemas men and women are together, especially young men and young women. In earlier times the youths of the locality would congregate in gangs: now the young clerk or apprentice goes with "his girl" to the pictures; and the standards of manners and of clothing are therefore improving. The film-story may be very superficial; but the manners and customs of hero and heroine are easily taken as models—more easily than was the case with the characters of printed books. In any great city to-day the cinema manner can be observed in the movements of many of the people in the streets. Again, the relief from monotony, given by any stage-play, is now available for all in the cinema: social restlessness therefore is relieved by film-stories and new realms are open for day-dreaming. Finally "localism" is corrected by stories of strange people and strange places: the modern mind in the majority of men is open to new ideas about custom, as the incidental result of seeing many different social circles. Since men and women of many different social

classes and many different occupations see the same film-story, there is democratization of the prevailing social customs; and because the same stories are shown in many different countries, there is a greater common sentiment in the world than ever before.

In the use of the radio, the social effects are more recent, but they may prove to be as fundamental and far-reaching; and the modern world may soon find television also available. In 1920 the United States alone had broadcasting: in 1923 and 1924 it began in Europe. Now, not only is there daily broadcasting in all modern countries, but great numbers of people have receiving-sets in their houses and listening becomes gradually more skilful, the listener making his choice out of the varied fare provided. The social effects are such as these: leisure is more interesting at home; the craftsman's interest is exercised in making and manipulating his "set"; and the practical applications of scientific knowledge are multiplied. In listening, the range of choice in music is extended.¹ This has carried further the musical education which has developed through the gramophone.²

Apart from improvements in taste, the mere increase in the amount of music and other entertainment available has relieved the monotony of many lives. Again, the contact with living personalities through speech on the radio has brought many into contact with contemporary public affairs and modern issues. The printed word has never been so powerful. Language divisions still limit the use of radio; but in any one language-area a higher level of common speech is already noticeable. In some areas in England, for example, speaking good English is referred to as "speaking wireless." The teaching of the correct accent in foreign languages may

¹ A friend of mine met a farmer in the Fen district of England hurrying home after market to listen to Beethoven on his radio. He had discovered Beethoven for himself.

² See below for the fine arts in modern life.

also be made easier by the radio. But the most important social effect of radio, as of the cinema, is democratization. Men and women of all social classes and occupations listen to the same music and the same speeches at the same time. This often results in conversation between persons who hitherto and otherwise would have no common interest; and it equalizes without degrading the taste of all the members of a community. The same kind of effect unites people of different nations, since music at least is available from foreign stations. The speech of the King at the opening of the Naval Conference in London in 1930 was relayed by 242 stations throughout the world. The Pope for the first time in history spoke directly to all nations from the Vatican radio station in February 1931. Speeches made either in Great Britain or in North America are listened to across the Atlantic: and in some cases speeches in a foreign tongue are aimed at people across frontiers.¹

If, therefore, the international effects of the three very recent inventions, the cinema, the radio, and the aeroplane, are added together, it would seem that the scale of imagination for great numbers is now much larger than it was. That is to say, foreign people are felt to be less distant and less strange: the map of political divisions is less important for radio or aeroplane because the air has no frontiers; and the dress of foreigners is less alarming because of the cinema.² Again, the basic experience of many peoples tends to become more similar.

¹ The international effect may be doubtful, since the Russian Government, for example, aims at "propaganda" by radio across the frontiers of foreign States. See *The Times*, July 12, 1930. But agreement between States is necessary for the use of fixed wave-lengths; and any wave-length could be obstructed, if conditions agreed upon are not observed. The International Radio Union was founded in 1925. A Conference at Prague, 1929, fixed the present system. See *B.B.C. Year-book*, 1930.

² For aircraft, "Sovereignty is an empty word, because all control is illusory," p. 81, League Report on Air Navigation, 1930. Nationalism becomes more vehement, because it is more obviously against the nature of things.

Cinemas and radio-entertainments do not differ much in different lands. If this is standardization, it is not regrettable. Men may still hate and fear other men; but at any rate they have begun to be aware in daily life of other men with other customs and beliefs. It is a misleading metaphor to say that the world has become smaller. Indeed, the world has become fuller; because in earlier times, for most men, the world outside their locality was quite empty of meaning. Even the recent changes in food and clothing, although seldom connected with the peoples whose services have made them possible, tend to make a man look outside his locality for the improvement in the conditions of his daily life.

In general, therefore, standardization in its most modern forms, in the extension of new supplies of food and clothing, and above all in giving to all classes the same sort of uses for leisure, has had two immensely important social effects. In the first place, it has democratized social contacts. Men and women are not so far separated by distinctions of dress, by distinctions in foodstuffs or enjoyments. This tends to assimilate the manners and customs of men and women in different occupations in the same community. They may thus have a more extensive common experience; and on the whole, if the manners and customs of common folk to-day are compared with those of the gentry in the eighteenth century, the level is seen to have been raised, not lowered. In styles of dress the level of taste may be lower than the best in the past; but even in this the lack of distinct costumes indicating the trade or occupation makes men treat others as equals. The other great effect, as noted above, is the assimilation of peoples who still differ in language or custom. This has not yet affected the deeper passions or sympathies, largely because the contact of peoples is mainly through things and not in personal converse. Standardization, however,

even here is transforming the social situation and certainly not for the worse. There is much more sympathy for suffering in other lands than there ever was before.

PROBLEMS OF PURCHASING-POWER

Two quite different problems remain to be solved: one is the lack of purchasing-power among many who need available goods; the other is the misuse of such purchasing-power as exists. In a world in which there seems to be a surplus of foodstuffs and raw materials, there is also, not merely epidemic famine, as in China, but endemic poverty in London and New York. By poverty in this sense is meant an actual lack of enough food and clothing for barely human existence; and this is not due, in Western countries, to any failure of harvests or deficiency in production. It is due to the traditional system for the distribution of purchasing-power. It is due, in fact, not to modern conditions, but to a survival in the modern world of an obsolete custom. The number of those who lack necessities and the extent of their wants are clearly less than they were twenty years ago; but the advance made still leaves a problem to be solved. "In 1924 in the British Isles there were nearly two million people living below the poverty line—below the lowest standard necessary to maintain bare physical efficiency."¹ In the United States great numbers are without adequate food and clothing even in times of prosperity; and a still greater number have incomes too small to allow of any saving.² The principle of policy required for modernization is sufficiently plain. What these people need is more purchasing-power. To say that they cannot be given more is to confess

¹ J. J. Mallon: *Poverty, Yesterday and To-day*, 1930, p. 36.

² See Annual Report of Secretary of Labour, United States, for 1928, p. 164 sq.

"Low wages as a public responsibility." In 1928, a year of "prosperity" in the United States, about eight million persons were living below the poverty line, and about twelve million had a bare subsistence. See P. Nystrom: *Economic Principles of Consumption*, and W. I. King: *The National Income* (1930).

inexcusable incompetence; and all those arguments which are intended to show that, if a surplus were taken away from the rich, not more than a useless fraction could be given to each poor man, are really irrelevant. Money spent on education, public health, or amenities does actually increase the purchasing-power of the poor, without distribution of fractions of a penny to each poor man.¹ But the real issue is not the separation of a given sum; it is a problem of investment for securing markets and, incidentally, productive power. Goods exist which are needed by starving men. Grant them credit for the use of these goods. The conditions of such credit are of minor importance; but they may be made, if necessary, severe. The point is that the markets for foodstuffs and raw materials *can* be extended here and now by a skilful use of credit. All the more useful is such extension, if one thinks not merely of the two million below the poverty line in the British Isles, not merely of those who are half-starved in Berlin, Paris, or New York, but also of the millions in Asia and Africa who still die prematurely, owing to inadequate food and clothing. The problem is world-wide: its solution can only be achieved by co-operation between those who hold power in the advanced industrial countries. But it is hardly worth while to discuss it further here. Nothing on an adequate scale is likely to be done in this generation. The problem of poverty is not yet seen to be an opportunity for extending markets. It is still sentimentalized. Also, it is so vast a problem that there may not be a supply of intellectual ability in the world at present for dealing with it practically. Even within any one State, no politician or business man seems to be able to see the opportunity offered by a solution of the problem of credit for purchasing-power among the poor. And besides, there are so many urgent problems—the danger of war, the prospects

¹ See the argument in R. H. Tawney's *Equality*.

of unemployment, the defects of the traditional education—that the beneficiaries of the existing system seem to have no time to give to the rescue of its victims.

The other problem of consumption is not the lack of purchasing-power but its misuse by those who have it. The theoretical economist says that demand creates supply; but in practice the demand is traditional, uneducated, and thoughtless. Its method of creation is very like fumbling in the dark: and it seems to accept what is thrust into its hands. The improvement of such taste as exists is obviously the only method by which the evils of standardization may be corrected; but in order to improve taste it must be treated seriously. The problem is not how much a man has to spend, but how he may best use what he has.

If the consumer or enjoyer is to dominate social practice, he must be more than a mere appetite swallowing what the producer advertises. The defect of modern life, which underlies standardized vulgarity, is inexpertness in the buyer or user of goods and services.¹ Modernization has in some cases led to the use of skill in adulteration of goods: but this again is old. Even in mediæval society there was sham building, shoddy clothing, and decaying food disguised. The advance of science and of skill has given more opportunity for fraud, as it has added new weapons to war. And so the modern State has had to defend the inexpert consumer by the "Food and Drugs Act" in Great Britain and the Bureau of Standards in the United States. A Consumer's Council was established in Great Britain for "national defence" against raids by fraudulent producers. Consumers' Co-operative Societies have helped the wage-earners to obtain good food and clothing. All these, however, are not new. The protection of the consumer, in

¹ An admirable study of this incompetence in America is in Stuart Chase's *Your Money's Worth: a Study in the Waste of the Consumer's Dollar*, New York, 1929.

view of his ignorance and incompetence, is merely a first step towards the modernization of the whole system of consumption and of the ways in which men regard their uses of purchasing-power.

It is characteristic of contemporary taste among the majority that it is uneducated. Since education is a slow process and modern education, as will be shown below, has not been operative yet for more than about twenty years even in advanced communities, the lack of educated taste is not itself a sign of modernity. It is, in fact, the result of a pre-modern situation. But it is undoubtedly common in the modern world. All the more significant are the groups which now attempt to form a modern taste. In Great Britain the Design and Industries Association, in Sweden the Association for the maintenance of taste in industrial products,¹ and the active societies of architects and other artists in France, Germany, and Holland—all these are signs of a new power over production. As it was argued above in reference to modern government, voluntary groups of persons, specially interested in the promotion of some public advantage, are the sources in modern life of reform and progress.

The principle operative in this process is the increasing power to choose the kinds of production needed, which is exercised by consumers or enjoyers. That is to say, true modernization of "economic" activities involves a change in the nineteenth-century view of industry and leisure. That old view was itself an inheritance, largely accumulated under Puritan influence. Life was regarded as a serious business—but in any case "business." North America suffered badly from this disease. Benjamin Franklin perhaps spread it most effectually;

¹ The Svenska Slöjdföreningen. The cry for "beautiful everyday ware" became dominant in Sweden: as Ellen Key said, "He who designs a beautiful beer-bottle renders a greater service to humanity than the discoverer of the North Pole."

for his *Advice to a Young Tradesman* and *Necessary Hints to those that would be Rich* were gospels of "worldly asceticism."¹ Clearly, there were other and more attractive elements in Franklin: but historical analysis may be omitted here. For some reason, large circles in Western countries still believe that the *serious* part of life is in obtaining opportunities to be used and the "frivolous" part is in using the opportunities obtained. Western society, since industrialism began, seems to have given great attention to the means and none to the end; but that was consonant with the mythology which implied that if no one aimed at the common good an "invisible hand" would secure it as a result of conflicting egoisms. Thus work was regarded as the main purpose of life, because work had no other conceivable purpose in leisure. Work was therefore serious and leisure frivolous. To reverse such a contrast would annoy Puritans; but that would not matter. The trouble is that a reversal would be completely misunderstood by the majority. To treat leisure "seriously" would be still more awful than to be serious at work; for especially in the Anglo-American tradition, to be "serious" is to be a kill-joy, a solemn fool, or a sentimental bore. Indeed, the "worldly asceticism" which condemns men, in the pursuit of a philistine virtue to be worn out by labour and spiritually emaciated by thrift, has as its worst result the solemn manner in which, in the Anglo-American tradition, men "enjoy themselves." If, however, the arts of enjoyment are more important than the methods of obtaining the means of enjoyment, then some rational attention will be paid to them. And the governing ideal that what is enjoyable is good rather than bad, would react from the enjoyment of leisure upon the enjoyment of work itself. It is not, in fact, true that "production" is all "cost" and consumption all "gain." Work is not

¹ See Max Weber: *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Trans. 1930.

necessarily a burden. There are elements of positive "gain" or enjoyment—intellectual, emotional, social—in modern methods of production.¹ That is to say, men and women do actually find pleasure in factory life, in shops, and banks; and this pleasure is *not* due to the income they "make out of it." The coal-heaver enjoys using his muscles; the locomotive-driver enjoys controlling the speed of the engine; the typist enjoys her skill; the bank clerk feels happy in being quick. All this is quite natural and good; but onlookers, such as the traditional economists, cannot imagine themselves enjoying what they see other people doing; a certain number of people at work are physically inert and intellectually half-witted; and worst of all, there is an ancient theory that work is a curse or at least a distasteful task which would never be done at all, but for a reward. Two distinct tendencies, therefore, exist in one tradition—one the natural tendency to enjoy that energizing which is "work" and the other the evil inheritance from slave-mentality, the tendency to regard all work as objectionable. The former must dominate society, if the economic system is to be modernized. But in that case a man will explain his work not as merely a means to an end, even the service of other people, but as an enjoyable expression of his personality.

This redemption of "work" from Puritanic solemnity, however, will probably be achieved only by a new understanding of leisure. In the old days of the first industrial revolution, leisure was commonly regarded as merely an interval between spells of work. Holidays were days in which one recovered energy to be spent upon work. Even sleep—

sleep that knits up the ravell'd sleeve of care,
the death of each day's life . . .

¹ See J. A. Hobson: *Work and Wealth*, 1914, a book which has never yet received the recognition it deserves, for its fundamental analysis of psychological factors in production. See also J. A. Hobson: *Wealth and Life*, 1929.

divine sleep was regarded as merely an unfortunate necessity; Business men go by train during the night in order not to "waste a day." They do not care whether or not they waste a night: and they would think a man mad who told them what night was, for they have never seen night! And as for sleep, they despise what they do not understand.

It is a commonplace that work is for the sake of leisure; but it is the sort of commonplace which, in contemporary life, is only in the school-books. The abolition of "worldly asceticism" involves applying the principle in practice. But that means taking holidays seriously. It means that the consumer and enjoyer, not the producer, should dominate the policy embodied in business. That is to say, the test of the well-being of any nation or group is not the amount of wealth or exchangeable values it produces, but the way in which it uses its wealth. The proportion of available energy or vitality which is spent upon "mere" living, in a civilized community, would be much larger than the proportion spent in getting a living. The work done would be in the intervals between "holidays": and if it were disagreeable work, it would give all the more zest to enjoyment in the always increasing periods of holiday. Thus if modern conditions decrease the hours of labour and the strain of daily work, if they increase the ways of using leisure, they are changing the philistinism of the early industrialism into civilized life: and the tendency of modern industry to increase productivity is desirable only if the result is more leisure for all men and a much greater skill in the use of leisure.

How horrible that sounds to the traditional moralist! One hears him say that men get drunk and beat their wives on holidays: perhaps he thinks that factories and offices are morally useful for keeping people out of the mischief they naturally do. The devil has been believed to be the best em-

ployer during leisure. But that was not always so. Among the Greeks, men's comrades in leisure were the Gods; and in that belief ancient Athens was more modern than nineteenth-century industrialism. The enjoyment of leisure is no less important for all men in a modern community than it was for the few in earlier civilizations.

However that may be, holiday is redeemed by modern inventions from being a time of inertia or somnolence: rather it is an opportunity for more vigorous interest and energy. If interest and energy, when one is not at work, are wasted, that is a sign of barbarism; and clearly more leisure is worse than useless, without an improvement in the ability for using it. But that involves an educational problem, which will be discussed later. The point of the argument here is that enjoyment is natural and good, even if it requires some skill to enjoy one's self adequately. The increasing facilities for enjoyment in the modern world are not dangers or temptations: they are opportunities for a more civilized life; and they will be most effectual when they destroy the pernicious doctrine that a factory or a business office is more important for civilized life than a theatre or a concert-room or a cinema.

CHAPTER XI

MODERN EDUCATION

IT is an old game that a man should pay for what he uses. It is comparatively new that he should use trousers instead of a toga and pay for them by making engines. Positively modern, however, not to say American, it would be to buy a radio-set with what could be collected from sitting at the top of a pole for two days. The same method of exchange has new effects, if the items in the bargain are different; and the items differ because of what is called "culture." What most men work for and use depends upon the current social estimate of what makes life worth living, which is the cultural standard.

I was on the Taconic trail, where Indians once scalped their neighbours, and I saw the sun setting over Troy—another Troy, where millions of collars are made, even if the same Helen is still the centre of the struggle. And why should they not make collars in Troy? It is as good a game as pulling a wooden horse about. But where I stood was the sound of a voice, over the radio sweetly discoursing. The voice, they said, came from Rome, another Rome—not claiming to be eternal; and the voice discoursed about—stomach troubles. Those who were looking at the sunset listened to the latest news of cures for dyspepsia. Thus a practical age is not blinded by the beauty of nature to the trials of civilization. It may be even delightful to think of stomach troubles at sunset.¹

In the modern world mechanisms are not used only by a select caste. Therefore the process of directing their use must affect all men: education, that is to say, must be general and

¹ "Suave mari magno . . . ex alto spectare." The reference will be clear to scholars.

popular.¹ The cultural standard of a modern community must be operative directly upon the customs of the majority, both because great numbers have the power to use the new mechanisms and because most of the new mechanisms are means of increasing contacts between men. The carpenter, the clerk, and the working engineer can travel farther and faster, with greater ease, than the gentleman of a century ago could in his coach. The common man to-day makes and consumes so many and such various goods, that the greatest stores of ancient Assyria, Egypt or Rome are small by comparison. The common man now sees and hears more than his forefathers did. Photographic illustration and gramophones have made the worlds of sight and sound more various. On the radio, even if allowance is made for those who "cut it off" when the jokes end, many more listen to Beethoven than ever heard him twenty years ago and thousands more than heard him when he was alive.

The motor-car, the talkie, the radio, the aeroplane are all means of contact between persons. Through them one comes into contact with a greater number of other folk and a more varied assortment. This latest stage, then, in the methods of transport and communication invented by the first industrial revolution, has carried farther the social effects of railways, steamships, telegraphs, and telephones. Omit now the indirect effects upon friendship or acquaintance—the direct effects upon personal relations are fundamental. The use made of all these new opportunities for contact between men may release forces that are superficial or destructive: the mind of the time may not be strong enough to control the machinery which is the extension of its bodily power. An example—the telephone makes it much easier for the younger generation

¹ The best general statement of a point of view which is "modern" in the sense implied here is in John Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, 1916.

to be in intimate contact. It may even affect sexual relations. Nowadays a young man can arrange a meeting with a girl at any moment; and the motor gives new opportunities to keep the appointment. In the old days the impulse might pass before the means to indulge it were available. But is it a reasonable ground for the abolition of telephones and motor-cars, if they endanger the traditional morality? Another example—any cinema has an audience, part of which consists of young men and girls, who go to “the pictures” partly in order to sit together, who enjoy the love scenes, which are much too many and too long for the more mature. There may be strange effects of the cinema upon the relations of the sexes, but is that a reasonable ground for setting up a censorship of old gentlemen who have had their own love-scenes long ago?

Clearly the new opportunities are not, in fact, being used generally in such a way as to produce a finer type of personality or higher levels of contact between persons. Complaints against the instruments should be directed rather against those who misuse them. But in any case, the cinema, the radio, the telephone, and the motor-car do not seem to have deepened experience nor to have made perception or expression more subtle. Indeed, the chief danger of modern mechanism is that it promotes superficiality. If a man sees more countries, he may not see more in any one of them. If a man hears more music, he may be less moved by it than the mediæval peasant was by the *Stabat Mater* in plain-song. If a man meets a greater number of other men, he may know nobody well. If “love” is only a cinema-episode, the relations of the sexes may be reduced to superficial excitement and still more trivial satisfactions. If momentary pleasure is the only end, public affairs are merely a public nuisance.

Whatever superficiality, however, there is in the use of

modern mechanisms is due to the education or lack of education of former generations. It is *not* due to the "younger generation," who are presented by adults with moral standards which are ineffectual or unintelligible or mediæval. The dominant use of opportunities in any society is the result of its past educational system—in the broadest sense of that phrase. There may be no schools, or the majority may be unaffected by such schools as exist. But even in this case, the "tone" of the influence of adults upon the new generation is the source of their manners and customs. In all forms of civilization, however, there has been some use of a consciously devised system and well-recognized methods for maintaining and spreading the current standard of manners and customs.

During the nineteenth century, as noted above, a great extension of formal education took place in all Western countries. A consciously organized State-system of schools took the place of an unorganized or ecclesiastical influence in the formation of the manners and customs of the majority. But the methods used in the new system were mainly the old methods which had been used to educate the few in an oligarchic society. Books were assumed to be the most important instruments of education. Hand-work and scientific experiment had not been used in the mediæval or eighteenth-century schools of the clerical and "upper" classes. Therefore they were omitted in the new system of education; for this was only an extension to new social classes of the traditional school, and the methods were the old literary methods for training a caste in an authoritarian and traditionalist age. The democratic idealists gave to the many the best as they knew it. The best was bad for any human being, but hopelessly bad for children who were going to be, not mediæval clerks, nor eighteenth-century lords and their tutors, but textile

operatives and coal-miners. Some simple-minded reactionaries concluded that, because mediæval methods for the education of a caste were obviously ineffectual in the education of the majority in an industrial community, therefore either all education was useless for "the lower orders" or a special form of education for "lower orders" was required. The reformers of the nineteenth century struggled with their own lack of experience in methods of education. They made changes, adaptations, and additions in the old system and methods. Psychology was only just descending from the clouds; and primitive conceptions of childhood were still dominant. The fine arts were currently regarded as entertainments for the upper classes and the sciences were thought to be tricks for running engines. But educational reformers persevered; and the clouds outside the school gradually lifted. When the new century began, the educational system and methods of education were transformed.

This change may prove to be more important than the introduction of new mechanisms or the new social organization incidental to changes in the number and kind of populations in different countries, for the educational change is a change in the direction of the force which controls the use of opportunities for civilized life. Modern civilization indeed is much more significantly distinguished from earlier civilizations in its educational systems and methods than it is in its mechanisms or its political and economic organizations. The fundamental problem of all civilization is the *use* of opportunities; and education creates the moral standard operative in such use.

The organizations in society, through which "the best" in any civilization is maintained and developed, may be called "the Spiritual Power." In that phrase are included all the churches, schools, universities, theatres, and concert-halls,

and also all artistic and scientific societies. Western civilization still includes these; but what sort of position have they? Do they dominate or are they dominated by politics and business? If they do not dominate in any age, that age is barbaric; because it is concerned chiefly with the *possession* and not chiefly with the *use* of its instruments of power. But if the Spiritual Power has at least some influence in the modern world, what in fact is the effect?

Such effect is to be tested, not by reference again to the provision of means; for that would be argument in a circle. It is obviously futile to say that the effect of the use of wealth is provision of more wealth. The only valid test, therefore, is itself cultural, just as the methods for directing the use of opportunities are fundamentally cultural. And the clearest terms in which the test can be made are those of personality, perception, subtlety of interaction with men and things, and vitality in its most general meaning. It is asked, then, What sort of men and women does modern civilization produce?¹ Can they see more clearly, hear more keenly? Can any of them express vision as well as Michelangelo or Beethoven or Plato or Confucius? Or—if the supply of genius is regarded as accidental in any generation—can the ordinary man live more fully in intelligence and emotion than his forefathers could? The answer to such questions may be found, first, by reference to contemporary changes in mental outlook, as contrasted with former changes and, secondly, by reference to the new educational methods.

¹ It must not be assumed that the answers to these questions are all uncomplimentary to the modern world. Not all ordinary folk are superficial; nor is it certain that the supply of genius is less than it was. A night watchman in London was found reading Einstein's *Relativity*. On the other hand, the defects of the moment may be due to city-areas, as in the case of the five girls of a top class in a London school who saw a live cow for the first time in 1928. See pamphlet of the L.C.C. on "School Journeys" for 1929.

FIRST STEPS TOWARDS THE NEW SYSTEM

Historical discussion is unnecessary for the argument: but the character of the change involved in modernity may be understood by comparison with earlier changes in the West. Since the establishment of the mediæval order in Europe there have been two great social changes: one occurred about the fifteenth century and may be called the Renaissance and Reformation, the other occurred three hundred years after, at the end of the eighteenth century, and on its political side was the French Revolution, on its economic side the Industrial Revolution. The first change was an attempt to escape from established authorities by making the claim that individuals or groups had a right of interpretation for themselves. The Classics for the Renaissance, the Bible for the Reformation, were the bases for denying the established tradition in the name of what in fact was only another and older tradition. Science, it is true, seemed to move into another world, not that of commentary: but the other world it found was only a new apparatus of established "laws." Copernicus and Newton meant that they had reached a final truth, just as the theologians had before them. In any case this first change in the European tradition did not disestablish authority: it only established new authorities in place of the old.

The second change went farther. It proclaimed the absolute right of the individual. The ideal of the French Revolution was Liberty—meaning no hindrance from anyone; and the ideal of the Industrial Revolution was Wealth—meaning as much as each could get for himself. And Science, dominated by the atmosphere of competition and the general sense of relief, due to acquired "liberties"—preached an Evolution which implied that nineteenth-century Europe was the finest possible product of the labour of the Universe. This second

change in the Western outlook, therefore, displaced the old confidence in traditional authority by a justifiable pride in the results of individual effort.

The new change, which is that to modernity, is more fundamental than the former two. The modern world does not look back for its "authorities": it has no authorities in that sense of the word. Commentary is irrelevant. Whatever good or truth or beauty there may be, is now believed to be discoverable in the medley of immediate experience, not in any records, nor in any earlier enlightenment. On the other hand, the new industrial processes as well as the greater scale of social organization have brought into prominence the fundamental nature of social co-operation. It is no longer possible to suppose that an individual produces separately a given amount of the result of joint effort. Science meantime has become much less dogmatic, research has become less individualistic. And above all, the confidence of the nineteenth century in the results of its activities has been replaced recently by scepticism as to the results and confidence in a *method* which may make the future entirely different and possibly better than the present.

If, in the next place, the new forms of education are observed, the same fundamental changes are to be seen. Modern education extends its influence far outside the schools. Adjustments are made in each community from day to day to meet the new conditions of life. Customs change as inventions become popular: the motor-bus, for example, changes the way in which people mount vehicles. But this gradual adjustment, which is going on all over the world, is only the informal and tentative method for doing what organized communities consciously endeavour to do in their educational system. Education in the schools, universities, and other similar institutions is that process which deliberately fosters and

promotes the kinds of intelligence, skill, or emotion which this or that community requires or finds at the moment available. Modern education, therefore, is the growth-point of a modern society; not merely because it "fits" the available ability into situations already in existence but also because it releases such new abilities as the whole of modern life may discover. Thus a modern Educationalist says: "We stand at an hour when the civilization that bred us, having barely missed uttermost disaster, faces a future which no one pretends to read. It cherishes bright hopes, but knows too well that they may be dupes. It is faced by problems which we cannot hope ourselves to solve; they must be solved, if at all, by generations that will take up our work when our place knows us no more. . . . Though our children cannot build a fairer world on any other foundation than our own, yet they are not bound, unless in our folly we will have it so, to repeat for ever our failures: they have within them a creative power which, if wisely encouraged and tolerantly guided, may remould our best into a life far worthier than we have seen or than it has entered into our hearts to conceive."¹

The extension of education in modern communities which occurred between 1870 and 1900 reduced the amount of illiteracy and improved the general competence for thinking among common folk. But the educational system was formal, in the sense that it aimed at "results" of the crudest and most superficial kind, such as the ability to add numbers or to read print or to remember what the nineteenth century called "facts."² About 1900, however, in modern communities an educational revolution occurred. The old "results" were recognized to be unimportant: inspectors of schools, who had previously sought to find teachers doing wrong—the

¹ Sir Percy Nunn: *Education*, at the end.

² See the Summary in the Report, *The Primary School*, published by the Board of Education, 1931.

mediæval habit of authority—now became advisers and assistants in the tasks of education. The educational authorities began to provide not commands nor rigid directions, but information for teachers. Greater freedom in choosing the curriculum and the method to be used was made possible even in State schools. And above all, the old method of teaching by authority—the “moulding” and “filling” of the new generation—began to give place to the promotion of free activity and of the interest of the pupils. The elementary school, instead of being a prison to which unwilling children had to be driven by school-attendance officers, was becoming a home to which children liked to go. Again, in the effort to educate the children of industrial workers, it was found necessary to assist physical as well as mental development. The feeding of school children, school medical inspection, and the rest, which were advocated at first as unfortunate necessities if the children of the poor were to learn reading and writing, were eventually perceived to imply a fundamental change in the training of bodily activities. What was primarily a revolt against the crudity of the new system of schooling introduced about 1870, was—deeper down—a revolt against certain tendencies in industrial society as a whole. Educational reformers may not have been conscious of this deeper sense of revolt: but it is shown occasionally in the complaints against the city-area as oppressive to children.¹ In any case, the effort to give in the school opportunities for self-expression, initiative, and interest in “humane” aspects of experience, was like the effort in the industrial world to escape from the mechanization of the imposed task, from the “externalism” which disregarded all results of work except pay or profit, and from the individual greed which seemed to be destroying all

¹ See Ellen Key: *The Century of the Child*, for the general conception of childhood as more than a mere preface to adult life.

sense of the community. Thus by the beginning of the twentieth century a new system and new methods had been introduced in modern communities. The new system is to be seen in the organization of health services for schools, in the better school-buildings where class-rooms are less like prison-cells than they used to be, and in the freedom of teachers from a rigid curriculum.

NEW METHODS IN EDUCATION

As for the modern *methods* in education, the dominant ideas of the new movement may be indicated by reference to the Montessori method, the Dalton plan, and the many examples of the group-method of learning.¹ These are not the only new methods recently practised; but they serve to suggest three aspects of the educational revolution. The Montessori method implies the reliance upon the initiative and tendency to self-expression in the child. The controversies as to the validity of certain psychological ideas or the efficacy of certain mechanisms are unimportant for the argument here.² The point is that there is a significant change in the attitude towards the pupil in education. As it has been well said, in the old days when the teacher wished "to teach John Latin," it was not considered necessary for him to know "John." Now it is agreed that the pupil is more important than the "subject": indeed, whether the teacher should "know Latin" is much more doubtful than whether he should know "John." With this attention paid to the pupil may be connected the use of other instruments of education besides books. Activity education, as it is called, implies the use of tools of all sorts in occupa-

¹ See, for the whole of this section, the discussions in *Towards a New Education*. Review of a conference in August 1929, edited by A. Boyd (Knopf, 1930). Also the Report of the Consultative Committee of the English Board of Education, *The Primary School*, published 1931.

² See the analysis in Sir Percy Nunn's *Education*, second edition, p. 102 sq.

tional conditions for the development of humane contacts with the real world. The spade, the hammer, the needle, and the frying-pan may be just as valuable in the training of intelligence as the blackboard and the printed page.¹ The occupational basis for education, therefore, is not an apprenticeship to trades but a use by the new generation of the instruments which have made a man out of a beast and a civilized man out of a barbarian.

A second group of modern methods relies upon the power of the child to work out a method of learning for himself. The various forms of the Dalton plan seem to imply reliance upon the active co-operation of the pupil in collecting and assimilating the material for knowledge—the “foodstuff” for the growth of intelligence. These methods allow the child, with the use of such books or other instruments as can be found, to work out some “project” at the child’s own rate and with the occasional assistance of a teacher. This is not the place for detailed criticism. All such methods are experimental. The general idea is modern in so far as it aims at protecting the child from the domination of the adult mind, allowing the child to feel the nature of the process by which knowledge has grown and leaving each child to move at the rate most convenient to its type of mind and body. Whether or not the Dalton plan is too intellectualist and places too much responsibility on the pupil, we may connect with its central idea the new use of *expression* as a means of education. Not what the child takes in, but what it gives out is its best means of development. Therefore a continual practice in expression, in speech, in the arts, in manners and customs may be the best education. Hence opportunities to draw and to use colour, to sing, and to dance, are not merely lessons in imitation, but outlets for the expression of the whole personality. The “subjects” in

¹ See the valuable discussion in Dewey’s *Democracy and Education*, p. 341 sq.

a curriculum, barren in isolation, are only aspects of a given whole situation to be dealt with by the use of all available powers of sight, of skill in speech, of movement, and of intercourse. Geography and arithmetic are unintelligible unless united in the understanding of facts, events, or situations, and the child must not be compelled to tear his real world to pieces for the convenience of academic research or the writers of textbooks.¹

A third group of modern methods has in view the experience of social co-operation. The modern mind is conscious of social relationships. In education, therefore, it is argued, the old competition of individual against individual in a class or an examination must be discarded as a method. This old competition in school reinforced the false gospel that a person of superior intelligence owed the results of his ability only to himself and that he had a moral right to take what advantage he could for himself, if he happened to be quicker than his fellows. The new method in education would make class-work, or group-work co-operative: that is to say, the child is expected to help his fellows and to receive help from them in common tasks. As at games the player is supposed to play for his side, so in the schoolroom the scholar is assumed to be working not for himself alone. The habit of co-operation in learning arithmetic, history, or singing may develop skill in co-operation: and certainly a greater skill in the understanding of other people and in working with them is required in the modern world. The old education trained individuals to be egoists: the new method implies that social co-operation cannot be left to chance or to moments of benevolence in "spare" time.

In summary form, the chief characteristics of modern

¹ See the attack on the old-fashioned "subjects" in the Board of Education Consultative Committee. Report on *The Primary School*, p. xxii.

education are as follows. The whole person is to be developed in body and all intellectual and emotional capacities. Bodily development does not mean gymnastic strength or agility, but grace of movement in the dance and skill in craftsmanship: and such bodily development is not distinguishable in practice from mental growth. On the other hand, knowledge of "facts" has given place to skill in the use of methods for observing facts; and "literature" and the other arts are now used as modes of expression, not as riddles to be explained or as models to be copied. In the process of teaching, modern education involves the dethronement of the teacher and the abolition of despotism and dogmatism as methods of teaching. If, however, a teacher descends from his throne and is on the same "floor" as the pupils, if he assists instead of informing, his task is no less important and no less difficult. It is obviously fantastic to imagine, as some opponents of modern education do, that the teacher has no importance, if he has not to keep order by force and threat, nor to impart information nor to punish forgetfulness or inability to understand. Greater skill in the teacher is required for modern education and more initiative and imagination, if less exhausting pressure. It follows that an entirely new social situation is created in a modern school: it is a relationship between the older and the younger generations, which is still experimental. "A good school," says the Consultative Committee of the Board of Education, "is not a place of compulsory instruction but a community of young and old, engaged in learning by co-operative experiment." An atmosphere more similar to that of friendship than that of leadership or guidance is required; and in such an atmosphere clearly new types of personality among teachers will have more effect. The old-fashioned teacher cannot use the new methods and, indeed, the new methods can hardly be used in a school-building which is ugly or mean, whose

class-rooms are like prison-cells where colour and light do not enter.

The changes in the system of organizing education since 1918 include provisions under Treaties and Declarations for schools for linguistic Minorities in Europe: the establishment of Departments of Education in new States, so that now 55 out of the 72 national jurisdictions have such Departments; increases in expenditure on education in most countries: international Congresses of Education, such as the Edinburgh Congress of July 1925: a great increase in interchange of teachers and students across frontiers: and the establishment of many Research Institutions connected with Education.¹

The change in the methods of education, however, is more important; and this is spreading in all countries of the democratic tradition. In Great Britain and the United States many experimental schools exist and the State schools are freer than they were to attempt new experiments.² In Scandinavia and Germany "activity" education is widespread, and the over-burdening of the memory in the old "literary" tradition is being diminished. In France, reform has been recently (1923-4) attempted in the secondary schools, but they are not yet released from a rigid traditional curriculum; and the teachers appear to be more progressive than the Powers that control the system.³

These new conceptions and new methods, already effectual in countries of the democratic tradition, have been adopted under the new dictatorships as part of their system of modernization. Thus Russia, Italy, and Turkey, began after 1920 where Great Britain began in 1870 and Prussia in 1787: for

¹ For all this, see J. F. Abel: *Major Trends of Education in Other Countries*. U.S. Department of Interior, 1928.

² See F. W. Roman: *The New Education in Europe* (1923), and the Year-books of Education published by Teachers' College, Columbia College, New York.

³ See the periodical of the Federation of Teachers, *L'Ecole Liberatrice*.

they were able to use the experience of countries which had passed through nineteenth-century education and had established new methods. In the case of Russia this seems to have had some advantages—such advantages as a household may have which can install electric light without having to take down the fittings for gas. To change mediæval candles for electric light may make progress easier than it is with those who made the earlier experiments in progress. Thus in Germany and Great Britain the new methods in education are often hampered by school-buildings of the 1880's, which are too good still to be destroyed; whereas in Russia no such old schools existed and the average quality of the schools, most of which are quite recent, may therefore be better. Similarly in Italy and Turkey, the conquest of illiteracy has been very rapid during the past ten years, whereas in the London area, for example, it has taken from 1891 to 1930 to reduce the percentage of parents who had had *no* education from 50 per cent. to 5 per cent.¹ But this clearly does not show that modernization under dictatorship is more excellent than the educational tradition which, after many errors, has made the present system possible.

EFFECTS OF EDUCATION UPON THE LIFE OF A COMMUNITY

The remaining problem is the relation of the educational system as a whole to the modern world. Reformers tend to perceive evils easily; and the modern world in industry and politics does indeed contain many evils, not all of them modern in origin, but all of them seeming to be dangers against which education must guard. The school and the other parts of the educational system, however, must not be merely refugees from the real world. Even "activity" education may misrepresent the real situation if it idealizes mediæval

¹ *New Survey of London Life and Labour*, Vol. I, p. 265.

crafts in carpentry and needlework and refuses to recognize that modern machinery is just as useful educationally as hammers and needles. Education to-day has to redeem from monotony and slavishness, not domestic industry but modern work in mines and factories and offices. It would indeed be futile for the schools and the other educational institutions to produce men and women who regarded the chief characteristics of the modern world as objectionable. The inevitable result would be a loss of all influence of the Spiritual Power over the current customs and beliefs of a modern community.

The modernization of the educational system, therefore, cannot be a mere revolt against modern conditions or a departure into some romantic forest, where everyone does as he likes and food drops from trees. The schools and the other educational institutions are parts of a single social life, which is significantly different from that of twenty years ago in the following particulars. It is a world in which physical labour is less important and skill or agility of muscle and intelligence is more important. The new machinery involves a complete transformation of the meaning of "manual labour." Therefore the educational institutions must make men and women more capable of controlling the new machinery, that is to say, more highly vitalized, quicker in reaction, and more flexible in view of probable changes of occupation. It must also form men and women who value the work they do, as fields for the play of their abilities; for modern work cannot be done by slaves. A slave might row a galley; but a slave could not be beaten into running an internal-combustion engine. Again, educational institutions must allow for new social conditions tending towards equality of persons in different occupations, irrespective of incomes. Thus dress tends to be similar in all classes in the modern world; and all tend to use the same means of transport. Therefore the same

forms of politeness must be practised by all in any community. Similarly the equality which theoretically now exists between women and men involves new forms of manners and perhaps of speech in the relation between the sexes.

But, above all, the modern world is peculiar in its uses of leisure. Not merely have great numbers now some leisure. Even slaves had leisure. The important new fact is that the opportunities for using leisure are greater, more varied, and more easily available for large numbers. The educational system, therefore, must have in view the cinema and the radio; just as the mediæval system had in view the book or the village dance. Apart from educational uses of cinema and radio, the man or woman who has to live in the modern world must know how to use the new mechanisms of entertainment. But there is a still larger problem—the choice of entertainment, among the increasing number of possible choices, or, to put it in the old language, the ability to make the best use of leisure. If labour is less exhausting, if health and vitality increase and the mind is less obsessed in the modern world with the fear of violence, revolutionary or warlike—then there will be more “spare” vitality seeking outlets in leisure; and the educational system must fit men and women to select among the possible uses of leisure.

This, then, would be the social effect of a modern education: work in which one's interest is engaged, leisure occupations that energize rather than degrade, and ability to increase intelligence and deepen emotion through the many contacts with other persons made available by modern conditions. Such results might be expected to follow from co-operation in learning or educational activities. As indicated above, the individualism of intellectual competition tends to produce the smart fellow who can use his wits for his own advantage. But this will not “fit” modern conditions. The ability to

“play into the other fellow’s hands” is more valuable; and this can be acquired as a habit by practice even in the school-room. Games and dances are obviously social; but even arithmetic and history can be learnt by sharing information or labour with others. Thus the “class” in a school becomes not a fortuitous concourse of competing atoms but a joint enterprise. The school becomes not a refuge from the world, but one part in the common effort to improve the life of the community.

The principle of co-operation carries farther than the school. It means that all parts of the educational system or the Spiritual Power are integrated in one whole. The secondary school, the various technical schools, and the Universities would in that case be felt to be parts of one Spiritual Power, along with the artistic, scientific, and religious societies which are intended to promote exceptional ability and insight. Artistic and scientific institutions seem to be modernizing their functions, as will be noted in the next chapter. But although there has been a great increase in the number of Universities recently, the methods used in most of them are still mediæval; and religious associations are all traditionalist. A new form of educational method, however, and an extension of the system is to be found in adult education, which is not merely the education of adults who are defective in knowledge or skill. Adult education properly so-called does not merely supplement in later life a defective earlier education. It is not, as in the countries of the non-democratic tradition, only an attack upon illiteracy. Adult education is a new form of education peculiar to the modern world: it is the co-operation of adults in the endeavour to understand and control social forces which are unintelligible to those who are not adults. Thus the increase in the number of classes for industrial workers in most European countries is a sign of the times,

not as a mere extension of academic traditions but as an experiment in new methods for new purposes. What is discussed in such circles is not history and geography, but contemporary problems of marriage, unemployment, industrial democracy, and the rest. Thus the educational system is being brought out of the clouds and out of the nursery into vigorous contact with the living world; and the world-wide movement in adult education may be taken as one of the signs that modern education is different from the traditional training of a caste in a mediæval society.

Obviously the numbers will be small in any community, who will devote attention to intellectual pursuits. The connection of the educational system, therefore, with the whole life of the community, cannot rest only upon adult education. It involves also a much more intimate connection of the schools with parents of pupils, and the use of the facilities provided in the school-building by all members of any local group. As for the parents, modern education implies that they have a part to play complementary to that of the teacher. It follows that the day school is better educationally than the boarding-school, which creates an abnormal social atmosphere.¹ The transfer of the task of teaching from parents to teachers does not involve that parents have no function except to produce and to pay for their children. The modern system keeps parents continually informed of what the children require in health, interest, or companionship: it provides parental criticism, still unskilful since most parents have

¹ This is not important for democracy, since the expense of the boarding-school system alone would prevent its becoming general. But educationally it is abnormal for children to be thrown among great numbers of other children to live, under direction of professional teachers who are living out of touch with their own contemporaries in politics, business, or the arts. Rigid uniformity of manners, the herd-mind at its lowest, and the "superior air" of the school teacher are the results. After school-years, no doubt, the new generation should be separated from their parents, but not in childhood.

suffered from the old education; and it will increasingly unite the home with the school in one task.

As for the larger unit, the community within which the school and other educational institutions are performing their functions, the tendency in modern circumstances is for the school-building to become what the mediæval church once was—a centre for the whole cultural life of all in the locality. That is to say, the school includes the library, the place for social dances, the picture-gallery, and the concert-room. Examples of this unity of functions may be found in some of the smaller towns in North America and in some villages in Scotland and Germany.¹ Elsewhere the severance of the school from the normal life of the community has not yet been overcome. Indeed, it cannot be overcome because of the obsolete and unsightly school-buildings, the prison walls of the rooms, and the atmosphere of the three R's, which are monuments to early mistakes. But there are already signs that beauty and dignity may be as closely associated with modern education as they once were with mediæval ritual; and when that is established, the Spiritual Power will have its proper place in the common life.

Superficiality in the use of modern opportunities and triviality in the many contacts of persons in the modern world cannot be avoided unless a distinction is made between what may be called the "levels" of experience. It is not unusual to speak of a depth or height of intelligence or emotion; and it should be possible to use the same sort of metaphor to express different kinds of contact between persons. When a man is getting into a street-car, his experience has less depth or height than it has when he is moved by the sight of a sunset. Men meet on the level of getting into a street-car;

¹ See *The Agricultural Extension System of the United States*, by C. B. Smith and M. C. Wilson (New York, 1930). The Agricultural College at Sawston, near Cambridge, is a good example of a modern conception of the school-building.

but they may also meet on the level of seeing a sunset. An educated man is able to use in common life greater depths of experience: and an educated community is one in which men meet not only at the level of getting into a street-car but also at the level of seeing sunsets. This, however, goes beyond the problem of education into the problem of the use of exceptional intelligence and insight—which is the problem of the place of the sciences and the arts in the life of a community.

CHAPTER XII

THE SCIENCES AND THE ARTS

IF men are to meet at levels which allow of an escape from superficiality in a changing society, their intelligence must be more acute and their emotions more deeply stirred than need be the case in a traditionalist age. But keener intelligence and deeper emotion depend upon the influence of the sciences and the fine arts in common life. In any community only a few have the ability to see farther than their forefathers have seen and to express new emotions in new ways. These few constitute the growth-point of human experience; and only in obsolete forms of society are they cut off from their fellows. Those of exceptional ability do not claim superior status nor private advantage, although their ability is often used by the cunning to rake in the proceeds of ability for themselves. The great scientist or the great artist in any age is well aware of his dependence upon the store of experience preserved and extended by common folk; and he gives back to his fellows more than his debt. Thus the results of exceptional ability are signs of a general growth in the understanding and forms of expression in any community: and the advantage of these results may accrue to all members of the community in the attainment of a higher "level" of experience, at which men may meet. Through knowledge of the world and of men, gained by exceptional insight, all men communicate in a serener air; and through the insight expressed in works of art all men feel more deeply. But before "placing" modern science and modern art in the complex which is called modern civilization, specific instances must be given

of recent change in the application of knowledge to common life and of the effects of new forms of artistic expression.

During the past twenty years science has made cheap electricity available, not only by the development of Faraday's work of a century ago, but also by making the conservation of electrical power possible.¹ That depends upon insulation, for which adequate materials, as regards quality and price, hardly existed thirty years ago. Synthetic resins, for example, almost unknown twenty years ago even to pure science, are now consumed to the extent of about 200,000 tons a year in finished insulating material. Ten or fifteen years ago the porcelain insulator was used, which suffered distortion in the heat of manufacture; but now the chemistry of silicates is producing mineral insulants which can be moulded accurately. Metallurgy, alloy chemistry, and oil chemistry supplying modern lubricants, have made possible not only inexpensive electrical power, but also aviation and radio. About 1900 the first discoveries were made in the physics of transference of electrical effects over long distances without conductors. The name of Marconi is well known in this connection. The same process of discovery is now making television possible.

For clothing, new materials have been provided by the chemistry of the cellulose derivatives and solvents, which twenty years ago were not sufficiently developed to allow of their bulk use.² Artificial silk and composite fabrics have displaced the use of some older vegetable fibres; and now, after years of research, chemistry indicates the possibility of a similar displacement of wool. If this occurs, the influence on

¹ For examples of applications of science, I am indebted to my friend, Victor Lefebure.

² Solvents and cellulose, however, had already been used in bulk for explosives.

the breeding of sheep and on the price of mutton may be drastic! In building materials, the type of Portland cement which makes ferro-concrete possible, depends upon recent advances in the chemistry of the cements. Copper-nickel alloys and stainless steels make inexpensive containers for storage and distribution of cooked foods possible, which again make food supplies more easily available for great numbers with small incomes.

In medicine, apart from the results of the discovery of radio-activity about 1900 and insulin in 1922, immense changes have occurred since the biochemical work on vitamins (about 1910) and glandular secretions. The old remedial efforts of medicine are being supplemented, if not transformed, by the power to remove abnormalities in the personality itself; and as a result of knowledge of vitamins, a revolution may occur in the diet of peoples, especially in the East and in Africa, where the peoples have suffered for centuries from disabilities due to diet.¹

In this connection another effect of "the West" upon the whole world is to be seen in the applications of botanic science to the introduction of plants from one land for cultivation in other lands. For example, rubber from Brazil was introduced into the East, through Kew Gardens, in about 1876; but only in 1892 was rubber from Ceylon commercially available; and plantation rubber, in marketable quantities, from the Malay States and Ceylon first became available in 1903. Cocoa was brought from America to Africa; quinine from Peru to Asia by Europeans. The West African oil-palm, introduced in the 1880's to the East, only now begins to produce as much as is derived from West Africa. Tea was brought by "the West" into India and Ceylon from China,

¹ Work on the vitamins in 1930, by Japanese in Korea, suggests that the infection of animals, and possibly of man, with leprosy may be prevented.

coffee into Java, sisal into East Africa, and cotton into the Sudan.¹

Botanic science has been useful in improving the breed of plants.² For example, about 1921 a new type of barley was produced; and by 1930 about 800,000 acres in England were planted with it, resulting in a gain to the farmer of about a million pounds. A similar gain is derived from two new wheats, bred by Sir R. Biffen. The sugar-content of beet was raised from 8 per cent. to 18 per cent. in about eighty years; and now the sugar-content of sugar-cane has been raised by breeding in Java so that the yield is 15 tons per hectare, as compared with a world average of 3.57. Pests and plant-diseases have been counteracted by applied science, as in the work of the Imperial Mycological Institute and of the Bureau of Plant Industry in the United States Department of Agriculture.³

Modern civilization has not only applied science to common life, but it has also caused the establishment of organized research for this purpose. Such research is new; and it is characteristic of the modern outlook on life both in its confidence in its methods and in the recognition of social co-operation as the only possible means of increasing knowledge and making it useful. Thus in Great Britain there are the Medical Research Council established in 1913, the Schools of Tropical Medicine established in 1899, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research established in 1919, and the National Physical and Chemical Laboratories. In the United States there are the research sections of the Bureau of Mines, the Bureau of Standards, the Department of Agricul-

¹ For this information I am indebted to the Assistant Director of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew. See also a lecture on "The Quest for Economic Plants," by the Director, April 16, 1926.

² For information I am indebted to my friend, Sir Daniel Hall, Director of the John Innes Horticultural Institution.

³ See C. A. Beard: *The American Leviathan*, p. 525 sq.

ture, and other sections of the Administration.¹ In Germany there are the forty laboratories of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institut, the Physikalische Technische Reichsanstalt, and other similar institutions. Thus government includes a new function.

Similar research organization has recently been extended by private generosity, as in the Rockefeller Research Institutions, and for commercial purposes by non-Governmental industrial enterprises. Older instances are the Mellon Institute for Industrial Research in Pittsburgh and the Nobel Institute in Sweden; but these are the results of individual foresight. The commercial policy of great industrial organizations now leads to organized research, especially in the chemical and electrical industries, as in the laboratories of the Bell Telephone Company, the General Electric Company, General Motors, and the Dupont de Nemours Company, all in the United States; those of the I.C.I. in Great Britain and of Siemens and Halske in Germany.

One of the most recent tendencies is that towards international co-operation in research. With this is connected the advance in international standardization, on a scientific basis, for materials and products. On a national basis the British Engineering Standards Association, formed in 1901, is typical of the new movement; and for some years commercial advantage was sought by manufacturers in different nations by keeping separate national specifications. But now the complementary units for the new industries are seen to be best manufactured in different countries; and separate national standards have become a hindrance to the development of engineering. Therefore in radio,² for example, in medicinal

¹ See Beard: *The American Leviathan*, p. 615 sq.

² The International Radio Union was founded in 1926. Many agreements have been made between the radio stations of different nationalities for the allocation of the available wave-lengths, all of which involves scientific co-operation. See above, p. 219.

products, and in other fields, international standards are being established, based upon co-operation in scientific research.¹

The modern connection between the sciences and the arts is in the new power to reproduce works of art, due to scientific advance which has made possible inexpensive photographic emulsions, inks, and synthetic dyestuffs, and new materials such as those required for gramophones and cinemas. A very great increase in the influence of music in social life has been due to gramophones and radio. Thus Sir H. Harty, the composer and conductor, says: "During the past five years, since 1925, there has been an extraordinary fresh outburst of interest in music, especially among the poorer classes. This is due mainly to the improvement in mechanisms for supplying music." He noticed "at his concerts an entirely new public, most of them from the poorer classes."² Similarly with the cinema—"movie" and "talkie"—the ideas conveyed are indeed ancient and simple-minded; but modern instruments, made possible by modern science, would convey equally well any modern ideas available. It should be noted that great numbers, hitherto excluded from theatres by high prices, now can have some experience of drama on cinema-films, owing to science.

Similarly in the plastic arts, reproductions of great works of art became possible about 1890; and by 1910 innumerable cheap reproductions and inexpensive books about painters, sculptors, and architects gave an opportunity to a great number, which hitherto had been reserved for rich men making eighteenth-century "travels." And not only the despised "vulgar," but also scholars and artists have derived advantage from photographic reproductions of works of art,

¹ The Health Section of the League of Nations has assisted in standardizing vital and mortality statistics, and in standardizing sera and certain remedies. See *Ten Years of World Co-operation*, p. 255 sq.

² Report of speech, *Manchester Guardian*, January 14, 1930.

of inscriptions and manuscripts.¹ The modern study of art, and perhaps even the influence of primitive art upon the modern mind, are due to recent applications of scientific knowledge in photography.

The facts so far noted indicate only the applications of what has been already achieved in the sciences and the arts; but the experience of a community grows not merely in the "spread" of ideas and insight, but also through such advances as can be made only by exceptional ability. The changes during the past twenty years in the pure sciences and in the fine arts themselves, therefore, are no less indications of the character of modern civilization than the applications of science and art in common life. It must be remembered that scientific advances made by exceptional ability in one age often become the commonplaces of later ages. For example, multiplication as we know it in grocer's shops or engineering works was impossible except for experts in the European Middle Ages, before the adoption of Arabic numerals and the discovery of a place for zero. "Computations which a child can now perform required then the services of a specialist; and what is now only a matter of a few minutes meant in the twelfth century days of elaborate work."² And this change came, not by the inventions of mechanisms, but by the influence of a new form of thinking, which was initiated by men of exceptional ability. So to-day, even the most highly specialized science and even the forms of art which are intelligible only to a few—these, too, belong to a single comprehensive social experience which is modern civilization.

In pure science, that is to say in the systematic knowledge of facts, the two most significant recent advances are con-

¹ Cf. the absurdly inadequate drawings of Egyptian and other sculpture in Perrot and Chippiez's *History of Art*, as lately as the 1890's with the cheap and admirable photographic reproductions now available.

² See T. Dantzig: *Number, the Language of Science*, p. 27.

nected with the Quantum Theory and the Theory of Relativity.¹ Planck first published a Quantum Theory in 1901; and Einstein's first Theory of Relativity appeared in 1905. The accidental discovery of X-rays by Röntgen in 1895 and the work of the Curies about 1899 led to developments of the theory of radio-activity by Sir Joseph Thomson and Lord Rutherford. This led to a new theory of the structure of matter; and in 1915 Einstein carried farther his first theory, thus displacing the Newtonian theory of gravitation. The modern mind, which may include the thinking of common folk, can hardly be said to have acquired familiarity with the Quantum Theory or the Theory of Relativity; but both have already affected the attitude towards natural phenomena of great numbers who are by no means mathematical specialists. A certain mental "tone" or "atmosphere" which is now widespread, is distinguishable from that of the nineteenth-century materialistic determinism.

Recent changes in philosophy have been more deeply affected by the physical sciences than by the social or psychological sciences or the arts. The new forms of philosophy began with Husserl in 1900 and A. N. Whitehead about 1910. The general tendency would be called, in the traditional terms "realist," in so far as it is departure from the Hegelian tradition, which dominated the later nineteenth century. If a single sentence on so large a subject may be excused, the modern movement in philosophy seems to treat appearance as the only reality, without implying, as Hegel did, that "to appear" is what is meant by "to be real."²

The social sciences have recently been transformed by advances in psychology. Within the past twenty years two

¹ See *A History of Science*, W. C. D. Dampier-Whetham, second edition, 1930, pp. 382 sq., and *Science and the Modern World*, by A. N. Whitehead.

² See S. Alexander: *Space, Time, and Deity*, and A. N. Whitehead: *Process and Reality*.

great movements in psychology have taken place, one connected with psycho-analysis, the other with behaviourism. Freud, Jung, and Adler have shown that study of the abnormal is useful for the understanding of all mental life, and that the area of psychical experience includes what has been called "the unconscious." These beginnings were carried farther by the use of evidence provided by psychological abnormalities arising out of the Great War.¹ Dreams, hypnosis, and the dissociations of personality have been studied: and the new material has made it possible to use psychological knowledge in the cure of some diseases. With regard to behaviourism, the abstract theory seems less important than the stimulus to experiment, which has come from the emphasis upon behaviour as the best source for knowledge of psychical factors in experience; and in this connection the behaviour of animals has proved to be illuminating.

The modern attitude in psychology has given a new impetus to anthropology, political science, and economics. Men in society are no longer assumed to be calculating machines: rituals and habits, as behaviour-patterns, are taken as expressions of social experience. What is primitive may not be dead, but only buried. And by a psychological study of primitive peoples as well as by psychological analysis of current habits among civilized peoples both political science and, to a smaller extent, economics have been influenced.

By a succession of accidents the same period has witnessed a rediscovery of the past in excavation and archæology. Egyptian tombs have revealed more of that civilization; and recorded history has been carried farther back into the past by the recent discoveries at Ur. Archæology is now much more systematic than it was; but modern methods began to be used only about twenty years ago. Thus both in the sciences

¹ See W. McDougall: *Abnormal Psychology*, 1926.

of nature and in those which study men, a revolution has recently occurred.

It is obviously impossible to summarize the whole of the recent achievements of science; but a tentative indication may be given of their characteristic effects upon the modern mind. As compared with the effect of Renaissance science or with the effect of the scientific advance between 1750 and 1850, the modern movement seems to have had two results. First, it has given to the modern mind a sense that we are at the beginning rather than at the end of our knowledge of the universe and of man. Contemporary thought does not seem to complete old processes of explanation so much as to initiate new processes. That sense of a new beginning occurred in the Renaissance with regard to astronomy, and in the nineteenth century with regard to biology; but now the sense of a new beginning is connected with the most fundamental conceptions of all physical science in mathematical physics. Similarly in the sciences relating to man, modern psychology has completely transformed the basis of our analysis in history and of our criticisms of contemporary life. A second result of the new sciences has been a pervasive scepticism as to conclusions and a greater boldness in the use of hypotheses. In physics, as Sir William Bragg says, "we use the classical theory on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays and the quantum theory on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays":¹ or as Whitehead says: "The progress of science has now reached a turning-point: the stable foundations of physics have broken up."² Thus the modern expert in science is by no means so dogmatic or so narrow in his interpretation of experience as even his immediate predecessors were.

Indeed, the most modern scientific attitude is exceedingly

¹ Whetham: *History of Science*, p. 485.

² Whitehead: *Science and the Modern World*, p. 24.

like what we imagine to be natural in a primitive society; for in such a society the first efforts point not to a past tradition but to an unknown future. It is, therefore, not unnatural that we moderns should be interested in the very beginnings of history and in the "dark backward and abysm" of mental processes. But here perhaps is the point at which the modern sciences have a close contact with the modern arts; for the primitive has had an immense influence upon the most recent art-forms. In the music, in the plastic arts, and in the literature of to-day two characteristics are observable: first the inspiration of the primitive; and secondly, experimentation in new fields; and these are similar to the characteristics of modern science.

In the arts the revival of dancing is of fundamental importance for the modern mind. The dance is so little understood, especially in Great Britain, that possibly even to refer to it may be misleading. Dancing is an art, not a form of physical exercise for assisting digestion; but in some countries dancing is regarded as gymnastics or as excusable only for "charity" to support hospitals, or to give doles to the poor, who are not at the dance. In civilized communities, however, the dance is rhythmic movement of persons or groups, a movement whose only reason for existence is that it is beautiful. But in modern times the folk-dance and the negroid "jazz"—both primitive—have been revived. The tendency seems to be to go down to the basic elements of rhythm. The beat of a drum is close to the throb of a pulse. The dance needs rhythm only, which melody may obscure.¹ The Russian ballet, formed in 1909, has proved to be the bridge, in the Western world, between primitive rhythm and some modern music; but the more widespread music of to-day is connected with "jazz" rhythms, which seem to have come from Africans in North

¹ See Frank Thiess: *Das Gesicht des Jahrhunderts*, p. 184, "Tanz."

America, who thus give to Europeans what Africa still has in its forests. The primitive inspires modernity, not only in the folk tradition of this or that people, but also across the frontiers of custom, in so far as modern communities learn from communities still closer than they are to primitive experience.

Modern music is obviously related to the dance. Stravinsky wrote his *Petrouchka* (1910) and his *Sacré du Printemps* (1913) for the ballet; and they are frankly reminiscent of the folk-dance and still more primitive rhythms. Indeed, the vigour of the rhythm in some of his compositions subordinates the melody or harmony, with which traditional Western music had been until recently concerned. Similarly Bela Bartók's music was founded on Hungarian folk-song; but it has passed into atonal and strongly rhythmical forms. His first extreme use of atonality was made in 1908, in his first String Quartet. Modern Spanish music is also based upon the rhythms of the folk-dance. African "jazz" rhythms have affected not only Stravinsky, but Ravel and Constant Lambert, for example, in *Rio Grande*. With Debussy and in most of Ravel's work, the strongest influences seem to have been not only the primitive but also the simple communal modes of the ecclesiastical tradition.¹ Experimentation in new fields is most marked in the Germans. Schönberg until 1908 followed Wagner; but he then began the development of atonality, which is carried on by such composers as Hindemith. Arnold Bax seems to combine the modern feeling for pure rhythm with modern experimentation. Thus some of the inspiration of modern music comes from the primitive, from the depths, not from the latest products of tradition; and its influence on the modern mind is disturbing rather than satisfying. It demands not approval but attention.

¹ See Cecil Gray: *A Survey of Contemporary Music*, and A. Weissmann: *The Problems of Modern Music*, English translation, with introduction by E. J. Dent, 1925.

Similarly with the plastic arts—architecture, which is the basis of all these arts, has now on its hands not wood and brick and stone, but steel and concrete. It has for its “conditions” not the mediæval or Renaissance family dwelling, but the needs of the modern railway, the aeroplane, and the motor, heating and lighting which is communal in city-areas, and the modern habit of living close together but changing one’s dwelling often. In France Le Corbusier and in Germany Gropius have made experiments in a new architecture, and in the United States the new materials have at last escaped from the “Beaux Arts” into undecorated surfaces and structural lines. As it has been very well said, in architecture we have “a new alphabet but not yet a new language”; but here also the characteristic of modernity is that it begins again with new material in new conditions, and is not merely a new way of manipulating old material or applying old forms.

As for the other plastic arts, in sculpture Epstein seems to have astonished the English-speaking world with forms of a type already familiar in Europe. The influence of the primitive, as contrasted with Greek and Roman “classical” sculpture, is very obvious in the work of Maillol and Gaudier-Brzeska. Similarly in painting, Picasso both revives the primitive and splits the “unities” of the traditional picture-makers so as to present new patterns. Derain and Matisse use as little drawing and colouring as is necessary for any single expression. And each painter of genius, inducing minor painters to adopt his style, at once passes on to other styles or initiates a new line of development. Cubism, perhaps arising out of a misunderstanding of Cezanne’s work, is already dead; but simplicity and direct expression of a meaning rather than scientific attention to light, as with the Impressionists, seem to remain significant in modern painting. Pictures for frames, however, may not be the most significant instances of the modern

movement, for wall-decoration is now beginning again, and all the plastic arts will, no doubt, be affected by a transformation of architecture in new materials and in the new conditions of city-areas.

Modern literature indicates the same attempts to use new material and new forms of expression. The modern mind, finding its embodiment almost unconsciously in the new use of sound in music and in new forms in the plastic arts, is more conscious of itself in literature. Thus poems and dramas and novels tend to include in their "material" some philosophy—some view of "what it is all about." Modern literature uses new material—psychological complexes, new forms of social cohesion or social explosiveness, new mechanisms as parts of the body of the modern mind. In the novels of D. H. Lawrence, together with flotsam and jetsam of the past, there is an effort to express an inner impulse, largely connected with sex. In the plays of Eugene O'Neill there is the labouring of men in a mechanism of life to which they "belong," as in *The Hairy Ape*.

But not only does modern literature use new "material"; it also makes experiments in new modes of expression. In the plays of Kapek and Toller is the restlessness of social upheaval. In André Gide's work is exploration of new methods as well as new material; and there are many minor writers in Germany, France, and England who, in one or other of their works, sound a modern note among the squeaks and grunts, which they sometimes foolishly take to be significant. Drama, the most significant of modern literary forms, is frankly social in its methods and its appeal; and as a modern dramatist has said, it "widens the scope of consciousness by producing reverberations in the realm of the imagination."¹ Experiments

¹ See C. K. Munro: "Experiment in Drama," p. 126, in *Tradition and Experiment*, Essays, 1929.

in staging and in the use of new methods are combined with a reminiscence of simplicities in the primitive forms of drama.

Taking all the fine arts as one whole, the modern movement seems to be the same in them as in the sciences. Its characteristics are an immense and in some ways contradictory variety of expressions and a sense of new beginnings, which reinforces the tendency to experiment. What in the sciences is scepticism, in the arts is a break with traditional forms; what in the sciences is confidence in the use of new hypotheses, in the arts is the violent forcing of material into new forms. The effect of the new advances in pure sciences upon the mind of the time is generally acknowledged; but, partly because the modern world has inherited the blindness of industrialism, the place of the arts in a modern community is not generally recognized.¹ And yet, in so far as the arts can be distinguished from the sciences in a civilization, it is upon the influence of the arts in social life that modern civilization now depends for its delivery from "externalism" and superficiality.

Actual poems or buildings or paintings or pieces of music must be considered, for it is much too abstract to discuss the fine arts in general; and first, what is due to our inheritance in the arts must be recognized. Take, therefore, a dramatic poem such as *Hamlet* or a building such as Chartres Cathedral or a painting such as Botticelli's *Primavera*, or a piece of music such as the *Kreutzer Sonata*. The problem is: of what practical use are these?

The answer implies a criticism of the daily experience of common folk. What a man sees in passing down the street depends, as everyone knows, upon what is of interest to him—upon his mood at the moment and upon the startlingness of anything that "stands out." The range of perception in

¹ Note the assumptions underlying the articles by scientists in *Towards Civilization*, 1930.

seeing and hearing and touch is always changing. Sometimes a man sees more and sometimes less ; and what he sees depends upon his ability to use his eyes. A man may learn more about the real world by looking out of the window than he does by reading a newspaper ; but then he must have some ability in looking out of windows, and that is not taught in schools as it should be. Now what is commonly seen to-day in the street or in looking out of a window is due very largely to the forms of art which have "directed" the eyes of former generations, and so fixed the direction in which we look—whoever "we" are—Europeans or Chinese or Malays or Africans. Even the direction in which scientists look is influenced by the arts of their racial tradition. Thus what we know about personality is due in part to what *Hamlet* makes us see ; what we feel to be beautiful in the lines of a building is due in part to Chartres Cathedral ; the human form is seen as we see it because we follow the design of the *Primavera* ; and we catch such melody as the *Kreutzer Sonata* has made us expect to find. Thousands, who are unaware of these works of art, are affected by them, in so far as the perceptions thus directed have entered into common speech and into the current attitudes or impulses of a community.

The argument applies to all works of art, but the examples hitherto given are works of art which are "in the tradition" of the West. They are the sources of modern civilization, in so far as it is Western. *Hamlet* and Chartres Cathedral and the *Primavera* and the *Kreutzer Sonata* have made us what we are ; and we who made the modern world are not Chinese, nor Indian, nor African. It is another question whether those who belong to one tradition can use the experience expressed in the arts of another tradition. Are the works of art of an Eastern tradition useful in Western life ? Shall we in the West be able to "see" the work of Chinese artists and see "the

real world" through them? Shall we be able to use, for our own enlightenment, the sense of rhythm which African races still possess, and have already expressed in their plastic arts and their music? On the other hand, if China is modernized, will the Chinese be able to "hear" Beethoven? The fundamental problem in the modernization of the world implies the possibility of sharing, not merely motor-cars, cinemas, or the mathematical sciences, but the sort of insight which is expressed in works of art. But that problem cannot be solved now; for it is not yet even stated in such a way as to be soluble in practice. Neither the West nor the East have yet reached the "level" of experience at which we can meet for such a solution; but each nation and each race will reach that level most easily by following its own path. Hence the value of tradition.

In the understanding of tradition, however, some communities, superficially modern, are obviously defective, as for example in North America. There, as elsewhere, small groups can be found, which are not typical nor dominant, but may be used argumentatively to show that North America is as highly civilized as any other part of the world; for obviously there are groups there, especially in the schools and colleges, in which tradition and the fine arts are increasingly used. But the social tone in other communities in North America heavily discounts, if it does not completely disregard tradition; and it is inhospitable to artistic expression.¹ No community, however, can be fairly judged "from the outside." No country in the world is, in its own opinion, seriously defective; and none, in the opinion of other peoples, possesses the graces of life. The example given may not be correct; but the general principle holds good, that the social use of a tradition, formed

¹ This may be the case with the type of community referred to in *Main Street* or in Luc Durtain's *Quarantième Étage*.

by the fine arts, is necessary in order to deliver modernity from the danger of superficiality.

The precise value of tradition in a rapidly changing social life is, first, that it establishes a psychological perspective. It would be most un-modern to imagine that no age has been "modern" before. The first men who used knives for dividing food must have felt themselves to be "in the movement," dangerously advanced; for the process which we call modern civilization is the same as that which produced flint implements at one stage and the *Kreutzer Sonata* some few years afterwards. Secondly, tradition forestalls the danger of a repetition of errors. The number of times men have discovered an old "blind alley" in the course of their advance is a warning, in view of some contemporary experiments, particularly in sexual experience. The gnostics, for example, had some very original but mistaken ideas about the sexual impulse, which are now being revived by critics of what is called Christian marriage, who seem to be ignorant of history. Thirdly, tradition enlarges the number and variety of the contacts between persons. A man ignorant of history has never felt great issues nor "met" great persons in such crises. The majority of men in motor-cars and cinemas have a very narrow range of acquaintance because they meet or see so many who are of the same type; and they cannot meet Plato or Hamlet by travelling faster or seeing more on the surface of the earth to-day. Where these live no man can reach, except by an effort unfamiliar to most of those who are contented to believe themselves "modern" because they are chilishly proud of new toys.

But tradition is as dangerous as it is useful. It may oppress and limit the mind it should illuminate and vitalize; and it has oppressed the mind of former generations in the traditional education. The use of the works of art hitherto described,

however, does not depend upon their being traditional, but upon their being "art"; and modern works of art are being produced while this is being written. The delivery from superficial perception and trivial emotion must come first through such modern works of art, as "expressions" within the whole experience which is modern; for if we go first to tradition, we shall misinterpret art and science. Tradition is useful only at a later stage in the growth of understanding, because all men see the real world first in the light of the moment in which they live.

A modern work of art should be, for common folk, a means of insight into realities in contemporary life which are not obvious at first sight; but in order to reveal those realities, art-forms may need to be strange. The work of art pierces through what is superficial, and therefore some contemporary "realism" fails as art. A mere catalogue of the obvious gives a "spread" to the canvas but no "depth." That is superficialism, not realism. The true realism searches out realities underlying the obvious; and therefore it may produce works of art which deny the traditional views of chairs and tables and persons, precisely because the realities which, in the old metaphor, underlie the obvious, are often hidden by a customary habit of mind. A man is what he seems to be, to the trained eye. Only the eye of exceptional ability can see "the real man"; and when the reality seen is revealed in a work of art, anyone may see it. The revelation of contemporary realities, in this sense, therefore, may require, not realism, but a certain romanticism—if that obsolete contrast may still be used. And the most modern works of art in music and painting are not realistic in the old sense—not reproductions of "nature" or "fact." They are "romantic" in so far as they assume a new perspective; for there is no reason why a painter, for example, should always look at "nature" horizontally. Photography has indi-

cated that one can obtain a good picture by tilting the camera, by looking upwards on to a face or downwards on to feet. An unusual angle of vision reveals form more effectually; and this is the experience implied in some modern painting. Traditional architecture is indeed still "horizontal" in its perspective, but the modern architect knows that a skyscraper in a city street is seen from its foot, and that therefore its "lines" cannot be those of a Greek temple or a mediæval cathedral.

Thus, even if the forms are strange in modern works of art, their use to common folk will be, first, a clearing or cleansing of perception. We do not see what is to be seen in modern life. A work of art removes the ancestral "cataract" from our eyes—the film of accepted conventions as to what a thing "really is." By such means one can perceive more than is obvious, in a motor-car or a steam-whistle.¹ What is "in" them may be bad or ugly, but modern works of art would increase the ability of common folk in distinguishing what is ugly in the sights and sounds of to-day from what is beautiful. Secondly, a modern work of art will reveal modern life as one whole. It will place the mechanisms of the modern world in their setting of modern experimentalism. Here again the argument may be misunderstood. It does not imply that "modern" music will make sounds like an exhaust or "modern" painting reproduce factories instead of Nature. The point is that the material for works of art lies within the whole of the common experience of to-day, just as the material for Beethoven or Michelangelo lay in the experience of their days. There were cocks and hens in Beethoven's day: he heard them and he wrote his symphonies. But he did not make violins crow and cackle, for he heard the whole world.

¹ See the use of photography for this purpose in *Technische Schönheit*, Schaeffer, Zurich, 1929.

Similarly, one hears to-day the sound of a six-cylinder car on the road, as well as the sound of the leaves in the tree it passes. Only a poet can put the result into a modern melody; and if he did, it would certainly not be a succession of explosions; but in the forms of his art we should hear the modern world as one whole. Thirdly, as in all ages, modern works of art will provide holidays for the spirit of men, outside the daily round of meals and work and sleep. The influence of the arts in social life, therefore, will relieve or sublimate that restlessness which is one of the chief reasons for the superficiality of some contemporary habits.

If, however, common folk are affected or moved by music drawn out of the confused noises of industrial civilization, they will perceive or feel more deeply. Most men are, most of their lives, like children unborn, still in the womb of their mother. The child in the womb must have some dim sense of an outer world, but it cannot perceive colour or melody. When it is born, it may. All education is a midwifery of the mind; and works of art are the finest instruments in the birth of adults out of childhood, because they give the ability to see and hear, that is birth to the spirit of a man. Works of art are means of escape from the superficiality of modern life, because they increase the "intensity" of experience. But this intensity of experience is not "soulfulness" or "uplift." It is excluded by posturing or affectation; and common folk are so well aware of the affectations of most advocates of the fine arts that they become suspicious of the very word "art"—and rightly so. Indeed, the whole field of experience to which the argument here refers is so full of the rabbit-holes into which "superior persons" run, that one would gladly avoid the field altogether; for it would be hateful to be welcomed as an advocate of the arts—by most of the established advocates. It is possible, however, to be genuinely

affected by a work of art, so that the intensity of common experience is deepened; as, for example, in hearing a modern piece of music. There may be a certain *spread* of hearing into the rest of one's being, because the "glow" of a genuine experience extends from one sense into all the senses, and perhaps into the blood and the bone.

Again, by the intensity of any experience is meant the reaching down of that experience into the deepest stores of memory, to be kept there during the whole of a life. That is to say, an intense experience is preserved for use afterwards, when the immediate experience no longer exists. The under-current running in every man's life sometimes make swimming dangerous on the coasts. Superficiality disregards this current. Good business may find it inconvenient even to remember personal passion or death or changing moods; but great art makes us conscious of such realities. The consciousness of these, however, need not involve fear of them—as in the Puritanism which puts up notices to forbid bathing because the coast is dangerous. But given the current, to get at it and use it for what it is worth, is easiest through works of art; for the sight of beauty may have enduring and happily dangerous effects, even if a man goes blind afterwards.

If the metaphor is not strained, it may be noted that there is neither noise nor haste in the deeper currents. The quiet, which is by no means inactivity, attained by common folk who have been moved by a work of art, is another sign of that intensity which rescues men from the superficial and the trivial. There is, indeed, no harm in the trivial; for gossip at the cross-roads is good. Superior persons misunderstand the trivial and its proper place in life. Those who love quiet so much that they do not care to hear how Mrs. Brown deceived Mrs. Smith's cat, do not understand the sort of quiet or serenity which is an aspect of intense experience, but does not involve

disregard of what is trivial. Pure water is all very well, but water that is too pure may kill. The admirable pollutions of the surface may assist digestion. But clearly the trivial, in which one may find good company, is not the only experience; and common folk use other levels also at which to meet their fellows. The way to those other levels lies through the fine arts. Therefore not only in the applications of science to the improvement of common life, not only in the popularizing of traditional works of art, but also by the social influence of the results of exceptional ability in pure science and in the most recent art forms, the mind of a whole community is raised to a level at which modern civilization can be compared with other and earlier civilizations in their finest forms. Under such influences the type of personality dominant in a community becomes more sensitive and more vigorous, and the relations between persons become more subtle. But the quality of a civilization is finally tested by reference to the type of persons and the type of relations between them which are characteristic of it; and therefore what is modern can become what is civilized only when the insight and genius of to-day have a pervasive influence over the common life of any community.

CHAPTER XIII

CHARACTERISTICS OF MODERNITY

THE underlying tendency which produced both the cinema and the theory of relativity has characteristics distinguishable from those of other and of earlier movements. The sense of a new beginning, which comes from the use of new mechanisms, makes it possible to speak of a new industrial revolution. But this revolution has brought into a new relationship peoples who live at different stages in the development of their own traditions; and while the West affects primitive and Eastern peoples, the West itself is changing. Not only are its mechanisms and institutions being remodelled, but the dominant attitude is also being transformed; and so modernization is to be found in industrial production, in new uses of leisure, in education, and in the sciences and the arts. The whole movement is what is meant by modern civilization—and not so much its expression in machines or theories as the force which is thus expressed. But it is arbitrary to distinguish between the force and its expression, as it is arbitrary to distinguish between the soul and the body; for the cinema and the radio *are* modern civilization, if we see in them a force and not merely a form.

The characteristics of this force may be summarily discussed under three headings—experimentalism, the emphasis upon impulse as contrasted with ratiocination, and the sense of social co-operation. But first the immediate source of modernization must be noted.

Modern life has appeared in a period in which two great changes have already been accomplished—mechanization and large-scale social organization. Those were the accomplishments of the nineteenth century. Neither can be called the

cause of the other; but their interaction was essential to the result. It is impossible to believe that the new social organization of the industrial era was altogether due to mechanization, since some changes in social organization have always preceded rather than followed any mechanization. For example, slavery in ancient civilizations prevented the discovery of the uses of natural forces. Where thousands of men could be used for their muscle only, as in ancient Egypt or Imperial Rome, steam and electricity remained undiscovered. But when slavery and its later form, serfdom, became impossible, invention of mechanisms arose. Similarly at present, where many domestic servants are available, the efficient organization of traditional household management is delayed. But the social organization which supplies some needs is not generally abolished because its victims are pitied. The system decays when the beneficiaries desire more than such an organization can supply. Cheap labour for portage in Africa to-day, for example, brings goods for our use as fast as men's legs can carry them; but that is not fast enough for our needs. Hence the bicycle and the motor displace portage. On the other hand, in some cases the introduction of new mechanisms compels new social organization. Expensive and elaborate productive "plant" now requires large-scale organization of capital supplies; and at an earlier date the factory produced Trade Unionism. Similarly to-day the new occupations of women change the relationship of the sexes. Thus the mechanization and the large-scale organization of the nineteenth century are interacting elements of one force or tendency. In summary form, the results of the past century, which form the basis of the modern movement, are these. The increase in the natural forces available—steam, oil, and electricity—has decreased the mental and physical "wear and tear" incidental to civilization. There is much less burden in proportion to

benefit in the whole of a modern community than there was in ancient Athens. The burden of Athenian civilization was cast upon women and slaves and craftsmen, who provided leisure for philosophers and poets; but the distribution of the burden and the benefits in every civilization is difficult to assess. The point here is that the use of natural forces has reduced dependence upon muscle; and muscle is a very wasteful source of power. Secondly, health and vitality have been generally increased during the nineteenth century. That is to say, men and women and children live, on an average, longer; and, between birth and death, each sees more clearly, feels more keenly, moves more freely. The majority in a modern community have more vitality and have a different outlook on life from that of any population a century ago.

Again, the nineteenth century established a greater shared vitality of groups of men. The diminished "wear and tear" and the increased vitality of individuals, taken separately, is far less important for civilization than the fact that men are at the same time in closer, more continuous, and more intimate contact, one with another. The growth of nationalism is only one example of the same change as is to be seen in the strength of trade unionism, of consumers' co-operative societies, of universities, of scientific societies, of governmental organizations, and industrial enterprises—all of them social units. The group-life of to-day is much more vigorous than any in history. But the maintenance of this group-life depends upon an ability to organize, which was immensely increased during the nineteenth century. Obviously the ability to organize was made effectual by the new transport and the new means of communication—by railways and telegraphs. But civilization did not consist in the rail or the wire: it was in the movement of men and goods and the conveyance of men's thoughts from man to man. It is ridiculously childish

to suppose that a telegraph-pole is in itself more "civilized" than a waxen tablet. The important difference between these two is in the amount of thinking and feeling they carry. The most important aspect, therefore, of the new instruments is that they have released abilities not hitherto available.

The great extension of a meagre education in the nineteenth century was an essential part of the group-vitality, which spread as far as language-boundaries and established the great States. But the process or current of group-vitality in the nineteenth century did not stop at frontiers. Commerce and finance, without common language, brought the labour of English cotton-workers into the clothes of Chinese coolies and brought the labour of Indian tea-gardens into the bodies of English housewives. Thus different groups of men became dependent one on another on a large scale; but the kinds of groupings differed, and two kinds may be selected for contrast. The nineteenth century produced both nationalism in politics and culture, and also a sort of unconscious internationalism in commerce and finance. Men internationally ate foreign fruit; but nationally they killed the foreigners who grew the fruit. To call this contradictory is to be far too complimentary to the mind of the time. Eating and thinking seldom go together.

The group-life which resulted in nationalism was like that of a family or a village community. It arose out of unconscious impulses, undefined sympathies and suspicions, out of confidence in the familiar and fear of the unfamiliar; and upon these sympathies and timidities the States of the world depended. But there was no conscious purpose or plan of life in such group-life. On the other hand, men clubbed together in another kind of group-life for specific purposes. A trading enterprise is an example of such group-life: and for a conscious purpose, because it is strictly limited in its scope, men can work with foreigners or with other men whose social customs

they abhor. If a man sells oranges to you, you do not necessarily trouble even to speak to him. The conscious groupings for limited purposes grew in scale and in number and variety during the nineteenth century; and we have inherited the difficulties which arise when men become aware that the group-life arising out of impulses may be irreconcilable with the group-life necessary for conscious purposes. The affection for familiar things and places and persons comes into conflict with the desire to have what can only be had from the unfamiliar; and that conflict now continues in the hostility between races or nations or between groups within any nation. The nineteenth century left the process at that point.

All these results of a century of mechanization and increasing social organization may be regarded as forming the basis upon which modern civilization is being built. But the metaphors drawn from architecture are misleading. Civilization is a process, not a product. The changes which occurred during the nineteenth century are more significant than the results of those changes at any particular date. The shape and size of a railway-engine changed between 1850 and 1920 in such a significant series that a cinema-film of the changes would indicate a form of life-process. The process so revealed would be the mental process of an age—a behaviour-pattern of a group-life. There is a tendency to regard an instrument as a product to be admired; and the nineteenth century almost lost its heart to its machines. To us they seem clumsy. In any case they are fossils. Some are in museums. The life that was in them escaped, nevertheless, into other forms which are now in our streets and houses; and this life goes to the make of modern civilization. Thus what is modern is not the shape now given to steel in a motor-car but the force that makes the shape and will change it. Civilization is not a building, except in so far as architecture itself is life. The process would be

more obvious than the product, if the coming of modern civilization were compared with the growth of a tree. The tendency or force which is shaping machinery, which is expressed in scientific hypotheses and works of art to-day—this force is modern civilization on trial.

EXPERIMENTALISM

Of the characteristics of this movement, the first to be discussed is experimentalism. This may be contrasted with "fundamentalism," which is the American name for a crude form of authoritarianism. In a changing society men may be carried away by all sorts of currents and eddies; and the fundamentalist says quite truly that civilized life is impossible in mental and moral chaos. He concludes wrongly that the only security from eddies is to be found in an anchorage. He sometimes advises attachment to a rock. But he is not to be despised or ridiculed. His methods may be inadequate, but his purpose is sound; and he himself perhaps has had experience of the utility of an anchorage. In frontier-countries, such as North America, perhaps fundamentalism implies a better understanding of the structure of civilization than the local forms of experimentalism. But there is a fraudulent fundamentalism—an authoritarianism which is only a "cover" for the device to retain control over others. The authoritarianism which parents and clergy preach to those whom they are pleased to call "the younger generation," is in many cases only a plea that they—the said parents and clergy—shall have control. All authoritarianism is advocated most strongly by those who claim authority.

Modern tendencies, on the other hand, imply not merely the obsolescence of old authorities but the abolition of all "authority" in the old sense of the word, as a control of the past over the future. The Brahmin, the mandarin, and the

priest are exponents of tradition and advocates of authority; and even if they honestly believe that their status is delegated to them from another world, it is their own authority which is maintained by their advocacy. But if the scientist or the philosopher or the self-chosen "expert" seeks to fill the place of the sacred guide or the local lord, he misunderstands the modern world just as much as does the Brahmin; for in the modern world there is no such place at all. Authoritarianism cannot survive the obsolescence of the traditional authorities. The creeds, theological or ethical, which contain "final" summaries of acquired truth, have no place in the modern mind. Neither science nor philosophy can supply the kind of certainty which believers felt for their creeds; and if anyone cannot live without such certainty, he cannot live in the modern world, but must build himself a shelter in the ruins of temples. It will be picturesque but draughty. He may be satisfied; but the modern mind requires a more spacious dwelling.

Experimentalism implies that whatever truth, goodness, or beauty was achieved by the past was so achieved by methods which are as easily available for use now. Thus to the modern mind the reason why one believes is more important than what one believes, the conception one seeks to express is more important than the expression. Science gives hypotheses, not conclusions; and the arts are incitements to action, not satisfactions for repose. The pace of change has so much increased that we can feel the change more easily than our forefathers did; and therefore we do not claim to be wiser because we see what they missed. But the very fact that not merely the eddy but the rock itself is seen to be moving, indicates to us that to attempt to rely upon the rock for safety is futile. Thus for anyone who understands modern science or modern art, or even the spirit underlying modern mechanization, authoritarianism is not so much false as impossible.

Some truth may have been discovered, but much truth has not yet been discovered, and the only way to discover more is by experiment.

There is obviously a fraudulent experimentalism as there is a dishonest fundamentalism. It is very common in sexual relationships. There are some who excuse their own superficiality and triviality of mind in sexual relationships by saying that one cannot rely upon traditional standards. Thus a man or a woman, who is quite unaware of the higher levels at which civilized persons may meet, may claim to be "modern" because he or she prefers to satisfy the sexual impulse as dogs or fishes may. Apologies are due to dogs and perhaps also to fishes, for comparing them with "advanced" bohemians. But experimentalism does not imply that two and two make five. We know already that two and two make four: we are not uncertain about that, but only about much it may mean to say that that is so.

Many of those who claim to be "modern," even if they are honest, are not intelligent; for at any rate, some literary men and women, with "advanced" ideas, seem to be either confused or over-educated. The experimentalism typical of modernity, therefore, is more easily seen not among the "advanced" but in the application of research to industry, in the increase of travel, and in the changes of diet and clothing, which common folk practice. Such experimentalism, however, undoubtedly extends to social relationships. For example, modern education is not a doctrine; it is an attitude. No one pretends to know what the best possible readjustments may be, in the relation of teacher to learner. Modern government is not the application of a system: it is an experimental adjustment of public powers to changing circumstances. And similarly experiment may be needed to discover what are the best relationships between a man and a woman, either in marriage

or outside marriage. The increase in the practice of birth-control is a sign of modernity, not because it is "modern" to have fewer children and more sexual satisfaction, but because it is modern to think about the number of children which is best in any given circumstances and to adopt such means as may result in what is best.¹ Obviously if anyone already "knows" what is best without thinking, he does not understand what knowledge is. But this implies a new ideal of personality and of the relationships between persons. The mediæval saint and the eighteenth-century gentleman were ideals for other times: it is impossible to produce them now, even if it were desirable. A new ideal is being formed in the modern world, by experiment not only in the natural sciences but also in the arts of common life.

Experimentalism is the combining of thought with action.² It is not blind action, trusting to what will turn up. It is action under the correction and guidance of thought: and thought in that sense is not colourless; it is emotional. Experimentalism is the habit of the frontier-mind. It is the attitude of the pioneer. It is not and cannot be prevalent in the daily life of the majority of men; but it may occur at moments in any man's life, and it can certainly inform and inspire the dominant attitude of a community. In the modern world it shows itself in that "sense of the horizon," which makes us look to the future rather than to the past. Even the nineteenth century looked back. Men felt that humanity had come a long way. We have discovered that the way was, in fact, even longer and more difficult than the nineteenth

¹ See, for the whole of this section, Walter Lippmann's *Preface to Morals*. The abnormal increase of European birth-rates as compared with non-European between 1800 and 1923 (215 per cent. increase for Europeans and only 82 per cent. for non-Europeans) is now being stopped by Europeans. This is a sign of civilization. See Havelock Ellis: *Task of Social Hygiene*, p. 190.

² See the admirable statement of this as applied to education, in John Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, p. 299 sq.

century supposed; and yet we look forward, not back. We feel ourselves to be at the beginning of a long future. We feel that 6000 B.C. is less interesting than A.D. 6000; for that is the way we are going. And the fact that we know more about 6000 B.C. than we do about A.D. 6000 makes us experimentalists. We are finding our way or making it.

This experimentalism is the same process as was noted above in the return of the arts to what is primitive. It is not that we despise the skill of Michelangelo or Beethoven; but where skill is so obvious, the form of expression seems to absorb more attention than what is to be expressed. Now in the earliest forms of art, the artist is evidently struggling to express more than he has skill to express. What is called crudity of form is, from another point of view, closeness of form to the spirit of which it is the embodiment. The primitive mind, therefore, seems to have a greater vitality precisely because its skill of expression is obviously inadequate. But the modern mind has this same difficulty. We mean more than we can say; and therefore we have a fellow-feeling for our simplest ancestors, which divides us from the complacency of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We are ourselves the primitives of a new order, facing an unknown future. The past cannot give us all our language, for it did not understand what we desire to say.

The contrast between the modern and earlier attitudes may be expressed in a simile. Suppose, on the one hand, that what life contains of goodness and truth and beauty is included within an explored area, whether that area is revealed by genius and imagination or has been discovered by science and the traditional arts. The dominant attitude of an intelligent man will then be reverence for tradition; and his best thought will be commentary upon his inheritance, adding perhaps a little to it. He will know what a good man ought

to do. That is the dominant attitude of the pre-modern world. On the other hand, the startling recent transformation of knowledge has turned some men's eyes from the explored area of tradition to the horizon of experience. When a man is young his world is his nursery or his back-yard. Later he knows the streets or fields which were once beyond his horizon; and later still, as he climbs the hill of experience, he can see beneath him his own village in a wider setting, and the roads passing away into unexplored distances. But always, however high he climbs, however far he sees—there is the horizon. The sense of that horizon is more illuminating to the modern mind than any sight of the explored area of experience; and on the horizon are—not the ghosts of mystical somnambulism, but the forms of a new world, The Western world has discovered the vast area lying outside tradition; and that discovery has created the modern mind.

THE MODERN EMPHASIS UPON IMPULSE

It would be incorrect, however, to suppose that this sense of a new beginning and of experimentalism in new fields makes the modern mind regard the present as only a step towards a better future. "Our heaven is here, is now." The modern mind lives in its own right; not by permission of its ancestors, nor for the sake of its successors. How prevalent this attitude is, it may be very difficult to decide; but that it exists at all is significant. We are escaping from some of the contradictions of the belief in "progress"; but who are "we"? In this respect North America is hardly modern; for the more simple-minded belief in "progress" seems to dominate even thinkers there. The French and the Germans have a keener understanding of this aspect of the civilized life, which is called modern. To some, therefore, modern civilization is not merely nor mainly a means for establishing a future

situation, which can be rendered in the terms of contemporary experience. The characteristic of modernity, to which reference is thus made, is best understood by contrasting "geist" with "leben," "thought" with "life"—in senses of those words not easily defined.¹

There is a deep undercurrent, underlying not merely individual experience but also group-life. In that depth are many forces, not commonly expressed in consciousness; but that depth can be stirred by music, by personal passion, by the gods. From that depth a man may draw life, as if from the roots of all civilization; and a company of men carries in that depth the life of a tradition "quasi cursores. . . ." A restless and chaotic consciousness hardly ever allows those deep "waters under the earth" to affect the normal life of men—the life, that is to say, of breakfast and dinner; and therefore the very absorption in change or motion, frequent in new communities, externalizes perception and sympathy so that men see of the world only what is visible at first sight and know of persons only what can be known of those whom one passes in the street. Contacts with nature and with men in a new community are on the surface of things, and there is no "interpenetration." A certain impoverishment of personality is the result of the exhaustion of energies in "externalism." What earlier civilization called the "inner" life is unknown; or perhaps it exists only in unnoticed corners. It occurs nevertheless—in railwaymen and seamstresses, and not only in artists; but unless it has an effect over a large part of the relationships of men in any community, that community is uncivilized. The modern mind gives an important place to this "life" or impulse or undercurrent. The attempt to express it is made in modern sculpture, painting,

¹ See in German the work of Klages; also Paul Valéry: *Eupalinos*, and Havelock Ellis: *The Dance of Life, Affirmations*, etc.

music, and literature; and this attempt makes the modern forms of art disturbing, for these forms are irregular, disorderly, not "in the tradition."

The enemy of modernity in this aspect is repression. It is felt that the traditional relationships of men depend too completely upon convention, in the sense of a behaviour-pattern which has lost its meaning. The rituals of common life are not objectionable. One may shake hands or bow for greeting. But there are some real restrictions against which the modern spirit contends—not merely for the sake of a traditional "liberty," but in order to release the "life" which lies under thought or plan or custom. For this reason modern education does not use prohibitions. One does not say to the child, who may tend to do what is wrong, "Don't do that." One says, "Do something else." That is to say, we use sublimation or redirection, not suppression of impulses. So in contending against such evils as war, one does not say, "Don't go to war": one says, "Trade in goods and ideas."

There is a misunderstanding of modernity under this heading, which makes it seem to excuse the irrational or the anti-rational. Praise is foolishly given to primitive beasts which are supposed to be within us.¹ But the impulses to which modernity attends are the very forces which are to be found in reason itself; and going down into depths is not separation from one's fellows. Serenity is not somnolence. What the simplest living organism found in blind feeling, that same "life" we find in the mathematical calculus; for the inner life is not to be found more easily in a wheelbarrow than in an aeroplane. The point is that, if what is modern is

¹ See J. C. Powys: *In Defence of Sensuality*, 1930. Some of the argument in this book is in agreement with what is said above; but it is wrong in supposing "loneliness" to be more valuable than converse, and in asserting that we do not owe to others "the sensations with which we contemplate the universe." Lying in bed with an ichthyosaurus is not the inner life.

civilized, this inner life *can* be found in the aeroplane—but not merely in rushing backwards and forwards. It is indeed difficult for anyone trained only in the ideas of antiquity to use the opportunities provided by modern machines; because cultured persons, unfamiliar with machines, often pay too much attention to them. But with a modern training, a man may find as much of the inner soul of things in the whirr of a propeller as the old psalmist found in the flail and the winnowing fan.

But if one may go deeply into the roots of existence here and now, our acts and our thoughts have a status of their own, not derived from any possible effects which may follow them centuries hence. Therefore we dance and sing and make holiday not in order to do better business, but simply because in dancing we find the rhythms underlying consciousness. The modern world in this sense is to be found in some elements of the Youth Movement and in the return of the arts which were exiled from the Western world during the nineteenth century. The great increase in the uses of leisure for enjoyment is a sign of the same tendency; for what seems to the traditionalist to be frivolity is an attempt, often unskilful indeed, but determined enough, to find a situation or an experience which has no reason for existence except itself. In personal relationships it is almost impossible to explain to anyone living outside the area of the modern mind, that the sexual impulse, for example, is not entirely for the sake of producing children. In our knowledge of facts or of what is called “the universe,” scientific thinking and artistic expression do not exist only for the sake of improving conditions. Their more important value is to be found in the moment of thought or expression. The modern mind thus seeks in the depths of an ephemeral but no less significant experience the sort of life which alone can be called civilized. Here is serenity combined with vitality.

Here is the impulse of which reason itself is only one of the fruits.

But this conception of the inner life or of serenity in the occupations of leisure is not the same as the conception of Aristotle and the Middle Ages. In the first place, the finest use of leisure for the release of one's deepest impulses is not a privilege of a social caste. The modern mind does not rest its ideal upon a division between leisured classes, who are civilized, and working classes who are the instruments of civilization for others. Leisure and the opportunities for using leisure are available for anyone in any occupation. These opportunities—the motor-car, the cinema, the radio, may not yet have been well used; but they can be so used as to be instruments of civilization no less adequate than the Greek Games or the Shakespearean theatre. Again, the use of leisure for the avoidance of superficiality by drawing upon deep impulses is not now rendered in terms of pure thought. Not "contemplation" but "passion" is the modern term for the inner life. To "immerse one's self in the alien element" when a man falls into life is the modern effort; not to withdraw to the safer and thinner air of mountain-tops.¹ The old gospels seemed to imply that the only way to avoid being "carried away" was not to be "carried" at all; the only way to avoid being rent asunder by passion was to have no passion. To the modern mind, on the other hand, the inner life is in the deepest current of common feeling.

THE SENSE OF THE COMMUNITY.

The third characteristic of modernity is the sense of social co-operation. This is contrasted with the ideal of saving one's own soul in mediævalism and with the complacent individualism of the early industrial era; but this new sense

¹ The quotation is from Conrad's *Lord Jim*.

goes farther than a doubt of our grandfather's dogma. All the newest inventions, as noted above, are means of bringing men into closer and more continuous contact; and some of them—such as the radio, tend to bring men together at a higher level than is the normal place for meeting, in so far as they promote a use of the arts. In the modern world, as indicated above, Governments tend to co-operate, industrial enterprises are interlocked, Youth Groups are formed, dancing in common is popular. The old and generally misleading contrast between individuality and social organization may obscure the argument here. It is not implied that in modern civilization "the individual withers" nor that the race is "more and more"; because the race *is* the individual in society and there is no individual who is not in society. The point is that in modern civilization the ideal is not "a good man" but "good company." A heaven of egoists, each of whom had managed, after infinite trouble, to save his own soul, would be unendurable to the modern mind. Nobody's soul is worth saving. Spending is better.

Thus it comes about that in the modern world the so-called social services are prominent. A medical man working at preventive medicine is typical of the modern mind, as the saint or the visionary is typical of mediævalism, and as the successful business man is typical of early industrialism. The modern world is to be seen in such vast organizations as those of the oil trade, in the co-operation of Governments which are members of the League of Nations, and in the sense of an inclusive community which is the best feature of Communism and Fascism. This social sense is not what used to be called altruism. It is not devotion of one man to the service of others: it is action and thought in view of a social whole which is more than these others. Thus the modern mind envisages the group-life of any community or association

as a reality which cannot be understood in terms of a collection of separate units. The social services and preventive medicine are not benevolence for the poor, drawn from the surplus of the rich. They are co-operative action of a community for its own life, taken as one whole. Even the activities of industrial and commercial enterprises are often excused on the ground that they are public services, which points to a vague sense of the community penetrating the intelligence even of "practical" men. But the most striking instance of this modern sense of social co-operation in a real community is to be found in the devotion of members of groups which are thought to be revolutionary.

It is not implied that the modern sense of a community as a real whole is morally better or more progressive than feelings that are not modern.¹ Indeed, some of the groups created and maintained by the sense of community may be reactionary or mutually destructive; and it is as likely that war will come out of such a devotion to a group-life as that it will lead to peace. The force is real, nevertheless, whatever direction it may take; and this force arises out of modern circumstances, modern mechanisms, and modern uses of leisure, which have brought into play new social contacts and have disturbed the unconscious traditionalism of great numbers of quite ordinary folk. Not theories of nationalism, nor the intoxication of students who have discovered the real world of politics, but the motor-car, the cinema, and the radio have been the chief influences which formed the modern sense of community and are now the instruments of this modern force. In the experience of these new mechanisms one may, without too fantastic an imagination, suppose that the majority have found what they can understand of relativity

¹ It may be significant that a "sense of the community" is characteristic of primitive societies and their forms of art. Here, then, is perhaps another similarity between the modern and the primitive.

and the quantum theory, of musical atonality and expressionism in the plastic arts. All the elements of the modern world make up one whole; and the effect of this modern world upon some minds, especially among the youth, is to show how far their experience interpenetrates that of others.

This interpenetration, which has no doubt always occurred in social contacts, is now more clearly perceived; so that the behaviour-pattern of a group, in custom and attitude, sometimes shaping new rituals, is highly valued. And vitality is released by the sense of a community. Economists in the nineteenth century, moralizing outside their sphere of competence, used to express the doubt whether anyone would work for anything but private gain. This was a doubt inherited from the theological conception of individual salvation. Everyone was supposed to be engaged in saving his soul, for some generations before everyone was supposed to be absorbed in saving his money. But to the modern mind the devotion of men to a group-life more inclusive than egoism or altruism would imply, is so obvious as to be almost a danger. Men will even be cruel to other men and ruthless to themselves in the name of some fantastic devotion to a "movement" as ravenous as any Moloch. Civilization, therefore, is not now confronted by individualism but by that very sense of the community which seemed to an earlier age to be better. The modern sense of the community, however, can be civilized by sublimation—the modern method in education, by turning the force in a direction in which it promotes rather than destroys the lives of common folk. That is difficult. The very strength of the devotion to one community—one social group or one nation—may make it impossible to extend sympathy to members of other groups. But it is altogether impossible to destroy devotion and enthusiasm by derision or suppression. The only hope is in reconciling one devotion

with others ; and that requires, not rhetoric, but skill in social organization, knowledge of facts, and above all great subtlety in the contact between persons. By contrast with the isolation of the saint which was the ideal of earlier ages, the modern mind points towards a closer and more intimate contact between persons. We escape from the crowd, because the crowd-contacts are superficial ; but we escape into good company where the contacts are deeper, not into isolation.

The sense of other personalities upon whom one's acts impinge and from whom arise forces which one values highly, does not imply that the modern mind is virtuous or benevolent. That is not the point. The modern mind is more willing to kill the feeble-minded than was the mind of earlier ages. The point is that the terms in which experience is now rendered are social—or personal in the sense of that word, which implies that the interpenetration of personalities attracts our attention. For example, modern medicine cures the patient, not the disease. Even so lately as fifty years ago doctors would diagnose a disease and apply a cure for that disease: the modern physician treats a whole person—by psychological as well as physical methods. Similarly the modern teacher in “teaching John Latin”—thinks it most important to know “John.” The discovery of personality, therefore, may well be one of the most fruitful of all the discoveries of recent times.

As it was indicated, however, from time to time in the argument of this book, men meet other men at many different levels. The use of modern mechanisms has generally increased the number, but it has not always improved the quality of such contacts. In the case of communities at different stages of development, it is very difficult for their members to meet at any but low levels. How is an African, for example, to join in a conversation on relativity? How is he to share the appre-

ciation of a modern work of art? It is not impossible; and to say that it is difficult is not to imply any disdain of Africans. The point is that one cannot share the latest results of a tradition unless one has reached in one's own tradition a similar level. In the same way a young child cannot understand a modern drama. Africans are not children; but the mental age of their community may not be the same as that of ours. The same is true of certain communities in the European tradition. Some rich communities, possessing the latest mechanisms, are so childish in all that concerns the deeper experiences of life, that if we grant them the right to call themselves "modern," we may nevertheless be doubtful whether they have the right to suppose themselves to be civilized. Civilization is contact between men at a high level of experience. The modern mind values highly such a contact; and a community can hardly be called civilized whose morality is only a vague sentimentalism, whose science is only a trick for working an engine, whose art is only a comfort for business men. Within the area in which modern mechanisms are used, there are many communities not yet civilized. It is in the modern mind, however, "to kill lies without hurting men"; and the modernization of external conditions may be the least painful method of civilizing a barbarism which modernity certainly did not create.

Let the argument, then, stop here. Anyone who could follow it farther can carry it farther for himself—in good company.

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